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RENT-A-BANK: BANK PARTNERSHIPS AND
THE EVASION OF USURY LAWS
ADAM J. LEVITIN†
ABSTRACT
“Rent-a-bank” arrangements are the vehicle of choice for subprime
lenders seeking to avoid state consumer protection laws. In a rent-abank arrangement, a nonbank lender contracts with a bank to make
loans per its specifications and then buys the loans from the bank. The
nonbank lender then claims to shelter in the bank’s federal statutory
exemptions from state regulation. The validity of these arrangements is
the most bitterly contested legal question in consumer finance.
The rent-a-bank phenomenon is a function of a binary, entity-based
regulatory approach that treats banks differently than nonbanks and
that treats bank safety-and-soundness regulation as a substitute for
consumer protection laws. The entity-based regulatory system is based
on the dated assumption that transactions align with entities, such that
a single entity will perform an entire transaction. Consumer lending,
however, has become “disaggregated,” so the discrete parts of
lending—marketing, underwriting, funding, servicing, and holding of
risk—are frequently split up among multiple, unaffiliated entities.
The binary, entity-based regulatory system is a mismatch for
disaggregated transactions involving a mosaic of bank and nonbank
entities. The mismatch facilitates regulatory arbitrage of consumer
protection laws through rent-a-bank arrangements, as nonbanks claim
favorable regulatory treatment by virtue of the involvement of a bank
in parts of a transaction.
Courts’ attempts to address such arbitrages have resulted in an
unpredictable doctrinal muddle. This Article argues that the best
approach to disaggregated lending is a presumption that the privileges
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of a banking charter do not extend beyond banks, coupled with an antievasion principle that looks to substance over form and captures renta-bank transactions based on derivatives rather than outright sales of
loans. Such an approach would create greater certainty about the
legality of transactions, while effectuating both state consumer
protection laws and federal bank regulation policy.
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INTRODUCTION
How did a small business end up paying over 122 percent interest
on a loan? Homes by DeRamo, a small, family-owned, Sarasota,
Florida, construction business, needed cash in 2015 for operating
expenses.1 An outfit called World Business Lenders, LLC2 offered a
$400,000 loan, but it required the business’s owners, Vincent and Tracy
DeRamo, to personally guarantee the loan and pledge their home as
collateral.3 Florida’s usury law caps interest charges at an 18 percent
annual rate.4 So how was World Business Lenders able to charge over

1. Complaint ¶ 7, DeRamo v. World Bus. Lenders, LLC, No. 8:17-cv-01435 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
June 16, 2017) [hereinafter DeRamo Complaint].
2. For background on World Business Lenders, see Zeke Faux, Wall Street Finds New
Subprime With 125% Business Loans, BLOOMBERG (May 22, 2014, 12:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-22/wall-street-finds-new-subprime-with-125-businessloans [https://perma.cc/G2UQ-BTTJ].
3. DeRamo Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 8. The DeRamos took out an initial three-hundredday loan, see id. at 9, refinanced it with another three-hundred-day World Business Lenders loan
(paying a 15 percent prepayment penalty), see id. at 55, and then took out a supplementary loan
from World Business Lenders, id. ¶ 22.
4. FLA. STAT. § 687.02 (2021).
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122 percent annually?5 Because World Business Lenders had “rented”
a bank.
Banks are effectively exempt from state usury laws.6 Usury laws,
which prevent high-cost lending, still apply to nonbank entities like
World Business Lenders.7 High-cost nonbank lenders engage in a
range of transactional devices to evade state usury laws,8 but their
preferred mechanism is to partner with a bank in a “rent-a-bank”
arrangement.9 That is precisely what World Business Lenders did.

5. The loan documents, included as attachments to the complaint, all provide for a daily
interest rate of between 0.331513939726 percent and 0.335945205479 percent. DeRamo
Complaint, supra note 1, at 13, 55, 158. On an annualized simple interest basis with a 365-day
year, this is between 121 percent and 122.6 percent. The DeRamos’ loans were only for three
hundred days, however, so in their pleadings they annualized the ratio of finance charges to
principal, which resulted in rates between 72 percent and 74 percent interest. DeRamo Complaint,
supra note 1, ¶ 26.
6. Federal law does not exempt banks from state usury laws so much as provide a choice
of law rule that enables banks to “export” the usury cap from their home state to other states. See
12 U.S.C. §§ 85, 1463(g), 1831d. This means that a bank based in a state with no usury cap is not
subject to other states’ usury caps when it does business in those states. Florida law also
specifically exempts banks from its usury laws. FLA. STAT. § 687.12 (2021).
7. States often have different usury limits for certain types of state-licensed lenders.
Unlicensed lenders, however, like World Business Lenders, are subject to general usury laws.
8. Examples of other devices include high-cost lenders basing themselves offshore and
claiming that foreign usury limits apply, see, e.g., First Amended Complaint ¶ 7, Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bur. v. NDG Fin. Corp., No. 15-cv-5211, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177756 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2,
2016), or partnering with Native American tribes or tribal members and sheltering in tribal
immunity, see infra Part III.B; Complaint at 3–5, FTC v. AMG Servs., Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00536,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183159 (D. Nev. Dec. 28, 2012); First Amended Complaint ¶ 19, CFPB v.
CashCall, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-13167 (D. Mass. Mar. 21, 2014).
9. Financial services firms refer to these relationships solely as “bank partnership”
relationships. Critics use the term “rent-a-bank” to describe the relationship. Neither is a neutral
term. “Rent-a-bank” may seem inflammatory, but the anodyne “bank partnership” masks the
true nature of the relationship and effectively accedes to these arrangements’ legitimacy as a
policy matter. Moreover, the contractual documents for these relationships often explicitly
disclaim the existence of a partnership. See, e.g., Elevate Credit, Inc., Registration Statement
(Form S-1) Exhibit 99.1, § 18 (Nov. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Elevate Registration Statement] (“This
Agreement is not intended to constitute, and shall not be construed to establish, a partnership or
joint venture among any of the Parties.”); id. § 19(a) (“This Agreement will not create a joint
venture, partnership or other formal business relationship or entity of any kind, or an obligation
to form any such relationship or entity.”); Elevate Credit, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 791
(Feb. 2, 2019) [hereinafter Elevate 2019 Annual Report] (“Intent of the Parties . . . This
Agreement will not create a joint venture, partnership or other formal business relationship or
entity of any kind, or an obligation to form any such relationship or entity.”).
Recognizing the absence of neutral terminology, this Article uses both terms, but
generally uses “rent-a-bank” because it more accurately captures the true nature of the
relationship, in which the bank effectively rents out its special regulatory privileges to a nonbank.
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In a rent-a-bank arrangement, a nonbank contracts to buy loans
that a bank has made for it on spec.10 The nonbank then claims to
shelter in the bank’s exemption from state usury laws and other
consumer protection laws, as well as the benefit of the choice-of-law
provisions applicable to the bank.11 And because the loan is not directly
made by the nonbank, the nonbank claims that it is exempt from state
licensure requirements for nonbank lenders.12 In exchange for renting
out its regulatory privileges, the bank collects a fee.13
In the case of Homes by DeRamo, World Business Lenders
negotiated the loan terms,14 but Bank of Lake Mills,15 a tiny two-branch
community bank in Wisconsin with no Florida presence, formally made
the loan.16 Within weeks of making the loans to the DeRamos’
business, Bank of Lake Mills assigned the loans to World Business
Lenders.17 The assignment was signed on behalf of the bank by a Vice
President of World Business Lenders with a power of attorney for the
bank.18 The documentation of the DeRamos’ loan bears indicia that
World Business Lenders was the intended assignee from the get-go:
World Business Lenders’ address appears in numerous places in the
loan documentation,19 and the loan documentation even provides for
venue and enforcement in New York, where World Business Lenders
was located at the time.20
The DeRamo case follows a pattern of other transactions
undertaken by World Business Lenders with Bank of Lake Mills and a

10. Predatory Lender’s Rent-a-Bank Scheme: What Is It and What Can We Do To Stop It?
RESPONSIBLELENDING.ORG, https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/
research-publication/crl-rentabank-jan2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8BK-SW4E].
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. DeRamo Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 10, 18.
15. Id. ¶ 8.
16. Locations, BANK OF LAKE MILLS, https://www.bankoflakemills.com/about-us/
locations-hours [https://perma.cc/JCX2-3CDM].
17. DeRamo Complaint, supra note 1, at 152, 182. World Business Lenders, LLC
subsequently assigned the loans to a securitization vehicle called WBL SPE II, LLC, id. at 184,
187, a wholly owned subsidiary of World Business Lenders, LLC, that World Business Lenders
uses to obtain financing, Verified Petition ¶¶ 2, 6, World Bus. Lenders, LLC v. Arena Ltd. SPV,
LLC, No. 653229/2019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 31, 2019).
18. DeRamo Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 24.
19. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 10, 18.
20. Id. at 17.
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pair of other banks.21 In other words, Bank of Lake Mills was little
more than a front for World Business Lenders to evade state
regulation.
The DeRamos challenged the loans as usurious.22 Because of
Bank of Lake Mills’s involvement, World Business Lenders was able
to respond that the loans’ documentation provided that they would be
governed by Wisconsin law, which has no usury rate for business loans,
rather than Florida law.23 As the bank’s assignee, World Business
Lenders claimed it could shelter in the bank’s exemption from state
usury laws.24 What’s more, because the DeRamos had defaulted on the
loan, World Business Lenders sought to foreclose on their home in a
counterclaim.25

21. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Quantum-Mac Int’l, Inc. v. World Bus. Lenders, LLC,
No. 1:20-cv-02353 (N.D. Ga. June 2, 2020) (recognizing Axos Bank, former BOFI Federal Bank,
as rent-a-bank partner for World Business Lenders); Kaur v. World Bus. Lenders, LLC, 440 F.
Supp. 3d 111, 116 (D. Mass. 2020) (recognizing BOFI Federal Bank as World Business Lenders’
rent-a-bank partner); Verified Complaint, B&S Med. Supply, Inc., N.Y. v. World Bus. Lenders,
LLC, No. 17-cv-03234-RMB (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2017) (recognizing Liberty Bank, Utah, as rent-abank partner for World Business Lenders); Verified Complaint, World Bus. Lenders, LLC v.
Queens Med. Servs., P.C., No. 600802/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 5, 2016) (detailing a loan made by
Bank of Lake Mills on Mar. 10, 2015, and sold to World Business Lenders on March 16, 2015);
Verified Complaint, World Bus. Lenders, LLC v. Michael’s Landscaping Constr., LLC, No.
611675/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 26, 2016) (describing a loan made by Bank of Lake Mills on
December 9, 2015, and sold to World Business Lenders on December 14, 2015); Verified
Complaint, World Bus. Lenders, LLC v. PM Recycling LLC, No. 509595/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June
6, 2016) (loan made by Bank of Lake Mills on November 26, 2014, and sold to World Business
Lenders on December 2, 2014).
22. The DeRamos alleged that they were also told that their refinancing of the loan and a
subsequent additional loan would be at 15 percent. DeRamo Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 14, 22.
The only 15 percent figure in the loan documents is for the prepayment premium. Id. at 13. While
the interest rate was in fact disclosed in the DeRamos’ actual loan agreement, it was in the form
of a miniscule daily rate with twelve decimal places. Id. On the term sheet for the transaction,
entitled “Business Loan Summary,” no interest rate was quoted, only a total dollar figure for the
interest charges. Id. at 9. The only number given as a percentage on the term sheet was the
prepayment penalty—15 percent. Id. No annual percentage rate was ever given because as a
business loan, the Truth in Lending Act’s requirement of disclosure of the annual percentage rate,
15 U.S.C. § 1632, did not apply.
23. Defendants, World Business Lenders, LLC’s and WBL SPE II, LLC’s Answer, Defenses
and Counterclaims at 6–7, DeRamo v. World Bus. Lenders, LLC, No. 8:17-cv-01435 (M.D. Fla.
June 23, 2017).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 9–14.
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The DeRamos’ case ultimately settled privately,26 but it is
illustrative of a larger phenomenon in subprime lending. Rent-a-bank
arrangements are common in online payday lending, consumer
installment lending, “marketplace lending,” and subprime small
business lending.27 Moreover, rent-a-bank lending appears likely to
expand in response to the tightening of state usury laws,28 new federal
regulations,29 and signals that federal banking regulators will tolerate
rent-a-bank relationships.30

26. Mediator’s Report, DeRamo v. World Bus. Lenders, LLC, 2017-CA-2438-NC (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Dec. 26, 2017).
27. See High-Cost Rent-a-Bank Loan Watch List, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR.,
https://www.nclc.org/issues/high-cost-small-loans/rent-a-bank-loan-watch-list.html?print=pdf
[https://perma.cc/VU2V-CWBM].
28. On October 10, 2019, California enacted the Fair Access to Credit Act (A.B. 539), which
created a rate cap of 36 percent on loans between $2,500 and $10,000. See Bill Information for
A.B.
539,
CAL.
LEGIS.
INFO.,
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/
billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB539 [https://perma.cc/5JYL-Z43U]. Previously
no rate cap had applied. In response, three nonbank fintech lenders, CURO, Elevate, and
ENOVA, each indicated in an investor call that it was considering moving to the bank partnership
model to avoid the usury cap:
California passed a law that caps interest rates on personal loans between $2,500 and
$10,000 . . . . As a result, we will stop originating loans through a direct lending channel
in California once the law goes into effect. However, we do not believe that it’ll have a
material impact on our business due to our diversified operating model and additional
opportunities. One of those opportunities is to expand our underwriting and
technology licensing to our three existing FDIC regulated bank partners in new
geographies. In addition, we are continuously looking for additional banks that share
our commitment to providing innovative consumer-focused products.
Elevate Credit’s (ELVT) Management on Q3 2019 Results - Earnings Call Transcript, SEEKING
ALPHA (Nov. 4, 2019, 4:06 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4302399-elevate-credits-elvtmanagement-on-q3-2019-results-earnings-call-transcript?part=single [https://perma.cc/RY3KWR6F]; Enova International (ENVA), Q3 2019 Earnings Call Transcript, THE MOTLEY FOOL
(Oct. 26, 2019, 12:23 AM), https://bit.ly/3rSLg8l [https://perma.cc/GCB3-3H6X] (“And instead of
originating near-prime loans, we plan to market and provide underwriting services for national
banks originating in California.”); CURO Group Holdings Corp. (CURO) Q3 2019 Earnings Call
Transcript, MOTLEY FOOL (Oct. 25, 2019, 4:23 PM), https://bit.ly/3pSHlXn [https://perma.cc/
PK3J-HR6U] (“[Analyst]: . . . [A]ssuming that you are successful at some point in potentially
creating a substitute product with the bank in California, . . . how [should] we . . . think about the
start-up process for that type of initiative? . . . [President & Chief Executive Officer]: . . . [W]e do
have a signed agreement . . . .”).
29. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.1031, 7.4001, 160.110, 331.4(e) (2020).
30. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency filed an amicus brief defending a rent-a-bank relationship. See Amicus Brief of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in
Support of Affirmance and Appellee, Rent-Rite Super Kegs W. Ltd. v. World Bus. Lenders, LLC
(In re Rent-Rite Super Kegs W. Ltd.), No. 1:19-cv-01552-REB, 2019 WL 4569774 (D. Colo. Sept.
10, 2019).
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The potential expansion of rent-a-bank lending threatens to gut
state consumer protection laws, such that one consumer group has
called it “the biggest threat in decades to states’ historic power to
prevent predatory lending.”31 Yet rent-a-bank lending stands on an
uncertain and contested legal foundation. A critical legal question
remains unresolved: Can a nonbank that acquires a loan from a bank
shelter in the bank’s exemption from state regulation? While this
question applies first and foremost to usury laws, it also applies to other
state laws regulating the substantive terms of loans and requiring
nonbank lenders to be licensed and subject to state supervision.
When a nonbank makes a loan itself, it is subject to state
regulations. But what if the nonbank instead acquires an otherwise
identical loan from a bank? Is the bank’s exemption from state
regulations entity-based and personal to a bank? Or is the exemption
asset-based, such that it travels with the loan?
Courts have split on the issue, which has arisen primarily in the
context of usury laws. Some have followed the “valid-when-made” rule
that holds that the nonbank can shelter in the bank’s usury law
exemption if the bank was itself the original lender.32 Others follow the
“Madden rule,” from the Second Circuit’s 2015 decision in Madden v.

31. NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., TESTIMONY OF LAUREN SAUNDERS NATIONAL
CONSUMER LAW CENTER ON BEHALF OF ITS LOW INCOME CLIENTS BEFORE THE HOUSE
FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEE ON RENT-A-BANK SCHEMES AND NEW DEBT TRAPS:
ASSESSING EFFORTS TO EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS AND INTEREST RATE CAPS 2
(2020), https://bit.ly/2JJcDAx [https://perma.cc/A7DA5LZT].
32. See, e.g., Hudson v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. IP 01-1336-C H/S, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11226, at *9 (S.D. Ind. May 30, 2002); Olvera v. Blitt & Gaines, PC, 431 F.3d 285, 288 (7th
Cir. 2005); Phipps v. FDIC, 417 F.3d 1006, 1013 (8th Cir. 2005); Krispin v. May Dep’t Stores Co.,
218 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2000); Munoz v. Pipestone Fin., LLC, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1079 (D.
Minn. 2007); Sawyer v. Bill Me Later, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1364 (D. Utah 2014); Rent-Rite
Superkegs W., Ltd. v. World Bus. Lenders, LLC (In re Rent-Rite Superkegs W., Ltd.), 603 B.R.
41, 60 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019), rev’d in part sub nom. Rent-Rite Super Kegs W. Ltd. v. World Bus.
Lenders, LLC (In re Rent-Rite Super Kegs W. Ltd.), No. 1:19-cv-01552-REB, 2019 WL 4569774
(D. Colo. Sept. 10, 2019); Robinson v. Nat’l Collegiate Student Loan Tr. 2006-2, No. 20-cv-10203ADB, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68342, at *12–13 (D. Mass. Apr. 7, 2021); Sims v. Opportunity Fin.,
LLC, No. 20-cv-04730-PJH, 2021 WL 1391565, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2021) (finding that
because a bank was the lender of record, the loan was not subject to usury law). None of the cases
prior to Rent-Rite actually invoked the valid-when-made rule. While some of these cases were
addressing the question of complete preemption in the context of removal from state court, others
were addressing substantive preemption in a merits context, but there is no indication that the
analysis would be materially different. For an exhaustive doctrinal treatment of history of the
valid-when-made rule, see the companion piece to this Article, Adam J. Levitin, The Spurious
Pedigree of the “Valid-When-Made” Doctrine, 71 DUKE L.J. ONLINE (forthcoming 2022).
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Midland Funding, LLC.33 The Madden rule holds that the exemption
is strictly limited to banks and not transferrable to nonbanks.34 Yet
others apply the “true lender” doctrine, which looks to whether the
bank or the nonbank was the real party in interest in the transaction.35
Adding to the doctrinal confusion, two federal banking regulators
have issued nonidentical rules that aim to codify valid-when-made.36
33. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015).
34. See id. at 253.
35. See, e.g., Rent-Rite SuperKegs W. Ltd. v. World Bus. Lenders, LLC (In re Rent-Rite
SuperKegs W. Ltd.), 623 B.R. 335, 342 (D. Colo. 2020) (remanding for true lender determination);
Dep’t of Ins. & Fin. Servs. v. Comdata Network, Inc., No. 17-003313, 2019 WL 3857904, at *10
(Mich. Dep’t of Ins. & Fin. Servs. Aug. 7, 2019) (finding that the nonbank was the true issuer of
a credit card program so the bank exception to state licensing requirements did not apply), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Comdata Network, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Ins. & Fin. Servs., No. 19747-AV (30th Jud’l Cir. Mich. May 19, 2020); Fulford v. Marlette Funding, LLC, No. 2017-CV30376, 2019 WL 4451038, at *5 (D. Colo. June 5, 2019); Meade v. Avant of Colo., LLC, 307 F.
Supp. 3d 1134, 1150–52 (D. Colo. 2018); CFPB v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV-15-7522-JFW, 2016 WL
4820635, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016) (applying the totality of the circumstances test to
determine whether CashCall or Western Sky was the true lender); CashCall, Inc. v. Md. Comm’r
of Fin. Regul., 139 A.3d 990, 1005 (Md. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that a party that was the de facto
lender was a “credit services” business subject to Maryland usury law); Eul v. Transworld Sys.,
No. 15 C 7755, 2017 WL 1178537, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2017); Commonwealth v. Think Fin.,
Inc., No. 14-cv-7139, 2016 WL 183289, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2016); Cmty. State Bank v. Knox,
523 Fed. App’x 925, 930 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding that state-law usury claims were not completely
preempted by the FDIA merely because a state-chartered bank was the named lender); Ubaldi
v. SLM Corp., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1201 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (noting that, “where a plaintiff has
alleged that a national bank is the lender in name only, courts have generally looked to the real
nature of the loan to determine whether a non-bank entity is the de facto lender”); CashCall, Inc.
v. Morrisey, No. 12-1274, 2014 WL 2404300, at *1, *7 (W. Va. May 30, 2014); West Virginia v.
CashCall, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 781, 783 (S.D.W. Va. 2009); Discover Bank v. Vaden, 489 F.3d
594, 601, 603 n.9, 607 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that the FDIA would apply only if the bank were the
“real party of interest”), rev’d on other grounds, 556 U.S. 49 (2009); Spitzer v. Cnty. Bank of
Rehoboth Beach, 846 N.Y.S.2d 436, 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); BankWest, Inc. v. Baker, 411 F.3d
1289, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005) (upholding Georgia statute deeming a purported agent of a bank to
be the de facto lender if it has the predominant economic interest), reh’g granted, opinion vacated,
433 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc), opinion vacated due to mootness, 446 F.3d 1358 (11th
Cir. 2006); Easter v. Am. W. Fin., 381 F.3d 948, 957–59 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying true lender
doctrine under Washington state law); Krispin v. May Dep’t Stores, 218 F.3d 919, 959 (8th Cir.
2000) (explaining that the close relationship between a bank and department store made the bank
the real party in interest); Glaire v. La Lanne-Paris Health Spa, Inc., 528 P.2d 357, 363 (Cal. 1974);
Daniel v. First Nat’l Bank of Birmingham, 227 F.2d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 1955), reh’g denied with
opinion, 228 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1956); see also FDIC v. Lattimore Land Corp., 656 F.2d 139, 148
n.15 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that there was no allegation that the assignee was the true lender and
suggesting that analysis would be different if there were such an allegation).
36. Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85
Fed. Reg. 33,530 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 & 160) (codifying OCC validwhen-made rule); Federal Interest Rate Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,146 (July 22, 2020) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 331) (codifying FDIC valid-when-made rule). The finalized rules were
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Further complicating the debate is that the doctrines affecting rent-abank relationships affect other transactions in which banks sell loans
to nonbanks, particularly bank sales of defaulted loans to debt buyers
and securitization.
This Article shows how the rent-a-bank issue is a function of two
features of the design of the financial regulatory system: the entitybased nature of the system, which has left it vulnerable to regulatory
arbitrage; and the absence of a general usury law for banks, which has
made regulatory arbitrage inviting.
Key parts of the financial regulatory system are entity-based. The
entity-based system is binary: either an entity is a bank and subject to
the pervasive oversight of bank regulation, or it is not. Such a binary
system makes sense when the regulated economic activity corresponds
neatly to entity type, but that is frequently no longer the case in
consumer lending.
Lending involves several discrete activities: designing a credit
product; marketing it and prospecting for borrowers; underwriting
borrowers; funding the loan; servicing the loan; and holding the credit
risk and interest rate risk. Historically, these activities were all
aggregated in the same institution, typically a bank, that would design,
market, underwrite, fund, service, and hold a loan until maturity. The
bank would not only be the “nexus of contracts” for producing loans,37

promptly challenged by a number of state attorneys general as failing to comply with the
Administrative Procedure Act and, in the case of the OCC, with the procedural requirements of
the National Bank Act. Complaint at 1–4, Becerra v. Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, No.
20-cv-5200 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2020); Complaint at 4–6, Becerra v. FDIC, No. 20-cv-5860 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 20, 2020). These challenges remain pending as of the date of this Article and are beyond
the scope of this Article. The Office of Comptroller of the Currency also issued a rule that would
overrule true lender doctrine by deeming a bank to be the lender for the purpose of usury laws
for any loans it initially makes or funds. National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as
Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg. 68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (the “OCC True
Lender Rule”). The OCC True Lender Rule was overturned by a joint resolution of Congress
under the Congressional Review Act. S.J. Res. 15, Pub. L. No. 117-24, 135 Stat. 296 (2021).
37. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976) (detailing the theory of
the firm as a “nexus of a set of contracting relationships”); see also William W. Bratton, Jr., The
“Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 415 (1989)
(defining the “nexus of contracts” approach as indicating that “the firm is a legal fiction that serves
as a nexus for a set of contracting relations among individual factors of production”); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1426 (1989)
(describing the nexus of contracts theory as “a shorthand for the complex arrangements of many
sorts that those who associate voluntarily in the corporation will work out among themselves”).
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but all factors of production would be internal to the bank, rather than
outsourced. The complete lending cycle existed in the bank.38
Over the past few decades, however, a new phenomenon has
emerged in consumer lending: the different components of the lending
cycle are split up and performed by multiple institutions, rather than
by a single “lender.”39 In this system, banks often play only a supporting
role. While a bank might provide the initial funding for a loan, the
underwriting, the servicing, and the holding of risk might all be
performed by other entities, or the bank might perform some of these
functions not as a principal in its own capacity, but as the agent for
another party.
Sometimes, this disaggregation reflects the outcome of a make-orbuy decision for banks. The efficiency of outsourced production may
exceed the efficiency of in-house production, such that vertical
integration of production may not be optimal for a firm.40 It may be
cheaper, for example, for a bank to pay for a third party to provide a
service than for the bank to produce the service itself. For example, it
may make economic sense for a bank to hire a third party to market its
loans.
Yet disaggregation may not merely reflect a bank outsourcing
factors of production and thus acting as a buyer of externally produced
factors of production. Instead, when lending is disaggregated, it may
reflect a nonbank outsourcing factors of production and buying them

38. The bank might farm out some functions to affiliated entities, but they were all within
the same firm. See Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 262 N.W.2d 358, 359–60
(Minn. 1977) (describing the role played by a bank affiliate in soliciting applications for credit
card lending).
39. “Disaggregation” of the lending function is a different phenomenon than the muchnoted “disintermediation.” Disintermediation refers to the shift from relying on banks to
intermediate between sources of capital and borrowers to other funding channels, such as
securitization and money market mutual funds. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow
Banking, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619, 626–27 (2012) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Regulating
Shadow Banking]; Zachary J. Gubler, Regulating in the Shadows: Systemic Moral Hazard and the
Problem of the Twenty-First Century Bank Run, 63 ALA. L. REV. 221, 271 (2012); Steven L.
Schwarcz, Securitization, Structured Finance, and Covered Bonds, 39 J. CORP. L. 129, 131–32
(2013). Whereas disintermediation refers to the funding channel for lending, disaggregation refers
to a division of the components in the lending cycle. These components include the source of
funding, but also marketing, underwriting, and servicing.
40. The classic explorations of make-versus-buy are R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386 (1937), and Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production:
Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. ASS’N PAPERS & PROC. 112 (1971).
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from the bank, such that the bank is acting as a seller of regulatory
privileges to the nonbank.
Either way, the upshot of the disaggregation of lending is that
lending transactions often involve a mosaic of firms, some bank and
some nonbank. The regulatory system, however, persists in a binary
approach to regulation that enables transactions to claim bank
treatment even when a bank is only minimally involved in a
transaction. The entity-based regulatory system is thus vulnerable to
regulatory arbitrages like rent-a-bank because the same type of
transactions can be performed through a range of entities and entity
combinations.
The rent-a-bank arbitrage is particularly appealing to subprime
lenders because federal law effectively exempts banks from state usury
laws without imposing an equivalent federal law. Federal law provides
that banks are subject only to the usury law of their home state, no
matter where they operate.41 Because banks have substantial ability to
choose their home state, by picking a favorable home state that allows
bank loans to be at the contractually agreed upon rate (like Delaware,42
Nevada,43 South Dakota,44 or Utah45), a bank can functionally be
exempt from usury laws, no matter where it operates. Federal law lacks
a generally applicable usury limitation,46 and the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau is expressly forbidden from promulgating a federal
usury regulation.47
The rationale behind the special treatment for banks is that they
should not be saddled with the burden of complying with inconsistent
state usury laws because they are already subject to a strict, bankspecific regulatory regime focused on ensuring banks’ safety and
soundness. A key feature of bank regulation is regulators’ exercise of
soft power through supervisory pressure. Regulators can use informal
41. Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 301 (1978); 12 U.S.C.
§§ 85, 1463(g)(1), 1831d.
42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 943, 953, 963, 965, 973 (2021).
43. NEV. REV. STAT. § 99.050 (2020).
44. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-3-1.1 (2021).
45. UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-1-1 (LexisNexis 2021).
46. The Military Lending Act caps the interest rate on certain loans made to military
members and their dependents. See 10 U.S.C. § 987(b) (mandating a 36 percent military APR
limit). Additionally, there is a usury cap for federal credit unions. 12 U.S.C. § 1757(5)(A)(vi)
(mandating a 15 percent usury cap for federal credit unions, temporarily increasable by
regulation).
47. 12 U.S.C. § 5517(o).
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moral suasion through the oversight process to ensure that banks will
not make excessively risky loans48 and can, if needed, back up such
suasion with cease and desist orders for unsafe banking practices.49
Riskier loans generally have high interest rates to compensate for the
risk.50 Thus, by preventing banks from making risky (and therefore
high-cost) loans, the bank regulatory system is assumed to compensate
or substitute for usury laws.51
The problem with this assumption is that even if borrower default
rates are high, they can be offset by recoveries from high interest rates,
such that a diversified portfolio of high-risk and high-rate loans can be
profitable and therefore actually enhance bank safety and soundness.
Thus, banking regulators are unlikely to use their soft supervisory
power to stop high-cost lending solely on the basis of the loans’ price.
Diversification, however, mitigates the risk on high-cost loans to the
bank, but not to individual borrowers. By definition, a set of consumers
will default and the losses from those defaults will be offset by the
higher charges paid by other borrowers, meaning that both groups of
borrowers suffer: one from the consequences of default, the other from
higher borrowing costs. Consumer protection is actually in tension with
safety and soundness because limiting high-cost lending can limit bank
profitability.
This Article relates to two separate areas of the financial
regulation literature. First is the literature about the regulation of
“shadow banks”—nonbank entities that perform the same functions as
banks, but outside the bank regulatory regime.52 As bank-type
48. This supervisory guidance is not legally binding, but it functions as law in that banks will
almost always follow the guidance lest they antagonize their regulator. See Guidance, Supervisory
Expectations, and the Rule of Law: How Do the Banking Agencies Regulate and Supervise
Institutions?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urb. Affs., 116th Cong. 44
(2019) [hereinafter Tahyar Testimony] (written testimony of Margaret E. Tahyar).
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)–(c).
50. See, e.g., Wendy Edelberg, Risk-Based Pricing of Interest Rates for Consumer Loans, 53
J. MONETARY ECON. 2283, 2284–85 (2006).
51. See, e.g., National Banks and Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg.
44,223, 44,227 (July 22, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7) (listing a range of other federal
regulations unrelated to the cost of a loan as allaying concerns about predatory lending).
52. See generally, e.g., MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL
REGULATION (Univ. of Chicago Press 2016) [hereinafter RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM]
(describing “the structure of monetary institutions” and arguing that the “existing monetary
framework is outdated and defective”); David Min, Housing Finance Reform and the Shadow
Money Supply, 43 IOWA J. CORP. L. 899 (2018) (providing an overview of the historical importance
of housing finance liabilities for the U.S. money supply and reviewing the housing reform debate
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activities expand outside of the confines of the bank-based regulatory
system, the result has been unregulated financial markets that
reproduce the very risks that bank regulation meant to shield against.
The shadow banking literature, which emerged after the 2008 financial
crisis, has focused on wholesale markets such as money market mutual
funds, repurchase agreements (repos), credit derivatives, and
securitization and is primarily concerned with the systemic risks
shadow banking poses to the overall financial system.53
This Article extends the shadow banking literature into the retail
markets of consumer finance. In retail markets the risk posed by
shadow banking is primarily not to systemic stability, but to consumer
protection laws through abuse of federal preemption of state law. In
consumer finance, however, shadow banking operates with a twist.
on safe assets and money supply); Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow Banking, 103
VA. L. REV. 411 (2017) (examining the effect of information-related incentives on banking and
securities regulation and arguing that information gaps are sources of systemic risk in shadow
banking); Iris H-Y Chiu, Transcending Regulatory Fragmentation and the Construction of an
Economy-Society Discourse: Implications for Regulatory Policy Derived from a Functional
Approach to Understanding Shadow Banking, 42 IOWA J. CORP. L. 327 (2016) (discussing the
limitations and optimal use of a functional approach to shadow banking); Anna Gelpern & Erik
F. Gerding, Inside Safe Assets, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 363 (2016) (providing an overview of safe
assets and highlighting market instability deriving from the legal fiction of “risk-free” contracts);
Adam J. Levitin, Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 357 (2016) (reviewing
government interventions facilitating various shadow banking products and arguing for the
withdrawal of government support and subsidization of the shadow banking system); David Min,
Understanding the Failures of Market Discipline, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1421 (2015) (arguing that
market discipline should be most effective in the shadow banking sector, while outlining the times
in which market discipline has failed); Chrystin Ondersma, Shadow Banking and Financial
Distress: The Treatment of “Money-Claims” in Bankruptcy, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 79 (arguing
that current bankruptcy rules increase the unique risks associated with money claims in the shadowbanking sector and that rules should be adjusted to give money claimants more options for prompt
payment); Jonathan Macey, It’s All Shadow Banking, Actually, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 593 (2012)
(arguing that shadow banking is functionally the same as traditional banking and that regulation should
address excessive risk-taking in both traditional and shadow banking); Morgan Ricks, Money and
(Shadow) Banking: A Thought Experiment, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 731 (2012) (arguing that by
viewing shadow banking as a monetary phenomenon, one can raise questions about why other
monetary systems have state regulation while this one does not); Stephen L. Schwarcz, Regulating
Shadow Banking, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619 (2012) (exploring how to regulate shadow
banking to minimize systemic risk and maximize economic efficiency through correcting four
types of market failures: information failure, rationality failure, principal–agent failure, and
incentive failure); Erik F. Gerding, The Shadow Banking System and Its Legal Origins (Aug. 23,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1990816 [https://perma.cc/ZK5CCXWV] (providing an overview of shadow banking and the effect of regulatory arbitrage).
53. See, e.g., RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM, supra note 52 passim; Gelpern & Gerding,
supra note 52, at 409 (“The [shadow banking] paradigm entrenches discontinuity between
markets, actors, and transactions on opposite sides of the [regulatory] perimeter.”).
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Instead of nonbanks avoiding federal banking regulation while
performing bank functions, in consumer finance, nonbanks also
pretend to be banks to evade state regulation.54
The other related literature is about the problems that have arisen
from federal preemption of state consumer financial protection laws,
particularly state usury laws, without the substitution of equivalent
federal protections.55 Most of the preemption literature predates the
54. Other methods of achieving similar ends are obtaining an industrial loan company
charter or the new “fintech” charter offered by the Office of Comptroller of the Currency. These
methods both bring with them federal safety and soundness regulation, either by virtue of FDIC
insurance for industrial loan companies or OCC chartering.
55. See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Exorcising McCulloch: The Conflict-Ridden History
of American Banking Nationalism and Dodd-Frank Preemption, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1235, 1277–
87, 1298–99 (2013) (arguing that the OCC’s preemption policy, which overrides bank-specific
state statutes yet preserves state common law rules that affect banking policies, creates
disharmony and allows the banks to self-regulate in areas where state law is preempted); Carliss
N. Chatman, HOLA Preemption and the Original Intent of Congress: Are Federal Thrifts
Necessary To Stabilize the Housing Market?, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 565 (2013) (arguing
that the federal Homeowner Loan Act’s preemption of state banking regulations not only
worsened the 2008 market collapse, but also continue to negatively interfere with states’ rights
and homeowner “access to justice”); Raymond Natter & Katie Wechsler, Dodd-Frank Act and
National Bank Preemption: Much Ado About Nothing, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 301 (2012)
(contending that the Dodd-Frank Act’s impact on preemption of state law is immaterial); Adam
J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 143
(2009) [hereinafter Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation] (arguing that because the majority of consumer
debt is in the hands of secondary-market entities which are not protected by federal preemption,
states are able to regulate federally chartered banks indirectly); Christopher L. Peterson, Usury
Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing
Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110 (2008) (analyzing state usury laws and arguing that the
methodology states use to calculate price caps is so varied that it makes compliance with both
federal and state law difficult); Howell E. Jackson & Stacy A. Anderson, Can States Tax National
Banks To Educate Consumers About Predatory Lending Practices?, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
831 (2007) (noting that the preempted ability of states to directly regulate residents’ financial
activities has led to novel legislative proposals, including taxing certain problematic consumer
loans to fund state financial literacy programs); Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and
Predatory Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2005) (analyzing
the current state of predatory lending law and arguing progressive state solutions to the problem
are being preempted by deregulatory federal law passed in the name of national uniformity);
Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect
on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518 (2004) (arguing that expansion of the
exportation doctrine—which allows a depository institution chartered in one state to charge
interest rates permitted under the law of that state to borrowers in other states, including states
under whose law those rates are not permitted—has undermined state consumer protection laws);
Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1
(2002) (arguing that federal legislation is necessary to prevent “rent-a-bank” schemes in which
predatory lenders partner with national banks to use preemption to evade state-mandated
interest limitations); Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial
Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About
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2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
which substantially transformed legal standards for preemption,56 but
a sizeable literature has since specifically focused on the Madden case.57
the Role of Usury Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589 (2000) (explaining that federal law
enables national banks to evade state usury laws by allowing them to export the regulations of
their home state nationwide as a form of federal preemption).
56. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 1045, 124 Stat. 1376, 2014–15 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b).
57. See Christopher K. Odinet, Predatory Fintech and the Politics of Banking, 106 IOWA L.
REV. 1739, 1793 (2021) (noting how the Madden decision triggered regulatory interventions);
Christopher K. Odinet, Securitizing Digital Debts, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 477, 532–34 (2020)
(questioning the historicity of the doctrine and the “vital importance” of valid-when-made for
fintech companies); Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social Provision, 71 STAN. L. REV.
1093, 1113–17 (2019) (taking a neutral position on the historicity of the valid-when-made doctrine
while noting the detrimental effects it can have on low-income consumer loan customers); Jayne
Munger, Note, Crossing State Lines: The Trojan Horse Invasion of Rent-a-Bank and Rent-a-Tribe
Schemes in Modern Usury Law, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 468, 488–89 (2019) (disagreeing with the
application of the valid-when-made doctrine in Madden); Christopher Baiamonte, Note, Stopping
Third-Party Debt Buyers From Using National Bank Act Preemption To Dodge State Usury Laws,
69 SYRACUSE L. REV. 127, 150 (2019) (questioning the relevance of valid-when-made because of
transactional dissimilarities and the Erie doctrine disavowing general federal common law); John
Hannon, Note, The True Lender Doctrine: Function Over Form as a Reasonable Constraint on the
Exportation of Interest Rates, 67 DUKE L.J. 1261, 1266–71 (2018) (agreeing with the historicity of
valid-when-made); Lenore Palladino, Small Business Fintech Lending: The Need for
Comprehensive Regulation, 24 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 77, 97 n.127 (2018) (agreeing, in a
footnote, with the historicity of the valid-when-made doctrine); Piotr Danisewicz & Ilaf Elard,
The Real Effects of Financial Technology: Marketplace Lending and Personal Bankruptcy passim
(July 5, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3208908 [https://perma.cc/
JY2E-X2SA] (providing an empirical study on the impact of the Madden decision credit
availability and bankruptcy filings); Daniel Kaplan, Note, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786
F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015): The Second Circuit Threatens To Disrupt Capital Markets, 8 NEB. L. REV.
BULL. 1, 3 (2017) (agreeing with the historicity of valid-when-made); Colleen Honigsberg, Robert
J. Jackson, Jr. & Richard Squire, How Does Legal Enforceability Affect Consumer Lending?
Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 60 J.L. & ECON. 673, 691–709 (2017) (reporting results of
an empirical study on the impact of the Madden decision on the discount of notes and on credit
availability); Brian Knight, Federalism and Federalization on the Fintech Frontier, 20 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 129, 145 (2017) (agreeing with the historicity of the valid-when-made doctrine,
describing it as “one of ‘two cardinal rules in the doctrine of usury’” (quoting Nichols v. Fearson,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 103, 109 (1833))); Charles M. Horn & Melissa R.H. Hall, The Curious Case of
Madden v. Midland Funding and the Survival of the Valid-When-Made Doctrine, 21 N.C.
BANKING INST. 1, 26 (2017) (accepting of the historicity of valid-when-made, describing it as “a
valid and dependable legal principle for loan origination, sales, and securitization markets”);
Angel Rzeslawski, Note, The National Bank Act and the Demise of State Consumer Laws, 68
HASTINGS L.J. 1421, 1437 (2017) (accepting the valid-when-made doctrine, but noting that other
circuits follow the Second Circuit’s lead); Andrew Silvia, Note, Madden v. Midland Funding LLC:
Uprooting the National Bank Act’s Power of Preemption, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 653, 660 (2017)
(agreeing with, and extolling, the historicity of valid-when-made as a cardinal rule of usury law);
Zachary Adams Mason, Note, Online Loans Across State Lines: Protecting Peer-to-Peer Lending
Through the Exportation Doctrine, 105 GEO. L.J. 217, 240 (2016) (agreeing with the historicity of
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This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I reviews the status of
banks and nonbanks under state usury laws. It shows how banks have
been effectively exempted from state usury laws, whereas nonbanks
remain subject to them. It also shows how consumer lending has
become disaggregated over the past several decades with different
components of a single lending transaction being handled by different
institutions. In disaggregated lending, nonbanks often work in tandem
with banks, but the regulatory system is still based on the binary divide
between banks and nonbanks.
Part II turns to the phenomenon of rent-a-banks. It explains how
rent-a-banks work and how they differ from mere outsourcing of
production by banks. This part also reviews the evolution of rent-abank arrangements and the incomplete nature of past regulatory
efforts to address the issue.
Part III presents a case study of the state-of-the-art rent-a-bank
arrangements used by Elevate Credit, Inc., a subprime fintech lender.
This section is the first detailed profile of a fintech lender in the
scholarly literature.58 The case study underscores the replication of the
valid-when-made); Michael Marvin, Note, Interest Exportation and Preemption: Madden’s Impact
on National Banks, the Secondary Credit Market and P2P Lending, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1807,
1832–35 (2016) (claiming that Madden ignores Supreme Court precedent on valid-when-made);
Kevin Petrasic, Helen Lee & Katherine Lamberth, Solicitor General in Madden Supports, But
Fails To Ensure, the Application of Federal Preemption Doctrine to the Secondary Loan Market
and Fate of “Valid-When-Made” Principle, 29 J. TAX’N & REGUL. FIN. INST. 42, 44 (2016)
(agreeing with the historicity of valid-when-made, describing it as “well-established”); Kirby M.
Smith, Comment, Banking on Preemption: Allowing National Bank Act Preemption for ThirdParty Sales, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1631, 1670 (2016) (accepting valid-when-made as a historical
doctrine, but stating that context makes older cases merely persuasive, not binding).
58. A small literature has emerged about fintech in the consumer finance space, but it does
not include a detailed examination of the contractual structure of any fintech lending operation.
See generally Matthew Adam Bruckner, Preventing Predation and Encouraging Innovation in
Fintech Lending, 72 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 370 (2019) (providing background information
on fintech lending, but focusing on how state and federal regulators can reduce the potentially
discriminatory consequences of fintech lending); Matthew Adam Bruckner, The Promise and
Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of Big Data, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 37 (2018); Matthew A.
Bruckner, Regulating Fintech Lending, 37 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 1 (2018)
(explaining fintech lending and cautioning against the restriction of innovation by fintech
regulators); Christopher K. Odinet, Consumer Bitcredit and Fintech Lending, 69 ALA. L. REV.
781 (2018) (exploring the operations and offerings of fintech lenders from a market perspective,
and offering commensurate regulatory recommendations); Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation
More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA L. Rev. 232 (2018); Robert P. Bartlett, Adair
Morse, Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, Consumer-Lending Discrimination in the Fintech Era
(NBER, Working Paper No. 25943, 2019), http://www.nber.org/papers/w25943 [https://perma.cc/
68S8-KSR6] (finding that algorithmic consumer lending reduces, but does not eliminate,
discriminatory consumer loan pricing); Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L.
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firm via contract in rent-a-bank schemes, the high level of transactional
sophistication used for little purpose other than evasion of usury laws,
and the ability of nonpublic firms to entirely mask the existence of a
rent-a-bank arrangement simply by using derivative contracts rather
than outright loan sales.
The remainder of this Article turns to the hotly contested
doctrinal status of rent-a-bank transactions. Part IV lays the ground by
reviewing the Madden litigation where the issue came to a head. It
presents the valid-when-made doctrine, the Madden rule, and true
lender doctrine as three different approaches to the question taken by
courts and regulatory agencies. The doctrinal confusion in this area
reflects courts’ difficulty in reconciling an institution-based regulatory
system with the reality that lending transactions are often
disaggregated with a range of institutions handling different
transactional components.
Part V turns to a normative consideration of the policy trade-offs
among the doctrinal approaches. This Article argues that the best
approach, as a matter of consumer protection policy and bank
regulatory policy, is the institutional identity presumption of the
Madden rule, buttressed by the anti-evasion principle evinced by the
true lender doctrine. The Madden rule prevents a regulatory vacuum
and has substantial administrability and certainty benefits, while the
anti-evasion principle protects against sophisticated transactional
attempts to evade the Madden rule through derivative transactions
such as those illustrated by the Elevate Credit case study. In order to
effectuate application of the anti-evasion principle, banks seeking to
enforce loans in court should be required to disclose any transfer of an
economic interest in such loans to nonbanks.

REV. 1023 (2017) (discussing the effect of algorithmic decision-making on discriminatory
outcomes); Frank Pasquale, Democratizing Higher Education: Defending and Extending Income
Based Repayment Programs, 28 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1 (2015) (arguing for lower interest
rates and more generous debt forgiveness in the reauthorization of the Higher Education Act).
A contemporary article by Christopher K. Odinet, Predatory Fintech and the Politics of Banking,
106 IOWA L. REV. 1739 (2021), contains an extended consideration of the structure of rent-abanks, including a high-level case study of Elevate Credit that relies on Elevate’s 10-K, rather
than the underlying contracts and does not track the evolution of Elevate from an online payday
lender into a fintech firm, see id. at 1760–65.
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I. THE DISAGGREGATION OF CONSUMER LENDING
Usury laws have been the cornerstone of consumer financial
protection in America since colonial times.59 Every state has a usury
statute of some sort that caps the level of charges on a loan.60 These
statutes vary considerably in their design and application, with some
covering only interest, and others extending to various types of loan
charges.61 Many states have different limitations for different types of
loan products or different types of lenders and borrowers. Thus, the
permitted rate on payday loans or other small-dollar loans might be
different than that for auto loans or for installment loans, the permitted
rate might be different for banks than for nonbanks, or the permitted
rate might be different for consumers than that for businesses.
This Part briefly reviews the function of usury laws as a borrower
protection, before turning to a history of the unraveling of bank usury
laws in the United States. It then considers how the various
components of consumer lending have become increasingly
disaggregated institutionally and how this structure has interfaced with
the entity-based structure of usury laws.
A. Functions of Usury Laws
Usury laws are fundamentally a borrower protection, even though
they can protect a reckless lender as well. Usury laws also
paternalistically intervene in freedom of contract by creating an
irrebuttable presumption that the conditions necessary for efficient
Coasean bargaining could not have existed if the interest rate in a
contract is above the specified usury level. This presumption protects

59. See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 55, at 604 (“Usury laws are, at core, the earliest form
of consumer protection law.”).
60. See 50-State Survey of Consumer Finance Laws, CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS
(Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.csbs.org/50-state-survey-consumer-finance-laws [https://perma.cc/
2GY8-VAUE].
61. See generally id. (offering an interactive map summarizing usury laws for each state).
For purposes of this Article, I refer to all manner of regulated charges on a loan as “interest.”
State laws vary considerably in how they define such charges. Some refer to “interest,” which is
not always defined. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. amend. 89, § 3; N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501(1)
(McKinney 2021). Others use the federal Truth-in-Lending Act (“TILA”) terminology of
“finance charge,” see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-1-301(20), 5-2-201 (2021), while others include
charges that lie outside that of the TILA “finance charge,” but which might be within the ambit
of the federal Military Lending Act’s broader definition of “annual percentage rate,” see, e.g., 815
ILL. COMP. STAT. 122/2-5(e-5) (2021).
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borrowers from lender market power and informational asymmetries,
and it helps prevent negative externalities from overindebtedness.
Usury laws shield borrowers from situations in which the lender
has market power. Such market power might be due to limited or
imperfect competition.62 Alternatively, the lender’s market power
might also stem from the consumer’s financial duress or misperception
of limited credit options. If a consumer needs funds immediately or if
a consumer thinks that he is such a poor credit risk that he is lucky that
anyone will lend to him, then the consumer might simply take the first
offer available and not shop for better terms.
Additionally, usury laws protect consumers from lenders taking
advantage of informational asymmetries and behavioral biases. A
consumer might fail to understand a deal because of misinformation or
a cognitive limitation. Or a consumer might simply be unduly
optimistic about repayment possibilities.
Usury laws protect not just consumers themselves, but also third
parties from negative externalities of overindebtedness. To the extent
that a usurious interest rate leads a consumer to get stuck in a debt trap,
such that the consumer is spending all disposable income on debt
service, rather than on other investments, it may harm the consumer’s
dependents and ultimately the public fisc if it results in the consumer
becoming a public charge.63
While usury laws prevent lenders from exploiting market power
or informational and cognitive problems and may also reduce negative
externalities of overindebtedness, they also restrict credit to a subset of
borrowers who, because of their riskiness, cannot obtain credit at
nonusurious rates. Indeed, the typical neoclassic economic analysis of
usury regulations is that they merely cut riskier borrowers out of the
market, which may actually be detrimental to those would-be
62. Such limited competition might be a function of market structure, such as situations
where lenders compete for a loan broker’s business, not the borrower’s business directly. That is
the situation in indirect auto lending, Adam J. Levitin, The Fast and Usurious: Putting the Brakes
on Auto Lending Abuses, 108 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1319 (2020) [hereinafter Levitin, The Fast and
Usurious], online lending through lead generators, Adam J. Levitin, Led Down the Financial
Garden Path 2 (May 15, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), and was historically
the situation with mortgage loan brokers and yield spread premium compensation, Howell E.
Jackson & Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread Premiums,
12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 289, 297 (2007).
63. Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability
Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom To Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD.
283, 301–02 (1995).
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borrowers’ welfare.64 Usury laws might also fairly be critiqued as
arbitrary in regard to the specific interest rate that triggers the
presumption of unreasonable advantage taking and as poorly tailored,
given that they are one-size-fits-all for consumers. Some consumers
may be able to responsibly assume greater risk than others because of
their greater resources or sophistication.
The point here is not the ultimate policy merits of usury laws in
general, much less any specific statute, but that they reflect a legitimate
consumer protection concern that certain loans may reflect
fundamentally unfair contracting conditions and that repayment would
be sufficiently deleterious to the welfare of borrowers that it should not
be required.
B. Marquette and the Race to the Bottom
While state usury laws were the traditional bulwark of consumer
credit protection, they were substantially undermined in the 1970s and
1980s by a U.S. Supreme Court decision that set off a legislative race
to the bottom. Usury deregulation started with banks. Banks are either
federally chartered (national banks) or state chartered (state banks)
and are governed by different laws. In 1978, in Marquette National
Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corporation,65 the Supreme Court held
that under section 85 of the National Bank Act,66 a national bank was
allowed to export the interest rate allowed in its “home” state to other
states in which it did business.67 Thus, when a Nebraska-based national

64. See, e.g., Rudolph C. Blitz & Millard F. Long, The Economics of Usury Regulation, 73 J.
POL. ECON. 608, 613 (1965) (“While the oft-stated purpose of usury legislation is to help that class
of debtors which includes the landless peasants, poor urbanites, and very small businessmen,
maximum rates are likely to affect them adversely by excluding them from the market.”).
65. Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
66. 12 U.S.C. § 85.
67. Marquette Nat’l Bank, 439 U.S. at 301. Technically, banks can export the greater of the
maximum rate allowed in the state in which the bank is “located” or 1 percent of the applicable
Federal Reserve ninety-day commercial paper rate. 12 U.S.C. § 85. Subsequent OCC opinion
letters interpreted the “location” of a national bank for the purposes of section 85 as being the
state of whatever branch of the bank had the closest nexus to the loan, rather than being the state
where the national bank is located on its charter certificate or where its main office is located. See
Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Interpretive Letter 686 (Sept. 11, 1995), as
reprinted in [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) P81-001; Off. of the
Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Interpretive Letter 707 (Jan. 31, 1996), as reprinted in [19951996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) P81-022; Off. of the Comptroller of the
Currency, OCC Interpretive Letter 782 (May 21, 1997), as reprinted in [1997 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) P 81-209; Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Interpretive
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bank made loans in Minnesota, it was still subject to the Nebraska
usury cap rather than the lower Minnesota usury cap.
The effect of the Marquette ruling is frequently referred to by the
shorthand of federal “preemption” of state usury laws, but as a
technical matter, that is inaccurate. Marquette did not void state usury
laws, which remained effective for all entities other than national banks
located in other states. Rather, it created a federal choice-of-law rule
regarding which state’s usury law would apply to a national bank doing
out-of-state business.68
National banks’ newfound ability to export their home state’s
usury rate to other states gave national banks a substantial competitive
advantage over state-chartered banks, particularly in the high interest
rate environment of the late 1970s and early 1980s, when prime interest
rates veered close to or even over some state usury caps.69 Among the
highest rate bank credit products are credit cards, so, unsurprisingly,
national banks with major credit card lending operations began
relocating to states with no or lax usury laws to take advantage of the
Marquette decision.70 These banks relocated (or created credit cardissuing national bank subsidiaries) to Delaware, South Dakota, Utah,
and Nevada—states that permitted whatever interest rate the parties
agreed to by contract.71 By 1988, eighteen states had removed interest
rate ceilings for bank transactions.72

Letter 822 (Feb. 17, 1998), as reprinted in [1997-1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) P81-265 (“[A]n interstate national bank may be ‘located’ for purposes of section 85 in
both its home state and its host state or states.”); Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC
Interpretive Letter 1171 (June 1, 2020), https://bit.ly/2LelbQd [https://perma.cc/AN83-Q3YS].
68. As a sign of the doctrinal confusion, section 27 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12
U.S.C. § 1831d, a parallel provision to section 85 of the National Bank Act, adopted in 1980 in
the wake of Marquette provides that state constitutions and statutes to the contrary are
“preempted for the purposes of this section.” 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a).
69. See Donna C. Vandenbrink, Usury Ceilings and DIDMCA, FED. RSRV. BANK CHI.
ECON. PERSPS., Sept./Oct. 1985, at 25, 27.
70. ADAM J. LEVITIN, CONSUMER FINANCE: MARKETS AND REGULATION 468–69 (2018)
[hereinafter LEVITIN, CONSUMER FINANCE].
71. See supra notes 42–45; cf. Robin Stein, The Ascendancy of the Credit Card Industry,
FRONTLINE (Nov. 23, 2004), https://to.pbs.org/3rRU5iK [https://perma.cc/AM7R-28AP]
(explaining how the rise of credit cards motivated some banks to relocate to South Dakota to
avoid New York’s usury laws).
72. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, Regulation and Deregulation of the US
Banking Industry: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for the Future, in ECONOMIC
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 503 (Nancy L. Rose ed., 2014).
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Marquette governs only national banks, but in 1980, Congress
passed a federal parity statute that gave all state banks treatment equal
to national banks, unless a state chose to opt out of the provision.73 The
federal parity law only allowed state banks to export their home state’s
usury limit, not to match the imported limit allowed for out-of-state
banks.74 To wit, if Illinois had an 8 percent usury limit, an Illinoischartered bank could charge 8 percent in Illinois or in Michigan, even
if Michigan had a 6 percent usury rate. But a national bank based in
Indiana, which has a 12 percent usury limit, could charge 12 percent in
either Illinois or Michigan. Thus, under the federal parity statute, the
Illinois state bank would remain at a competitive disadvantage to the
Indiana-based national bank.
States responded to protect their state-chartered institutions’
competitive equality with state parity laws that permitted state banks
to charge the maximum rate that could be charged by a national bank
doing business in the state.75 Accordingly, in the above example, the
Illinois-chartered bank would be able to charge 12 percent in Illinois
because an Indiana-based national bank could export the 12 percent
Indiana rate into Illinois. When combined with the federal parity
statute, this meant that the Illinois-chartered bank could also export
the 12 percent Indiana rate into Michigan. Given that several states
have no usury limit for bank loans when there is a written loan
agreement, bank usury law largely became a matter of the lowest
common denominator—the contractually agreed-upon rate.
The Marquette decision thus set off a race-to-the-bottom among
states with the result that state usury laws were effectively gutted for
73. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (“DIDMCA”) of 1980,
12 U.S.C. § 1831d. 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(f) separately addresses usury caps in state constitutions. The
DIDMCA parity provision allows state-chartered, FDIC-insured banks to charge the greater of
the maximum rate allowed in the state in which the bank is located or 1 percent above the Federal
Reserve ninety-day commercial paper discount rate for the applicable Federal Reserve District.
12 U.S.C. § 1831d. The opt-out provision, § 527 of DIDMCA, is not currently codified; it was
previously codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1730g (note). Puerto Rico and Iowa have opted out of the
federal parity statute. Catherine M. Brennan & Nora R. Udell, What’s Old Is New Again: The
Future of Bank Partnership Programs from Small Dollar Installment Loans to Mortgages to
Everything, 72 CONF. ON CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 425, 430 (2018).
74. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (allowing state insured banks to charge at the rate allowed by
the state in which the bank is located).
75. John J. Schroeder, “Duel” Banking System? State Bank Parity Laws: An Examination of
Regulatory Practice, Constitutional Issues, and Philosophical Questions, 36 IND. L. REV. 197, 203
(2003); NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., CONSUMER CREDIT REGULATION § 3.7.1 n.672 (3d ed. 2020)
(listing parity statutes).
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banks. Notably, the erosion of state usury laws in the wake of
Marquette did not extend to nonbanks. While states lost the ability to
control pricing of consumer credit issued by banks, their ability to
regulate nonbanks remained intact.
C. The Changing Institutional Landscape of Consumer Credit
In 1978, when Marquette was decided, the fact that it only directly
affected banks seemed of little importance, because banks comprised
the substantial majority of the nonmortgage consumer credit market.76
Indeed, in 1978, banks and other depositories made up 73 percent of
the U.S. consumer credit market in terms of receivables outstanding.77
At that time, nonbank lenders consisted primarily of finance
companies, pawn shops, and retailers (including car dealerships)
offering store credit.78 Thus, Marquette’s most immediate impact was
in the credit card market because most other types of standard bank
loan products—mortgages, auto loans, and student loans—have lower
interest rates than credit cards, such that usury caps would rarely be at
issue except in periods of extremely high market interest rates.
Yet 1978 also happened to be the high-water mark for banks’ role
in consumer credit. In particular, by the 1990s, securitization began to
play a major role in financing nonmortgage consumer credit, rising to
one-third of the market by the early 2000s.79 By 2008, banks’ share of
nonmortgage consumer credit outstanding had fallen from its 1978
height of 73 percent to just 43 percent.80 Subsequent changes to
accounting rules render later data noncomparable.81

76. Separate usury laws have often applied to mortgages, and federal law preempts state
usury laws for virtually all first lien mortgages. 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a.
77. Table F.222 of the Financial Accounts of the United States - Z.1, BD. OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20210610/html/f222.htm
[https://perma.cc/YG84-AGUB] (last updated June 10, 2021).
78. See PHILIP A. KLEIN, THE CYCLICAL TIMING OF CONSUMER CREDIT, 1920-67, at 4
(1971).
79. Table F.222 of the Financial Accounts of the United States - Z.1, Historical Annuals
Tables 1975-1984, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/z1/20160609/annuals/a1975-1984.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 9EP9-SW5Y ].
80. Id.
81. See Nancy Leinfuss, New U.S. Accounting Rules May Derail Consumer Lending,
REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2009, 3:20 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-securitization-fasb-absanalysis/new-u-s-accounting-rules-may-derail-consumer-lending-idUSTRE59856S20091009
[https://perma.cc/PM4K-DG3H] (noting that Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 167
would result in many securitization exposures being brought back onto bank balance sheets).
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The shift that occurred in the consumer finance marketplace was
not simply one of nonbanks replacing banks. Instead, it also involved a
disaggregation of the consumer lending cycle.
The financial regulation literature has long focused on
securitization as one of the exemplars of financial “disintermediation,”
meaning a shift away from bank intermediation between sources of
capital and borrowers.82 But securitization is not just an example of
financial disintermediation. It is also a type of disaggregated consumer
lending, as the following section explains, because securitization
structures inherently split the lending function into discrete functions
played by separate entities. While banks are often still involved in
consumer lending, many of the key activities in the lending cycle are
performed by nonbanks.
Consumer lending consists of a set of separate activities. First, a
credit product must be designed—how will the product operate and be
priced? Then the product must be marketed and potential borrowers
identified and wooed. Once actual borrowers apply for the product,
they must be underwritten, meaning that they must be qualified and
priced according to their risk profile. If the borrower qualifies and
agrees to the loan, the loan must be funded, meaning that the borrower
will receive the money. After the loan is made, it must still be serviced,
with billing statements sent out and payments collected, as well as
other administrative tasks, and any defaults must be managed. And
someone must hold both the credit risk and interest rate risk on the
loan.
Historically, the entire lending cycle was conducted by the same
institution—often a bank—that would design, market, underwrite,
fund, service, and hold the loan. Nothing, however, requires that the
entire lending cycle be conducted in a single institution. Thus, the
consumer lending cycle can be disaggregated and different functions
spread among different parties that are joined by a web of contracts.
Today, consumer lending is increasingly disaggregated.
Securitization, a financing technique that funds most mortgages in the
United States,83 represents a classic example of disaggregation in

82.
83.

See, e.g., Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, supra note 39, at 626–27.
Table L.218 of the Financial Accounts of the United States - Z.1, BD. OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20210610/html/l218.htm
[https://perma.cc/LWC4-5H8E] (last updated June 10, 2021). Securitization historically also
funded a large share of the credit card market, but today no longer does so because of a change
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consumer lending. While securitization transactions can be quite
complex, the basic idea is straightforward. A financial institution (bank
or nonbank) that sponsors the securitization owns a pool of loans that
it either made itself or purchased.84 The sponsor then sells the loans to
a special purpose entity (“SPE”) it has set up.85 The SPE engages in no
business other than owning the loans. The SPE’s purpose is to insulate
the loans from all risks other than those inherent in the loans
themselves, including operational risks and competing creditors.86 The
SPE then issues bonds that are to be repaid solely from the collections
on the loans.87 The SPE uses the proceeds of the bond issuance to pay
the sponsor for the loans.88 The loans have thus been effectively funded
by the bond investors, not the sponsor.
One of the attractions of a securitization transaction is that it
enables investors to invest solely in the risks related to the securitized
loans—whether they will prepay or default—and not have to worry
about all of the risks of the sponsor as an operating entity. If the bonds
were issued by the sponsor itself, the investors would be exposed to the
total picture of the sponsor’s finances, with all of its assets and
competing liabilities, including involuntary liabilities like tort and tax
creditors. Because the SPE has no business and is nothing more than a
box to hold the loans, the investors are taking on solely the risks
associated with the loans, but not the risks associated with an operating
entity that might engage in other types of business or commit torts. The
in accounting rules, SFAS 166 and 167, that went into effect in 2010. Xiaoli (Shaolee) Tian &
Haiwen Zhang, Impact of FAS 166/167 on the Securitization of Credit Card Loans 29 (Jan. 31,
2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2779147 [https://perma.cc/KUB9FSX5]. These new accounting standards changed the treatment of variable interest entities, such
as securitization vehicles. Id. at 9. Additionally, securitization-dependent monoline card issuers
have largely disappeared, having either failed (Advanta), see Harold Brubaker, Lawsuit Offers a
Painful Look at Advanta’s Collapse, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 19, 2013), https://
www.inquirer.com/philly/business/20130619_Lawsuit_offers_a_painful_look_at_Advanta_s_coll
apse.html [https://perma.cc/V5BM-2YH2], been purchased by a full service bank (MBNA,
purchased by Bank of America), see Julie Creswell & Eric Dash, Bank of America To Buy
MBNA, a Prime Issuer of Credit Cards, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/
2005/07/01/business/bank-of-america-to-buy-mbna-a-prime-issuer-of-credit-cards.html [https://
perma.cc/WL52-9K55], or become full service retail banks with a deposit funding base, such that
they do not need to rely on capital markets funding (Capital One).
84. ADAM J. LEVITIN, BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY: FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING AND
MODERN COMMERCIAL MARKETS 119 (2d ed. 2018).
85. A special purpose entity is a business entity created to perform a specific transactional
task, rather than serve as a general operating company.
86. See LEVITIN, BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY, supra note 84, at 120.
87. See id.
88. See id.
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SPE’s only obligations are contractual and knowable in advance, so
investors can price for the risk of competing demands on the SPE’s
assets.
By separating the loans from the sponsor, the securitization
structure inherently separates the front end of the lending process
(designing a loan product, marketing it, underwriting borrowers, and
providing the initial funding for the loan) from the back end of the
lending process (holding the economic exposure of the credit risk and
interest rate risk on the loan). The sponsor handles the front end of the
process, while the bond investors handle the back end.
On the back end, securitization further separates the economic
exposure to the loan from legal title to the loan; the bond investors
have the economic exposure, while the SPE has legal title.
Additionally, someone has to manage the loan, as invoices must be sent
out, payments collected, and defaults addressed. The SPE cannot do
this work itself because the whole point of the transaction is to isolate
the economic risk on the securitized loan from operational risks.
Therefore, the SPE must hire an agent (called a servicer) to manage
the loan. The servicer is typically compensated with some of the loan
collections, typically part of the interest and late fees.89 The servicer
might be an affiliate of the sponsor or it might be an unaffiliated entity.
Either way, the need for a servicer further disaggregates the lending
process. The result is that the front end is split off from the legal title
to the loans, which is split from practical control over the loans, which
is split from economic exposure to the loans. Securitization
disaggregates lending.
Both the front-end and back-end exposure can be further split, as
can the servicing. The sponsor can handle the entire front end itself,
but it might have purchased the loans from another entity. And it might
have underwritten the loans using automated underwriting software
provided by a third party. Indeed, that is how most mortgage lending
works, with lenders using Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s automated
underwriting platforms and underwriting to Fannie and Freddie’s
underwriting criteria—which is required for selling loans to Fannie and
Freddie—rather than to their own.90

89. Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 37–45
(2011).
90. ADAM J. LEVITIN & SUSAN M. WACHTER, THE GREAT AMERICAN HOUSING BUBBLE:
WHAT WENT WRONG AND HOW WE CAN PROTECT OURSELVES IN THE FUTURE 85 (2020);
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On the back end, securitization structures commonly divide
interest rate (prepayment) risk from credit risk and allocate them
differently, with credit risk frequently being assumed by a guarantor
that may or may not be affiliated with the sponsor.91 And servicing
rights are sometimes divided, such that one entity services performing
loans, while another one handles defaulted loans.92 The variation,
though not infinite, is extensive.
Disaggregation exists outside of securitization too. For example,
even without securitization, both the initial funding and economic
exposure might ultimately be provided by a party other than the
nominal lender. For example, most auto loans are “indirect loans” in
which the consumer enters into a retail installment sale contract with
the dealer, who then sells the contract to a financial institution.93
Depending on the timing of the sale to the financial institution, the
funding may be coming from the dealer (who initially floats the loans)
or from the loans’ purchaser. Likewise, many online payday and
installment loans operate through lead generators that advertise the
loans and collect loan applications, which are then auctioned off to
prospective funders.94 Various types of fintech firms present another
type of disaggregation.95
Another way to understand disaggregation is as an application of
Jensen and Meckling’s theory of the firm as a “nexus of a set of
contracting relationships.”96 Jensen and Meckling understand the
Selling Guide: Chapter A, FANNIE MAE (July 7, 2021), https://selling-guide.fanniemae.com/SellingGuide/Doing-Business-with-Fannie-Mae/Subpart-A2-Lender-Contract [https://perma.cc/FGD5R86V]; Selling Guide: Chapter B, FANNIE MAE (July 7, 2021) https://sellingguide.fanniemae.com/Selling-Guide/Origination-thru-Closing/Subpart-B3-UnderwritingBorrowers [https://perma.cc/KQ8C-PCFV].
91. Cf. LEVITIN & WACHTER, supra note 90, at 188 (“Every PLS deal has its own particular
waterfalls for allocating credit and interest rate risk and its own set of credit enhancements . . .
resulting in a unique payment structure.”).
92. See, e.g., Alex Weis & John Njoku, CMBS: An Introduction, CORNELL REAL EST. REV.,
May 2009, at 1, 1–2; Peng Liu & Daniel Quan, Foreclosure of Securitized Commercial Mortgages—
A Model of the Special Servicer, 46 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 321, 322–23 (2013).
93. See Levitin, The Fast and the Usurious, supra note 62, at 1277 (explaining the structure
of the indirect auto lending market).
94. See, e.g., UPTURN, LED ASTRAY: ONLINE LEAD GENERATION AND PAYDAY LOANS 1–
2
(2015), https://www.upturn.org/static/reports/2015/led-astray/files/Upturn_-_Led_Astray_
v.1.01.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GPK-95B7].
95. See Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO.
L.J. 235, 242, 276 (2019) (describing fintech’s role in the “fragmentation” of the “financial supply
chain”).
96. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 37, at 311.
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“firm” as a single entity or set of affiliated entities, with all of the
contracts occurring implicitly within the entity or among affiliated
entities bound by corporate control.97 This arrangement that enabled
corporate agents to fill in omitted terms in incomplete and implicit
contracts now occurs with explicit contracts among unaffiliated
entities.98 Disaggregation means that the firm now consists of a set of
formally unaffiliated entities, bound together by contract such that
they operate as a single unit. Disaggregated lending produces a
disembodied nexus of contracts that is not formally a firm consisting of
corporate affiliates, even if it functions as one.
D. Disaggregated Lending’s Effect on Consumer Protection
Key parts of the consumer protection regulatory system assume
concomitant form and function, but disaggregated lending splinters
function among multiple entities with varying forms. The mismatch
creates an opportunity for regulatory arbitrage, and the differential
treatment of banks and nonbanks for usury law (as well as for state
licensure and other consumer protections) incentivizes financial
institutions to engage in the arbitrage.
Overall, the financial regulatory system is a mix of entity-based
and activity-based regulation. For example, there are regulatory
regimes specific to consumer credit, such as Truth in Lending Act
disclosures, that apply irrespective of entity type.99 But other parts of
the regulatory regime are specific to particular entity types, such as
banks or money transmitters, because of the special functions these
entities play in the financial system and the types of activities in which
they are presumed to engage. Thus, banks are the only type of entity
allowed to hold insured demand deposits, an activity that necessitates
regulation of the risk of bank lending to ensure that the bank will be
able to honor its deposit liabilities. If the bank’s loans go bad, it will not
be able to repay the depositors.

97. See id.
98. See William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal:
From Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 783, 825, 859, 865 (2013)
(describing collateralized debt obligations as the “apotheosis” of the nexus of contracts firm);
Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout Prohibitions in
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1121–22 (2009) (describing
securitization as an attempt to create a contractually complete firm).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1631.
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Entity-based regulation presents a risk of a mismatch if there is an
expansion of the type of entity performing an activity. The limitations
of entity-based regulation are precisely why “shadow banking” has
raised so much regulatory concern in wholesale financial markets.
Shadow banking refers to the various institutions and transactions that
replicate the financing functions traditionally provided by banks.100
Because prudential regulation—regulation to ensure the safety and
soundness of financial institutions—is an entity-based regulatory
system, the rise of shadow banking has posed a major challenge to
regulators’ ability to guarantee the financial system’s safety and
soundness and to protect against systemic risk.101
Disaggregation of consumer lending has led to a parallel problem
in consumer protection. The banks are treated differently than other
entities for purposes of usury laws. The unstated logic behind the
different treatment is that banks, which can operate nationwide, should
not be saddled with complying with inconsistent state usury laws
because the federal bank regulatory system ensures that they will not
make excessively risky—and thus high-cost—loans. Riskier loans
generally have higher interest rates to compensate for the risk. By
preventing banks from making risky loans, the bank regulatory system
is therefore presumed to also prevent loans with excessively high cost,
effectively substituting for usury laws.
To be sure, nothing in the federal bank regulatory system
expressly prohibits banks from making high-cost loans. Rather, the
federal regulatory system relies on the “soft” tools of bank supervision
to dissuade banks from engaging in practices deemed excessively
risky.102 Herein lies the first flaw in the idea that federal bank
regulation is a substitute for usury laws: there is no guarantee that a
bank regulator will actually use these tools. Indeed, a regulator is
unlikely to act if it disagrees philosophically with usury laws as an
interference with “freedom” of contract. Whereas usury laws can be
raised as a defense or even as a private right of action,103 consumers
cannot force bank regulators to use their supervisory powers.
Even aside from discretion regarding supervisory actions, there is
a bigger flaw in the logic of federal preemption. Federal bank regulator
supervision is not a substitute for usury laws because the key bank
100.
101.
102.
103.

See, e.g., Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, supra note 39, at 623–25.
Id.
See Tahyar Testimony, supra note 48, at 37–39.
See, e.g., Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 2015).
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regulatory concern is not about consumer protection. Instead, it is
about bank protection—protecting the safety and soundness of the
bank.
Bank safety and soundness is not synonymous with consumer
protection. Among other things, banks can diversify their risks in a way
consumers cannot. If a bank makes thousands of high-cost loans
knowing that a percentage will default, the revenue on those that
perform (or perform for a while) may outweigh the losses from
defaults. Indeed, high-cost lending might be profitable. It is hard for a
regulator concerned with safety and soundness to tell a bank to cease
engaging in a profitable activity because a bank is only safe-and-sound
if it is profitable.
From a consumer protection perspective, however, diversification
is irrelevant. If a consumer’s loan is the one that defaults because of an
excessively high cost, it does not matter to the consumer that other
consumers were able to pay off the loan. The welfare loss of one
consumer cannot be offset by another consumer’s welfare gain.104
Simply put, supervision by federal bank regulators is not a substitute
for usury laws.
II. RENT-A-BANK ARRANGEMENTS
The disparate treatment of banks and nonbanks under usury laws
creates a motivation to exploit the regulatory arbitrage set up by the
mismatch between disaggregated consumer lending transactions and
the binary, entity-based regulatory system. In this arbitrage, nonbanks
attempt to shelter in banks’ exemption from usury laws. That is
precisely what the rent-a-bank structure is about.
This Part considers the contours of rent-a-bank relationships and
provides a history of their development as a response to regulation of
payday loans, and the subsequent and incomplete regulatory pushback
against rent-a-bank relationships.
Rent-a-bank arrangements represent yet another version of the
disaggregation of the lending cycle. The basic design of a rent-a-bank
transaction is straightforward. A nonbank lender contracts with a bank
to make loans according to the nonbank lender’s specifications and
then sells the loans to the nonbank lender. In a rent-a-bank transaction,
the bank’s role is likely limited to the initial funding of the loan and

104. In this regard, consumer protection resembles Pareto efficiency, not Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency.
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perhaps some servicing support, although the bank’s name will be on
the loan as the lender. The nonbank (or set of affiliated nonbank
entities) will handle the other aspects of the loan: design, marketing,
underwriting, servicing, and holding of all or most of the risk. The
precise allocation of marketing and servicing duties is not critical to
rent-a-bank structures. Instead, the key features are the bank taking its
underwriting marching orders from the nonbank and the nonbank
acquiring the lion’s share of financial exposure on the loans.
The details of rent-a-bank arrangements can vary substantially,
but the variations are often driven by a desire to make it look as if the
bank actually has greater involvement in the transaction than it does.
For example, the bank might maintain nominal control over
underwriting decisions, but in practice, the bank is unlikely to ever
second guess the nonbank, lest the nonbank decline to purchase the
loans and leave the bank holding a bunch of loans that it would never
have made on its own account.
Similarly, it is common in rent-a-bank arrangements for the bank
not to sell all of the loans to the nonbank lender. The bank might retain
$1 million exposure on the loans. Or it might sell the loans only after
holding them for a limited time period, perhaps only two days.105 Or a
bank may sell only a derivative interest or partial derivative interest in
the loans. The idea is that a partial, delayed, or derivative sale
strengthens the claim that the bank is the real lender in the transaction.
Yet the bank’s retained de minimis exposure or a de minimis holding
period would seem to underscore the sham transaction: what is its
purpose other than to enable the bank to claim that it is the true
lender?
A. Rent-a-Bank Distinguished from Outsourced Production
It is important to distinguish rent-a-bank relationships from runof-the-mill outsourced production. Banks are no different than other
businesses in that they face a make-or-buy decision regarding any
particular good or service they use. The efficiency of vertical
integration versus outsourcing will depend on many factors. For
example, banks require various types of computer software to operate
their businesses, such as loan servicing software that enables them to
keep track of balances and payments and legal notices for particular
borrowers. A bank could have its own employees code the software or

105.

See, e.g., Sawyer v. Bill Me Later, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1360 (D. Utah 2014).
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it could purchase the software from a third party that specializes in
writing such software or the bank could contract with a third party to
handle all the loan servicing, leaving the software issue up to that third
party. If the third party can provide the software or handle the servicing
more efficiently than the bank, the bank will likely opt for third-party
provision.
From an economic standpoint, the choice of internal versus
external production is irrelevant. What matters from an economic
standpoint is that the bank is the nexus of contracts among the various
factors of production. Those contracts may be either explicit contracts
with outsourced providers or implicit ones within the firm.
From a regulatory standpoint, however, things look different.
Banks are distinct from regular businesses. Whereas a regular business
corporation can be created more or less as a matter of right, the
issuance of a banking charter is discretionary to the chartering
authority and requires regulatory consideration of various factors,
including the public interest.106
The issuance of banking charters is regulated because the charter
carries with it privileges not granted to regular businesses, most notably
the right to take money deposits, pay checks from deposits, and lend
money.107 While nonbanks engage in lending and payments, they
require a special license to engage in these activities.108 More
importantly, they are not permitted to combine the activities: nonbank
lenders cannot accept deposits, and nonbank money transmitters
cannot make loans. The combination of deposit-taking, payments, and
lending activities is of particular regulatory concern because of the
risks those activities pose to the monetary system and to the economy
writ large. Because banks fund loans with deposits, the possibility of
losses on the loans poses a risk to deposits and to the payment system
106. See generally Margaret E. Tahyar, Are Banking Regulators Special?, BANKING PERSPS.,
Quarter 1 2018, at 23, 24 (“[A] generation has grown to accept that the granting of bank charters
is so up to the discretion of the bank regulators that the regulator need not even give reasons for
a denial.”); OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING
MANUAL: CHARTERS 29 (2019), https://www.occ.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/
comptrollers-licensing-manual/files/charters.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4QR-NZ5L] (requiring
evaluation of the banking needs of the community).
107. OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE
NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES 3 (2016) (identifying “three core
banking functions: receiving deposits, paying checks, or lending money”).
108. See 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (criminal prohibition of unlicensed money transmission). Lending
is licensed under a range of state statutory regimes varying by the type of loan.
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on which the economy depends. Restricting the set of institutions that
are allowed to engage in the combination of core banking activities
facilitates regulatory oversight because it defines the set of institutions
on which regulators must focus their supervisory efforts. If wildcat
banking109 were permitted, regulators would not even know which
businesses to supervise.
The difference between internal and external production matters
from a regulatory standpoint because of the regulatory concern about
keeping the entire business of banking within the four corners of
regulatory oversight. To the extent that external production shifts the
business of banking outside the scope of regulatory vision and
authority, it undermines the regulatory system. To this end, from a
regulatory perspective it is important which factors of production are
internal versus external at a bank. If all factors of production are
external, and the bank merely coordinates among them—literally
serving as the nexus of contracts—the entire regulatory regime’s design
is undermined. Regulators would still be focused on the bank, but the
bank’s coordination role does not itself pose any particular regulatory
concern, whereas the areas that should be of regulatory concern shift
outside the ambit of bank regulatory authority.
This is not to say that bank regulation cannot tolerate external
production. But it requires that the bank be the entity ultimately
answerable for the product, meaning that the bank must be acting as
the principal in the production relationship, rather than the agent.110
Likewise, the nature and extent of outsourcing also matter from a
regulatory perspective. Some activities are so fundamental to the
business of banking that their outsourcing begs the question of what is
left for the bank to do. In particular, designing and underwriting loans,
taking deposits, and paying checks are so fundamental that the bank’s
outsourcing of these activities undermines banking as a regulatory
category. It does not matter that nonbanks may engage in any one of
these activities. The point is that if the bank has been licensed to
perform these activities, the license is granted with the expectation that
it is the bank, and not some other party, that will be performing the
activity, as the license is personal to the bank.
109. Wildcat banking refers to the creation of banks that operate without any special
licensing regime.
110. Banks are, of course, permitted to act as agents for nonbanks, but when they do, their
powers are limited to those of the principal, as they are acting on its behalf. For example, when a
bank services loans on behalf of a nonbank, the nonbank is not entitled to federal interest rate
exportation merely by virtue of having hired a bank as a servicing agent.
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Relatedly, this suggests that the extent of outsourcing matters. For
example, banks regularly rely on credit scores purchased from third
parties for underwriting, but this is different from outsourcing product
pricing, setting applicable credit score cutoffs, or determining what
other factors should be considered in underwriting.
The earlier discussion points to four ways in which rent-a-bank
relationships differ from mere outsourcing of factors of production. In
rent-a-bank relationships there is:
(1) a loan product design that is proposed by a nonbank to the bank;
(2) an outsourcing of all or nearly all factors of production of loans
(marketing, underwriting, funding, and servicing);
(3) an outsourcing of the various factors of production of loans to a
single nonbank or its affiliates; and
(4) the transfer of most or all of the credit risk on the loans either to
the nonbank and its affiliates or to third parties through a transaction
arranged or facilitated by the nonbank.

In other words, in a rent-a-bank relationship, a single nonbank and
its affiliates initiate the relationship, propose the outsourcing, provide
all or nearly all of the factors necessary to make the loans and either
acquire most of the economic exposure to the loans or facilitate the
transfer of the economic exposure to a third party.
The first point emphasizes that the bank is not the true nexus of
contracts in the rent-a-bank relationship. Rather than the bank being
the entity that outsources production to various vendors, it is the
nonbank that outsources parts of the production of its own loan
product. It is the nonbank that sponsors the transaction and serves as
the hub for the various contractual relationships. The nonbank is
always the party that approaches the bank with the idea for the
partnership and that coordinates exactly who will provide what service
in the production process. This is a completely different situation than
when a bank devises a loan product and contracts with an advertising
firm for marketing services and with a technology provider for a
software made to the bank’s specifications, and then separately
transfers some or all of the risk on the loans to investors. Instead, in a
rent-a-bank situation, the nonbank approaches the bank with a
proposed loan product and a turnkey solution for the product—
marketing, underwriting, servicing, and possibly funding.
The second and third points emphasize that in the rent-a-bank
situation, the nonbank and its affiliates provide all or nearly all of the
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factors of production. The bank typically does little other than provide
the initial funding for the loan, and sometimes not even that, although
sometimes the bank retains nominal approval over external factors of
production. Instead, in a rent-a-bank arrangement, the factors of
production come nearly entirely from the nonbank and its affiliates.
That indicates that the bank is not simply outsourcing in a search for
the best external solution for any particular factor of production, but is
instead buying an entire loan product from the nonbank, such that the
nonbank is the real lender. In other words, the bank is adding little or
nothing to the production itself other than the privileges that come with
its charter. If the bank’s only material contribution to the lending
process is the privileges of its charter or initial funding (but with a near
immediate and substantial shift in economic exposure), the transaction
should be deemed an attempt to evade usury laws.
The final point emphasizes that in the rent-a-bank situation, the
bank always transfers most or all of the economic risk on the loans to
other parties. While banks frequently engage in risk transfers in nonrent-a-bank situations, it is the combination of outsourced production
and risk transfer that is the hallmark of rent-a-banking. This is
particularly obvious when the risk is transferred to a party affiliated
with the nonbank. When the risk is transferred to an unaffiliated third
party the situation is more complicated, but if that risk transfer has
been arranged or facilitated by the nonbank, it should not matter other
than in terms of the question of which entity—the nonbank or the
third-party investor—should be deemed the “true lender” in the
relationship. What is clear is that the bank is minimally involved and is
involved only because of the regulatory arbitrage benefits.
B. Payday Lending
Rent-a-bank partnerships first emerged in the context of payday
lending. The history of rent-a-bank partnerships in the payday context
is important because it shows how the issue was initially, although
unevenly, addressed by regulatory action. The regulatory conception
of the issue was too narrow and left the door open to rent-a-bank
lending other than payday lending, which is where the practice has
since moved.
Payday lending involves making short-term, small-dollar loans
with maturity dates designed to coincide with the borrower’s payday or
government benefit distribution date. The idea is that on payday the
borrower will have an influx of funds that can be used to repay the
lender. Payday loans typically have a maturity of between one week
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and one month, although some payday loans are longer-term
installment loans with periodic payments scheduled to align with the
borrower’s payday.111
Payday loans are unsecured because the lender either takes a
postdated check from the borrower (dated for the borrower’s payday)
or gets an automated clearing house (“ACH”) authorization from the
borrower.112 If the borrower fails to repay voluntarily, the lender can
then exercise its right to draw on the borrower’s bank account, which
it hopes will be replenished with funds on payday. A payday loan thus
gives the lender accelerated repayment ability through a self-help right
against the borrower’s bank account, rather than having to first get a
judgment and then a writ of execution or garnishment to collect.
Payday loans first emerged as a product in the mid-1990s.113 They
developed out of the informal practice of some check cashers of
purchasing a consumer’s personal check, rather than a check from a
third party, and agreeing to hold it for a period of time before cashing
it.114 This process was known as “deferred presentment” or “check
holding.” Typically, check cashers would agree to hold the check until
the borrower’s next payday in exchange for a fee. By calling the
transactions check cashing, rather than lending, payday lenders sought
to evade state usury and other consumer credit laws. Eventually, some
states legitimized the practice and allowed regulated deferred
presentment transactions.115
Payday loans are effectively or expressly prohibited in sixteen
states and the District of Columbia.116 In other states, payday loans are
a highly regulated product. In states that allow payday lending,
regulations vary considerably, but they generally require payday

111. See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg.
47,864, 47,911, 47,927 (July 22, 2016) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1041 (2018)).
112. Id. at 47,872.
113. See GARY RIVLIN, BROKE, USA: FROM PAWNSHOPS TO POVERTY, INC.—HOW THE
WORKING POOR BECAME BIG BUSINESS 72–73 (2010).
114. See A Short History of Payday Lending Law, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (July 18, 2012),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2012/07/a-short-history-of-paydaylending-law [https://perma.cc/4XG6-BKFH].
115. Id.
116. See generally PEW CHARITABLE TRS., STATE PAYDAY LOAN REGULATION AND
USAGE RATES (2012) (outlining payday loan usage rates in different states). A rate cap enacted
in Nebraska effectively prohibited payday lending in 2020, NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-918 (2020) (36
percent APR limit for payday loans); Illinois passed a similar rate cap in 2021, 815 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 122/2-5 (2021) (36 percent military APR limit for all consumer loans).
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lenders to obtain a license from the state, be subject to state
examination, and make certain disclosures to borrowers.117 State
payday lending regulations restrict the terms of products, particularly
the types, amounts, and frequency of fees, the length of loan maturities,
and the frequency of loan renewals.118 Thus, even in states that allow
payday lending, there are usury caps specific to the payday loans.
This regulatory landscape set the scene for rent-a-bank
partnerships because payday lenders that did not want to be subject to
state regulations sought out bank partners that were not subject to state
usury laws. Most banks have never had much interest in making payday
loans themselves because of skepticism about the profitability of the
product except at extremely high interest rates that would trigger
reputational risk and regulatory animosity.119 However, a number of
small banks have been willing to partner with payday lenders on terms
that turn a tidy profit for the bank with little investment or effort. The
first instance of a rent-a-bank arrangement is unknown, but they began
to appear by 1997.120 While rent-a-bank arrangements were most
common for payday lending, they also appeared in their first phase in
the early 2000s with nonbank subprime credit card issuers and tax
refund anticipation lenders.121
C. Regulatory Pushback on Payday Rent-a-Bank
The original wave of rent-a-bank arrangements was met with
substantial pushback from both state and federal regulators. A number
of states sued rent-a-bank lenders,122 as did private litigants.123 More

117. LEVITIN, CONSUMER FINANCE, supra note 70, at 627.
118. Id.
119. See SHEILA BAIR, LOW-COST PAYDAY LOANS: OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES 10
(2005) (“[M]ost bank officials we interviewed perceived the product as too high risk to offer
profitably except at extremely high interest rates . . . .”).
120. New York v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, No. 6046-03, at 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 2,
2007).
121. Complaint at 5–6, FTC v. CompuCredit Corp., No. 1:08-cv-1976 (N.D. Ga. June 10,
2008) (concerning marketed subprime credit card loans); Anderson v. H&R Block, Inc., 287 F.3d
1038, 1040–41 (11th Cir. 2002) (concerning tax refund anticipation loans); Beneficial Nat’l Bank
v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 4 (2003) (concerning tax refund anticipation loans).
122. See JEAN ANN FOX, UNSAFE AND UNSOUND: PAYDAY LENDERS HIDE BEHIND FDIC
BANK CHARTERS TO PEDDLE USURY 12, 25–28 (2004) (listing state enforcement actions).
123. Ironically, one upshot of these suits was a Supreme Court decision clarifying that no
state law usury claim could stand against a national bank that was a partner in a rent-a-bank
arrangement. See Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 539 U.S. at 3–5, 11.
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significantly, federal bank regulators acted to discourage banks from
partnering with payday lenders. The federal bank regulators did not
act in concert; the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”)
acted first and most strongly, while the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC”) acted later and hesitantly, and the Federal
Reserve Board never took any formal action at all.124
In 2000, the OCC issued an Advisory Letter highlighting its
concerns about rent-a-bank relationships, noting that it would closely
review bank activities in this regard, and explaining its expectations for
how banks would responsibly structure payday lending activities.125 In
2001, the OCC issued a Bulletin regarding third-party relationships
that emphasized proper risk management and oversight of third-party
lending programs.126 Critically, both the Advisory Letter and the
Bulletin emphasized the safety-and-soundness concerns rent-a-bank
lending poses to a bank, rather than the consumer protection concerns.
Neither of these nonbinding documents ever forbade payday renta-bank relationships outright, much less non-payday rent-a-bank
relationships. Instead of prohibiting payday rent-a-banking expressly,
the OCC acted through soft power, clarifying its expectations of banks
not through the formal notice-and-comment rulemaking process, but
through nonbinding guidance and supervisory actions. Thus, in
January of 2002, on the heels of the Bulletin, the OCC ordered a
national bank to cease its rent-a-bank payday lending program out of
safety-and-soundness concerns.127 The next month, the Comptroller
gave a speech directly addressing rent-a-bank relationships. He noted:
Let me raise one other caution about preemption. The benefit that
national banks enjoy by reason of this important constitutional
doctrine cannot be treated as a piece of disposable property that a
bank may rent out to a third party that is not a national bank.

124. Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 872–73
(2007). One large partnering bank left the Federal Reserve System to avoid scrutiny. Id. at 873.
125. OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, AL 2000-10, OCC ADVISORY
LETTER 1–2 (2000).
126. OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC 2001-47, OCC Bulletin 1 (2001).
127. Press Release, Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Orders Eagle To Cease
Payday Lending Program (Jan. 3, 2002), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/
2002/nr-occ-2002-1.html [https://perma.cc/53MQ-RLHD].
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Preemption is not like excess space in a bank-owned office building.
It is an inalienable right of the bank itself.128

After detailing the problem of rent-a-bank arrangements, the
Comptroller stated:
Not only do these arrangements constitute an abuse of the national
charter, but they are highly conducive to the creation of safety and
soundness problems at the bank, which may not have the capacity to
manage effectively a multistate loan origination operation that is in
reality the business of the payday lender.129

During the course of the year following the speech, the OCC
brought supervisory actions against another three national banks for
rent-a-bank payday lending.130 By 2003, the OCC could brag in its
Annual Report that
[a]ll national banks with known payday lending activities through
third-party vendors were ordered in FY 2003 to exit the payday
lending business. By undertaking enforcement actions against those
banks, the OCC addressed safety and soundness concerns about the
management of these payday loan programs, and ended significant
consumer protection violations.131

The FDIC moved more slowly. The FDIC Chairman expressed
concerns about rent-a-bank relationships in 2000, noting, “It may be
legal—but I don’t like it.”132 The FDIC, however, took no action until
2003, when it issued examination guidelines for state-chartered banks

128. John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the Women in
Housing and Finance in Washington, D.C. 10 (Feb. 12, 2002) (transcript available at
https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2002/pub-speech-2002-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/
S5KX-T4AS]).
129. Id.
130. Consent Order, Peoples Nat’l Bank, No. AA-EC-02-03 (Off. of the Comptroller of the
Currency Jan. 30, 2003); Press Release, Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Takes
Action Against ACE Cash Express, Inc. and Goleta National Bank (Oct. 29, 2002),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2002/nr-occ-2002-85.html [https://
perma.cc/UN7L-HDCX]; Press Release, Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, Peoples
National Bank To Pay $175,000 Civil Money Penalty and End Payday Lending Relationship with
Advance America (Jan. 31, 2003), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2003/nrocc-2003-6.html [https://perma.cc/C2CH-DY6M].
131. OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ANNUAL REPORT 17 (2003).
132. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Chairman Tanoue Denounces “Charter
Renting” as a Means of Funding Predatory Payday Lenders (June 14, 2000), https://
archive.fdic.gov/view/fdic/1736 [https://perma.cc/73G4-BMKY].
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partnering with payday lenders.133 The guidelines required that payday
loan portfolios be classified as substandard for regulatory risk
management, be charged off after sixty days, and be subjected to higher
capital requirements (up to dollar-for-dollar capital).134 Yet the bark
was much worse than the bite, because these requirements only applied
to loans on the bank’s books. If the bank were selling the loans
regularly, such as on a daily basis, the impact would be negligible. In
2005, however, the FDIC issued stronger guidelines, which limited the
frequency of loan rollovers, making it more difficult for state-chartered
banks to engage in payday rent-a-bank relationships.135 This guidance,
combined with enforcement actions in 2007,136 ended most payday
rent-a-bank arrangements.
D. The Incomplete Regulatory Pushback
Like the OCC, the FDIC did not outright forbid payday rent-abank arrangements, much less rent-a-bank relationships for things like
installment loans, which are not implicated by the rollover limitations.
Nonetheless, as a practical matter, the FDIC shut down most rent-abank operations by state-chartered banks, such that two scholars,
writing in 2007, observed that “by early 2006, the ‘rent-a-charter’ era
had come to an end.”137
These scholars wrote prematurely. Not only did some rent-a-bank
payday lending persist after 2006,138 but the rent-a-bank model was
ultimately adopted by other types of subprime lenders: “marketplace

133. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Issues Examination Guidance for Payday
Lending (July 2, 2005), https://www.fdic.gov/news/press-releases/2003/pr7003.html [https://
perma.cc/PJN8-M3AP].
134. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., GUIDELINES FOR PAYDAY LENDING 3, 5 (2003) (explaining
FDIC’s 2001 Subprime Guidance, including that the dollar-for-dollar capital charge applies to all
payday loan portfolios); id. at 6 (setting out the rules for substandard classification and sixty-day
charge off).
135. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., GUIDELINES FOR PAYDAY LENDING (2005),
https://www.fdic.gov/news/financial-institution-letters/2005/fil1405a.html [https://perma.cc/W3ZC6EXA].
136. See Order To Cease and Desist, Order for Restitution, and Order To Pay at 1, First Bank
of Del., FDIC-07-256b & FDIC-07-257k (Oct. 9, 2008) (detailing the Bank’s alleged violations of
law and unsafe or unsound banking practices).
137. Mann & Hawkins, supra note 124, at 873.
138. See supra Part II.C (describing FDIC’s regulatory responses).
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lenders,”139 subprime installment lenders,140 and subprime small
business lenders.141 At most, the FDIC ended an era of payday-focused
rent-a-banking. The model then shifted to other sectors of the
subprime lending market.
The following Part presents a deep dive into a rent-a-bank
arrangement, tracing a lender from its origins as a rent-a-bank payday
lender, through its transformation into a rent-a-tribe lender, and then
back into its reinvention as a fintech installment lender with a new renta-bank structure. The story illustrates the whack-a-mole nature of
states’ attempts to address rent-a-banking via litigation.
III. CASE STUDY OF ELEVATE CREDIT, INC.
Elevate Credit, Inc. (“Elevate”) is a nonbank fintech firm that
specializes in subprime lending and represents a state-of-the-art renta-bank arrangement.142 A close examination of Elevate’s business is
instructive for understanding how sophisticated rent-a-bank
arrangements can be and the challenges they pose to an entity-based
regulatory system. Elevate’s structure shows how it has been carefully
designed to protect Elevate from claims that it is violating usury laws,
or at least to muddy the waters in regard to the resolution of any such
claim.
Critically, the Elevate case study is possible only because it is a
reporting company under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.143 If
Elevate were not a reporting company it would be impossible to
discern the details of its relationships with its bank partners or even
that such relationships existed. Without such knowledge, a consumer
or regulator would not be able to challenge the legality of Elevate’s
loans; they would merely appear to be loans made by a bank and
nothing more.

139. E.g., Fulford v. Marlette Funding, LLC, No. 2017-cv-30376, 2019 WL 4451038, at *3 (D.
Colo. June 5, 2019); Meade v. Avant of Colo., LLC, 307 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1150–51 (D. Colo. 2018);
Meade v. Marlette Funding LLC, No. 17-cv-00575-PAB-MJW, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46814, at
*8–9 (D. Colo. Mar. 21, 2018).
140. See supra Part II.C (diving into rent-a-bank arrangements).
141. See supra Introduction (discussing World Business Lenders, LLC, and its rent-a-bank
relationships with Bank of Lake Mills, Wisconsin, and Axos Bank).
142. Elevate Credit, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 6–8 (Feb. 26, 2021).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 78a. Every issuer of a security that is traded on a national securities exchange
is required to register the security with the exchange. 15 U.S.C. § 78l. Issuers of registered
securities are required to file periodical public reports that discuss their business. 15 U.S.C. § 78m.
Such issuers are known as reporting companies.
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The case study starts with the history of Elevate’s origins in an
entity called Think Finance, Inc. (“Think”), which used a rent-a-bank
arrangement. In the face of regulatory pressure, Think switched to a
“rent-a-tribe” model in which it partnered with Native American tribes
to use their sovereign immunity to evade state usury laws. When
regulatory problems emerged with that model, Think spun off Elevate,
which returned to a rent-a-bank model that has been carefully
engineered to obfuscate the fact that Elevate’s partner banks play only
a minimal role in its transactions. This history illustrates the cat-andmouse nature of the rent-a-bank problem that exists because the
entity-based regulatory regime is vulnerable to being gamed by wellcounseled businesses.
A. ThinkCash’s Rent-a-Bank Model
Elevate is a publicly traded Delaware corporation144 that was spun
off from Think in 2014.145 Elevate’s history is itself instructive, as it
presents a study of the cat-and-mouse dynamic of regulation and its
circumvention.
Think started off around 2001 as PayDay One Holdings, LLC, an
Internet payday lender based in Fort Worth, Texas.146 In 2005, PayDay
One Holdings changed its name to PayDay One Holdings, Inc.147 In
2007 it changed its name yet again to ThinkCash, Inc., and then once
more in 2010 to Think Finance, Inc.148
Prior to 2007, Think made only direct payday loans.149 Starting in
2007, however, Think began to engage in indirect lending in states
where usury laws were a binding constraint using a rent-a-bank
arrangement through partnerships with Urban Trust Bank FSB (now
144. Elevate Credit, Inc., Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of
Elevate Credit, Inc. (Form 8-K) (Apr. 11, 2017).
145. Kelly Ann Doherty, Think Finance Announces Business Restructuring and Spinoff of
New Company, Elevate, BUSINESSWIRE (May 1, 2014, 12:00 PM), https://www.businesswire.com/
news/home/20140501006196/en/Think-Finance-Announces-Business-Restructuring-and-Spinoffof-New-Company-Elevate [https://perma.cc/6C4B-JSJU].
146. Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of the Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Against Defendants ¶¶ 1, 4, Commonwealth v. Think Fin., Inc., No. 2-14-cv-07139
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2019) [hereinafter Think Finance Undisputed Facts].
147. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendants Kenneth Rees
and National Credit Adjusters, LLC at Exhibit A, Commonwealth v. Think Fin., Inc., No. 2-14cv-07139 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2019).
148. Think Finance Undisputed Facts, supra note 146, ¶ 2.
149. Id. ¶¶ 4, 6.
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renamed Axiom Bank) and First Bank of Delaware.150 The details of
the Urban Trust Bank relationship are not public other than the name
of the product, Elastic, which is still one of Elevate’s main products and
is discussed in detail below. In contrast, the details of the First Bank of
Delaware product “Think Cash” are public as the result of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s litigation against Think.151
For Think Cash, different Think affiliates entered into three
related contracts with the First Bank of Delaware: (1) a marketing and
servicing agreement; (2) a master participation agreement; and (3) a
guaranty agreement. Pursuant to the marketing and servicing
agreement, a Think subsidiary marketed the Think Cash product using
First Bank of Delaware’s name and trademarks, took loan applications
from consumers, and serviced the loans in exchange for one hundred
dollars per loan fee for each funded loan from First Bank of
Delaware.152 The First Bank of Delaware formally made and funded
the loans, but Think provided the marketing, underwriting, and
technology platform.153
Under the master participation agreement, another Think
subsidiary agreed to purchase, on a daily basis, a 99 percent
participation interest in each ThinkCash loan made by First Bank of
Delaware.154 In exchange, Think was obligated to pay a monthly
participation fee of one hundred dollars per loan plus a percentage of
the revenue generated by the 99 percent participation interests to First
Bank of Delaware.155 Additionally, Think was required to maintain a

150. Id. ¶¶ 6–8, 11, 25.
151. See Commonwealth v. Think Fin., Inc., No. 14-CV-7139, 2016 WL 183289, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 14, 2016).
152. Id. ¶ 33.
153. Id. ¶ 6.
154. Id. ¶ 34. A participation is a type of a derivative interest. LEVITIN, BUSINESS
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 84, at 113–14. In a participation, the participation seller owns a loan
and sells off an undivided fractional economic interest in the loan, but retains complete legal title
to the loan. Id. This means that the purchaser of a participation interest is economically exposed
to the performance of the loan, but does not have contractual privity with the borrower on the
loan. See id. at 114. Instead, the purchaser’s only contractual privity is with the seller of the
participation interest, so its remedies in the event of nonperformance on the loan would lie solely
against the seller, not the borrower.
The use of participation interests, rather than outright sales of loans can be found even
in the earliest days of rent-a-bank arrangements. See Goleta Nat’l Bank v. O’Donnell, 239 F.
Supp. 2d 745, 747–78 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (noting that Goleta National Bank would sell payday
lender ACE Cash Express, Inc. a 90 percent participation in each loan).
155. Think Finance Undisputed Facts, supra note 146, ¶ 35.
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reserve account at First Bank of Delaware that could be used to offset
its obligations.156 Think later reduced its participation purchase
percentage to 90 percent, but indemnified First Bank of Delaware for
any losses that exceeded 2.5 percent of the loan balance.157 Finally,
under the guaranty agreement, Think’s holding company guarantied
the obligations of its subsidiaries under the other contracts.158 Think
was not the formal lender on the loans because it did not fund them,
nor was it the creditor of record, so it claimed that it was merely a
servicing agent of First Bank of Delaware.159
In 2008, the FDIC initiated an enforcement action against First
Bank of Delaware for its unsafe and unsound third-party lending
activity, including with Think.160 First Bank of Delaware entered into a
consent order where it agreed to discontinue its various rent-a-bank
relationships.161 Nevertheless, First Bank of Delaware continued to
work with Think until 2011, albeit through a restructured program.
Specifically, a pair of new Think subsidiaries began providing the
marketing, underwriting, technology platform and loan servicing to
First Bank of Delaware, while the participation interests were
purchased by a newly created special purpose vehicle (“SPV”),
Universal Finance II, LLC, that outside investors funded.162
Universal Finance promised its investors a 17 percent annual
return, guaranteed by Think Finance.163 Think Finance also agreed to
purchase from Universal Finance interest in any defaulted loans in
exchange for receiving all residual net income after the 17 percent paid
to investors as an “administrative fee.”164 Additionally, pursuant to an

156. Id. ¶ 36.
157. Id. ¶ 38.
158. Id. ¶ 37.
159. Brief of Defendant Kenneth E. Rees’s [sic] in Support of Motion to [sic] for Summary
Judgment Statement at 5–6, Commonwealth v. Think Fin., Inc., No. 2-14-cv-07139 (E.D. Pa. Apr.
1, 2019).
160. Order to Cease and Desist, Order for Restitution, and Order to Pay at 1, First Bank of
Delaware, FDIC-07-256b & FDIC-07-257k (Oct. 9, 2008). I served as an expert witness for the
FDIC in this matter. The First Bank of Delaware dissolved in 2012. Complaint ¶ 43,
Commonwealth v. Think Fin., Inc., No. 2-14-cv-07139 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Think
Finance Complaint].
161. Think Finance Undisputed Facts, supra note 146, ¶ 40.
162. Id. ¶¶ 42–43. Universal Finance II, LLC’s owner and managing member was the brother
of a First Bank of Delaware director. Id. ¶ 45.
163. Id. ¶¶ 44, 51.
164. Id. ¶ 51.
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administrative agency agreement, a Think Finance entity managed
Universal Finance.165
As its business expanded, Think Finance found itself needing an
additional source of funding for the loans. In the summer of 2010,
Think contracted with a Chicago-based investment firm called Victory
Park Capital to provide the funding for the loans.166 Victory Park
Capital purchased the right to purchase up to $90 million in
participation interests in various Think Finance products from
Universal Finance, with Think Finance guarantying Victory Park
Capital a 20 percent return.167
In October 2010, however, the FDIC ordered First Bank of
Delaware to cease its relationship with Think.168 Desperate to find a
new partner to replace First Bank of Delaware, Think unsuccessfully
contacted eighty banks169 before it embarked on a new strategy for
evading state usury laws: rent-a-tribe.
B. Think Finance’s Rent-a-Tribe Model
As the rent-a-bank model collapsed in the face of federal
regulatory pressure, Think Finance shifted to partnering with Native
American tribes.170 Native American tribes are themselves not subject
to state usury laws because of sovereign immunity.171

165. Id. ¶ 52.
166. Id. ¶ 56; About Us, VICTORY PARK CAP., https://www.victoryparkcapital.com [https://
perma.cc/GN57-AYNT].
167. Think Finance Undisputed Facts, supra note 146, ¶¶ 58–60.
168. Id. ¶ 62.
169. Id. ¶ 65.
170. Id. ¶ 67; Think Finance Complaint, supra note 160, ¶ 47.
171. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 825 (2014) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“[P]ayday lenders . . . often arrange to share fees or profits with tribes so they can use tribal
immunity as a shield for conduct of questionable legality.”). Regarding application of state law to
tribal payday lending, cf. Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., 769
F.3d 105, 115–16 (2d Cir. 2014) (upholding denial of a motion for preliminary injunction against
state regulators from interfering with tribal lending business allegedly taking place off tribal
lands); Williams v. Big Picture Loans, 929 F.3d 170, 174 (4th Cir. 2019) (dismissing the suit because
the lending entities affiliated with the Native American tribe were entitled to sovereign immunity
as “arms of the Tribe”).
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Think formed partnerships with three tribes.172 In these “rent-atribe” partnerships,173 Think again provided the complete turnkey
infrastructure for marketing, underwriting, funding, and collecting the
loans, including providing customer leads, a technology platform,
investors to fund the loans, and payment processing and collection
platforms.174 Think also trained customer service agents to handle calls,
drafted call scripts, drafted and administered contracts, hosted
websites, monitored tribal employees, identified third-party collection
agencies, and facilitated the sale of delinquent accounts.175
When consumers obtained credit through the rent-a-tribe
arrangement, the loan agreements purported to be loan agreements
with the tribes and to be subject solely to tribal law and jurisdiction.
Yet the tribes maintained only a minimal economic interest in the
loans. Instead, a Cayman Islands company called GPL Servicing Ltd.,
which was controlled by Victory Park Capital,176 purchased a
participation interest of between 90 and 99 percent.177 In exchange for
the participation interest, the tribes were paid a fee based on the gross
revenue from the enterprise.178 The arrangement depended on the
tribe, with one tribe getting 4 percent, another 4.5 percent, and the
third a graduated amount.179

172. Think Finance Undisputed Facts, supra note 146, ¶ 102.
173. See generally Nathalie Martin & Joshua Schwartz, The Alliance Between Payday Lenders
and Tribes: Are Both Tribal Sovereignty and Consumer Protection at Risk?, 69 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 751 (2012) (providing a broad overview of the rent-a-tribe model of payday lending).
174. Think Finance Complaint, supra note 160, ¶ 48.
175. Complaint ¶ 30, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Think Fin., LLC, No. 4:17-cv-00127 (D.
Mont. Nov. 15, 2017) [hereinafter CFPB Complaint].
176. Disclosure Statement Accompanying Second Modified First Amended Joint Chapter 11
Plan of Reorganization of Think Finance, LLC and Its Subsidiary Debtors and Debtors in
Possession at 4, In re Think Fin., LLC, No. 17-33964 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2019) [hereinafter
Think Finance Disclosure Statement]. GPL stands for Great Plains Lending, the first of the tribal
lending entities with which Think Finance partnered. Second Amended Complaint ¶ 94,
Commonwealth v. Think Fin., Inc., No. 2-14-cv-07139-JCJ (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2017) [hereinafter
Second Amended Think Finance Complaint]. GLP Servicing, Ltd. was originally named VPC/TF
Fund II Ltd. Id.
177. CFPB Complaint, supra note 175, ¶ 45.
178. Second Amended Think Finance Complaint, supra note 176, ¶¶ 101, 103, 104.d; CFPB
Complaint, supra note 175, ¶ 46. For a period of time, the tribes’ expenses were also reimbursed.
Id. ¶ 47.
179. Second Amended Think Finance Complaint, supra note 176, ¶¶ 101, 103, 104.d.
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GPL Servicing was structured so that Victory Park exercised all of
the voting shares and thus all of the management rights.180 The
nonvoting shares were held by various investors, including a Think
affiliate.181 As with the previous Universal Finance arrangement, Think
guaranteed a 20 percent annual return for GPL Servicing investors.182
Any return above the 20 percent went to Think.183 In other words,
Victory Park was simply providing the funding through a structure that
imitated a loan, while Think held the equity interest in the venture.
Think flew high for a while. In 2013, Forbes ranked it number two
on its list of America’s Most Promising Companies,184 and from 2010 to
2015 it was on the Inc. 5000 List of Fastest Growing Companies.185
Think even bragged that it was the original fintech, noting that
“[b]efore the term ‘fintech’ was coined, Think Finance was an
established leader and innovator in the marketplace for online
lending.”186
Think’s days were numbered, however. In 2013, the Department
of Justice (“DOJ”) commenced Operation Choke Point, an anticonsumer fraud operation that targeted banks that provided ACH
processing for consumer fraudsters.187 While the DOJ brought only a
handful of prosecutions,188 Operation Choke Point spooked the
banking industry.189 Soon after, many banks allegedly cut ties with

180. Cf. Think Finance Undisputed Facts, supra note 146, ¶ 103 (“GPL Servicing . . . [was] a
Cayman Islands limited partnership controlled by VPC.”).
181. Think Finance Disclosure Statement, supra note 176, at 4–5.
182. Second Amended Think Finance Complaint, supra note 176, ¶¶ 90.a, 91; cf. CFPB
Complaint, supra note 175, ¶ 48 (listing an 18 percent guaranteed return).
183. Second Amended Think Finance Complaint, supra note 176, ¶ 90.a; CFPB Complaint,
supra note 175, ¶ 49.
184. Think Finance Disclosure Statement, supra note 176, at 3.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Guilty Until Proven Innocent? A Study of the Propriety and Legal Authority for the
Justice Department’s Operation Choke Point: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regul. Reform,
Com. and Antitrust L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 7–8 (2014) (written
testimony of Adam J. Levitin, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center).
188. See Complaint, United States v. Four Oaks Fincorp, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-00014-BO
(E.D.N.C. Jan. 8, 2014); Complaint, United States v. CommerceWest Bank, No. 15-cv-00379
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2015); Complaint, United States v. Plaza Bank, No. 15-cv-00394 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 12, 2015).
189. See Kevin Wack, Beware the Tidy Narrative About Operation Choke Point, AM.
BANKER: BANKSHOT (Nov. 8, 2018, 3:09 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/
beware-the-tidy-narrative-about-operation-choke-point [https://perma.cc/S7CW-SLBL].
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payday lenders and high-cost installment lenders. Think struggled to
find banks to continue processing payments for the tribal lending
entities,190 and had to eventually turn to a Canadian payments
processor.191 Around the same time, the State of New York sent a cease
and desist letter to one of Think’s tribal partners, which responded with
a lawsuit, funded by Think,192 seeking an injunction against the State.193
The district court denied the request for a preliminary injunction in an
opinion that cast doubt on the tribe’s sovereign immunity claim.194
As a result of Operation Choke Point and the New York litigation,
Victory Park Capital started to get cold feet about its arrangement with
Think.195 As consumer class actions and state and federal enforcement
actions against Think piled up, Victory Park eventually pulled the plug
on Think’s financing, precipitating Think’s bankruptcy filing in
October 2017.196
Around the time that Think’s troubles with the ACH system were
emerging, Think undertook two important developments. First, it
developed an installment loan product called “RISE” that it would
offer directly in states in which usury caps were not a constraint.197
RISE replaced Think’s original PayDay One product.198
Second, in May 2014, Think, apparently with Victory Park
Capital’s support, spun off both its direct lending and branded
consumer products portfolio into a new independent company called
Elevate Credit, Inc. (“Elevate”).199 Elevate had the same shareholders
190. Second Amended Think Finance Complaint, supra note 176, ¶¶ 110–12.
191. Think Finance Undisputed Facts, supra note 146, ¶ 129.
192. Id. ¶ 213.
193. Second Amended Think Finance Complaint, supra note 176, ¶ 112.
194. Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., 974 F. Supp. 2d 353,
361 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 769 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2014).
195. Second Amended Think Finance Complaint, supra note 176, ¶¶ 111–13.
196. Think Finance Disclosure Statement, supra note 176, at 6–7.
197. Second Amendment Think Finance Complaint, supra note 176, ¶ 115.
198. Think Finance Undisputed Facts, supra note 146, ¶ 18.
199. Think Finance Disclosure Statement, supra note 176, at 3; Think Statement of
Undisputed Facts, supra note 146, ¶ 224. The spin-off has subsequently been challenged as a
fraudulent transfer. While the complaint was filed under seal, the court order granting the sealed
filing motion inadvertently gives away the nature of the suit. See Order Granting Emergency
Motion For Leave To File Complaint Under Seal, Think Fin. Litig. Tr. v. Elevate Credit, Inc. (In
re Think Fin., LLC), No. 17-33964 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2020) (“The Clerk of Court’s Office
is directed to accept as filed under seal the Trust’s Complaint to Avoid and Recover Transfers
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 548 and 550, and §§ 24.001 et seq. of the Texas Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act.”).
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as Think.200 The rump business left in the Think entity continued to
provide technology and administrative services to the tribal lenders up
until its 2017 bankruptcy.201 In the face of a new regulatory
environment, Elevate, Think’s real successor, moved back to a
revamped version of Think’s original rent-a-bank model. The
remainder of this section examines the current Elevate rent-a-bank
model in detail.
C. Elevate Credit, Inc.
Elevate operates as a state-licensed lender making direct loans
itself in several states. It operates primarily, however, through bank
partnerships with two small state-chartered and FDIC-regulated
banks, Republic Bank & Trust Company of Kentucky ($6.5 billion in
total assets, 1,086 employees)202 and FinWise Bank (“FinWise”) of
Utah ($326 million in total assets, ninety-eight employees).203 Not
coincidentally, both Kentucky and Utah allow unlimited interest on
smaller contractual loans.204 The fact that Elevate makes the loans itself
in states where there the usury cap is not an obstacle underscores that
its relationship with the banks is solely about evading state usury laws
and not because of value the banks otherwise bring.
Elevate lends to nonprime consumers and consumers with thin
credit files or no credit scores.205 It offers two credit products, Elastic
and RISE, in the United States.206 Elastic is a line of credit product for

200. Think Finance Disclosure Statement, supra note 176, at 17.
201. See id. at 3.
202. Republic Bank & Trust Company, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www7.fdic.gov/sdi/
main.asp [https://perma.cc/UY96-2PWX] (last updated Mar. 31, 2021).
203. FinWise Bank, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www7.fdic.gov/sdi/main.asp [https://
perma.cc/T67Y-4Y23] (last updated Mar. 31, 2021).
204. Kentucky law provides,
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, a bank may take, receive, reserve, and
charge on money due or to become due on any contract or other obligation in writing,
where the original principal amount is fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) or less,
interest at any rate allowed national banking associations by the laws of the United
States of America.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 286.3-214 (West 2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-1-1 (LexisNexis 2021)
(“The parties to a lawful written, verbal, or implied contract may agree upon any rate of interest
for the contract, including a contract for services, a loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or
services, or a claim for breach of contract.”).
205. See Elevate Credit, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 15 (Feb. 14, 2020) [hereinafter
Elevate 2020 Annual Report].
206. Id. at 7.
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loans between $500 and $4,500 for up to ten months.207 Elastic is offered
in some forty states, solely through a bank partnership with Republic
Bank.208 The weighted average effective annual percentage rate
(“APR”) on Elastic loans is 98 percent,209 well above most states’ usury
caps.
The RISE product varies by state. It is sometimes an installment
loan product and sometimes a line of credit product. Elevate is a
licensed nonbank lender in several states where it offers RISE
directly.210 It also offers RISE through a credit services organization in
one state,211 but in nineteen states it offers RISE through a partnership
with FinWise Bank.212 The partnership RISE product is for a loan
between five hundred and six hundred dollars, with a maturity of seven
to twenty-six months.213 The weighted average effective APR on the
RISE loans is 129 percent,214 again well above most states’ usury caps.215
Elevate’s secret sauce for all of its products is its proprietary
underwriting technology platform. Elevate boasts,
Our proprietary risk analytics infrastructure utilizes a massive
(approximately 80+ terabyte[s]) Hadoop database composed of more
than ten thousand potential data variables related to each of the 2.4
million customers we have served and about 8.6 million applications
that we have processed. Our team of over 50 data scientists uses our
proprietary technology to build and test scores and strategies across
the entire underwriting process, including segmented credit scores,
fraud scores, affordability scores and former customer scores. We use
a variety of analytical techniques from traditional multivariate
regression to machine learning and artificial intelligence to continue
to enhance our underwriting accuracy while complying with
applicable US and UK lending laws and regulations.216

207. Id. at 15.
208. Id. at 9.
209. Id. The annual percentage rate is a standardized measure of the cost of credit as a yearly
rate. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.14(a) (2021) (addressing open-end credit calculation); 12 C.F.R. §
1026.22(a) (2021) (close-end credit calculation).
210. See Elevate 2020 Annual Report, supra note 205, at 115.
211. This is another, Texas-specific method of evading state usury and licensure laws.
212. Elevate 2020 Annual Report, supra note 205, at 8.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. State Rate Caps for $500 and $2,000 Loans, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. (July 2021),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/payday_loans/FS_State_Rate_Caps_202
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2GF-TP5P].
216. Elevate 2019 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 8.
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In other words, Elevate represents something beyond a run-of-the-mill
storefront payday lender (and it is not actually a payday lender).
Instead, it is a cutting-edge fintech firm that uses a massive database
and a team of data scientists to extend credit to borrowers who might
otherwise not be well-served by the financial system because of their
credit profiles.
D. Elevate’s Rent-a-Bank Nexus of Contracts
Elevate has separate but similar rent-a-bank arrangements for
both its Elastic and RISE products. The arrangements differ primarily
in the identity of the partner bank and the extent of the partner bank’s
retained interest in the loans, but are otherwise materially the same.
Critically, in both of the arrangements, Elevate—not the bank—
created and proposed the product.
Elevate’s relationships with Republic Bank and FinWise each
consists of three contracts (and amendments thereto): a joint
marketing agreement;217 a technology license and support
agreement;218 and a participation interest purchase and sale
agreement.219 Another important set of contracts is Elevate’s funding
agreements.
Notably, while the bank is a party on each of the agreements, a
different Elevate-affiliated entity is the counterparty:
•

The joint marketing agreements have either Elevate@Work,
LLC, or EF Marketing, LLC, as the Elevate parties.220 Both are
single-member LLCs, the sole member of which is another
Elevate entity (Elastic Financial, LLC, or EF Financial, LLC,
respectively), which is itself a single-member LLC, with Elevate
Credit, Inc. as the sole member.221

•

The technology license agreements are between the banks and an
Elevate Credit, Inc. subsidiary called Elevate Decision Sciences,

217. Elevate Registration Statement, supra note 9, Exhibit 10.5, 1; Elevate 2019 Annual
Report, supra note 9, at 679.
218. Elevate Registration Statement, supra note 9, Exhibit 10.6, 1; Elevate 2019 Annual
Report, supra note 9, at 736.
219. Elevate Registration Statement, supra note 9, Exhibit 99.1, 1; Elevate 2019 Annual
Report, supra note 9, at 782.
220. Elevate@Work, LLC, subsequently changed its name to Elastic Marketing, LLC.
Elevate Credit, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), Exhibit 10.1 (June 30, 2018).
221. Elevate 2019 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 325, 603.
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LLC.222 Elevate Decision Sciences is another single-member
LLC, with Elevate Credit, Inc. as the sole member.223
•

The participation interest purchase and sale agreements are
between the banks and SPVs structured as Cayman Island
exempted companies, Elastic SPV, Ltd., and EF SPV, Ltd.,
respectively.224 The SPVs are not formally part of Elevate Credit,
Inc.’s corporate group; their nominal equity is held in trust, but
they conduct no business other than facilitating Elevate’s
financing of Elastic and RISE loans, and they are consolidated
for financial reporting purposes.225 Elevate provides all the
management services for the SPVs through administrative
services agreements.226

Each agreement is discussed in turn below.
1. The Joint Marketing Agreements. The joint marketing
agreements are the lynchpin of the relationship between Elevate and
its partner banks. The joint marketing agreements set forth Elevate’s
responsibility to design and market the loans, but the agreements give
the banks the right to approve the terms of the loan. For example, the
joint marketing agreement with FinWise Bank provides that FinWise
may offer loans to consumers who apply
at one or more websites, direct mail or other marketing channels
operated or identified by [EF Marketing, LLC] and approved by
[FinWise Bank] and who meet applicable credit standards and other
qualifications established by [FinWise Bank]. [FinWise Bank] may
change the terms and conditions applicable to the Loans, fees charged
to Borrowers, maximum amount of credit lines, the Program
Guidelines, the Credit Policy, the Credit Model Policies and the
Underwriting Criteria.227

At first blush, it would seem that FinWise controls the terms of the
loans and the underwriting criteria, but an inspection of the definitions
222. Id. at 325.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 41, 77. The ownership of Cayman Island exempted companies is not public, but
Cayman Islands SPVs are generally “orphan” SPVs with the equity held by a charitable or
purpose trust. See CONYERS, DILL & PEARMAN, SECURITIZATION IN THE CAYMAN ISLANDS 4
(2016) (explaining orphan SPV structures).
225. Elevate 2019 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 87.
226. Id. at 739; Elevate Registration Statement, supra note 9, Exhibit 10.7, 1.
227. Elevate 2019 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 679.
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for the contract shows that the arrangement is more complex.
“Program Guidelines” are defined as the “guidelines proposed by [EF
Marketing, LLC] and approved by [FinWise Bank] . . . including . . .
the Credit Policy or Underwriting Criteria . . . [and] the Credit Model
Policies . . . .”228 In other words, Elevate created and proposed the
entire design of the RISE product, including the underwriting
guidelines. While FinWise has to ultimately sign off on the product, it
did not design the product, and presumably FinWise would not have
entered into the joint marketing agreement with Elevate without
having a good idea of what the RISE product would look like.
How the contractual relationship has played out in fact is unclear.
For example, has FinWise ever refused a proposal from Elevate? Has
FinWise ever sought to change the program’s terms? The contract
contemplates the possibility that the answer to both questions could be
no, with FinWise merely rubber-stamping Elevate’s proposals. Indeed,
if Elevate is the entity with the lending expertise, with its enormous
database and team of data scientists that almost outnumbers FinWise’s
entire workforce, it is hard to see how FinWise could possibly exercise
any material input into the loans’ terms. Elevate’s agreement with
Republic Bank for Elastic is materially similar.229
Elevate subsidiary EF Marketing, LLC (“EF Marketing”) has
some obligations itself under the joint marketing agreement. Not only
is EF Marketing supposed to propose all the guidelines for
administration of the program, but it is also obligated to “perform
services reasonably required to market the Program,” including:
(A) acquiring, scrubbing and managing lead lists, (B) preparing and
distributing product offerings and associated marketing materials,
including pre-qualified offers, as approved by FB, (C) developing and
placing internet, print media, radio and television advertising, (D)
designing and developing websites, (E) compensating third parties

228. Id. at 701.
229. As explained in the joint marketing agreement,
“Program Guidelines” shall mean those guidelines established by RB for the
administration of the Program, including, but not limited to, underwriting standards for
the Accounts (which shall include, without limitation, specific criteria for evaluating an
Applicant’s ability to repay the Account, including the Initial Advance and all
Subsequent Advances thereunder), the credit, charge-off and collection policies for the
Accounts, and all other operating procedures for the Accounts, as such guidelines may
be amended, modified or supplemented from time to time by RB in accordance with
the terms of this Agreement.
Elevate Registration Statement, supra note 9, Exhibit 10.5, 25.
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that provide marketing services in relation to the Program, (F) subject
to FB’s approval, delivering all notices and disclosures required by
applicable Law with each solicitation, and (G) contracting with
mutually agreed third parties to offer the Program to their clients.230

In exchange for these services, FinWise pays EF Marketing a
marketing fee for each new loan that is made.231 This fee is offset by
other fees paid by Elevate entities to FinWise.232 Thus, pursuant to the
joint marketing agreement, Elevate proposes the loan product’s design
and underwriting criteria and handles marketing of the loan in
exchange for a fee from FinWise. The terms of Elevate’s agreement
with Republic Bank for Elastic are materially similar.233
2. Technology License Agreement. The technology license
agreements are licenses for the banks to use Elevate’s software in
exchange for a per-loan fee.234 The software is described as “an
internet-based consumer credit platform that permits the collection,
verification, scoring, evaluation, funding, and account management of
installment loans.”235 It includes “an internet website landing page,”
“an accounting and loan tracking system” to ensure compliance with
all applicable laws, and “internet-based financial wellness materials for
Borrowers.”236 It also generates credit bureau reporting files in the
standard Metro II data format used by the major consumer reporting
agencies.237 The software is hosted on hardware located in a data center
under contract with Elevate.238
For Elastic, the software also enables automatic draws on the
borrower’s bank account.239 The software automates virtually the
entire loan process from the time a consumer applies for a loan to the
230. Elevate 2019 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 680.
231. Id. at 682.
232. Id. at 682–83.
233. Elevate Registration Statement, supra note 9, Exhibit 10.5, § 2(a), (d).
234. Elevate 2019 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 705, 719.
235. Id. at 719.
236. Elevate Credit, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) Exhibit 10.2, § 4 (Aug. 10, 2018)
[hereinafter Elevate Quarterly Report for Third Quarter 2018].
237. Elevate 2019 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 719; Elevate Quarterly Report for Third
Quarter 2018, supra note 236.
238. Elevate 2019 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 719; Elevate Quarterly Report for Third
Quarter 2018, supra note 236. For RISE, this was Amazon Web Services as of the contract date.
See Elevate 2019 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 707.
239. Elevate Quarterly Report for Third Quarter 2018, supra note 236.
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underwriting, funding, and servicing of the loan. All the bank needs to
do is press go.
The RISE technology license requires Elevate to provide the bank
with “reasonable access to its Technical Information, credit and
business models underlying the Credit Model Policy, including all
pricing, credit, and underwriting assumptions thereto and the Credit
Model Documentation,” and the bank has a right to test and validate
the information.240 The Elastic license merely requires Elevate to
provide “reasonable cooperation” in connection with Republic Bank’s
testing and validation of the software.241 Republic Bank does not have
a contractual right to access the underlying software’s coding, for
instance, for Elastic.
It is unclear whether the banks have ever in fact exercised their
access, testing, and validation rights under the contracts. Given that
Elevate is the party with the technical expertise, the partner banks may
not even have the wherewithal to test and validate the software.
Notably, the reasonable access provision contradicts another provision
of the technology license, which forbids the bank to look under the
hood at the software’s code.242 The license agreement structure means
that the loans are made using software that is a black box to the bank,
such that the bank does not actually understand the underwriting
decisions.
The technology license agreement also includes an account
servicing provision in which Elevate undertakes to perform most of the
loan servicing duties. This includes maintaining account information,
providing initial account opening disclosures and periodic billing
statements, posting payments to borrowers’ accounts, and producing
reports on the accounts.243 Thus, it is Elevate, not Republic Bank, that

240. Elevate 2019 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 720.
241. Elevate Registration Statement, supra note 9, Exhibit 10.6, Exhibit A, § D.
242. See id. at Exhibit 10.6, § 4 (“Licensee shall not itself, or through any parent, subsidiary,
Affiliate or any other third party: (a) modify, decode, decompile, disassemble, reverse engineer
or otherwise translate the Software, Documentation or Tools, in whole or in part . . . .”); see also
Elevate 2019 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 708 (“FB shall not itself, or through any parent,
subsidiary, Affiliate or any other third party: (a) modify, decode, decompile, disassemble, reverse
engineer or otherwise translate the Software, Documentation or Tools, in whole or in part . . . .”).
243. Elevate Registration Statement, supra note 9, Exhibit 10.6, Exhibit D, § 1; Elevate 2019
Annual Report, supra note 9, at 726. The Elastic Participation Agreement says that Republic will
service loans or arrange for a third party to service the loans. Elevate Registration Statement,
supra note 9, Exhibit 99.1, § 3(a).
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maintains the relationship with the customer from loan origination
through the life of the loan.
3. Participation Agreement. The third leg of Elevate’s contractual
rent-a-bank nexus is the participation purchase and sale agreement.
Elevate’s participation purchase and sale agreements are technically
option contracts that give Elastic SPV and EF SPV an option, but not
an obligation, to purchase participation interests in the loans made by
Republic Bank and FinWise Bank, respectively. Specifically, Elastic
SPV has the option to purchase a 90 percent participation interest from
Republic Bank, while EF SPV has the option to purchase a 96 percent
participation interest from FinWise.244 The purchase price is equal to
the outstanding principal amount of the loan times the participation
percentage plus a purchase premium and a participation fee.245 This fee
offsets the marketing and technology license fees paid by the banks to
the Elevate entities.
The Elastic Participation Agreement means that Republic Bank
retains the Elastic loans on its books and is outwardly the legal party
in interest in the loans, even though it only has a 10 percent economic
interest in the loans. The RISE participation agreement means that
FinWise Bank retains the RISE loans on its books and is outwardly the
legal party in interest, even though it only has a 4 percent economic
interest.246 By structuring the participation purchases as options, it
would appear that Republic Bank and FinWise Bank could find
themselves in a position where they make Elastic or RISE loans, only
to discover that they are holding 100 percent of the economic exposure
on those loans because the Elevate entities have elected not to exercise
their purchase option. A closer look at the participation agreements,
however, shows that there is virtually no chance that Elevate entities
will not exercise the option.
Using the Elastic Participation Agreement as the paradigm, we
see that Elastic SPV’s option is to purchase a participation interest in
any advance funded at least three business days prior.247 But Elastic
SPV must notify Republic Bank of its election to purchase “not less
244. Elevate 2019 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 76–77; Elevate Registration Statement,
supra note 9, Exhibit 99.1, § 2(b).
245. Elevate 2019 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 76–77; Elevate Registration Statement,
supra note 9, Exhibit 99.1, § 2(b).
246. Elevate 2019 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 76–77.
247. Elevate Registration Statement, supra note 9, Exhibit 99.1, § 2(a).
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than three (3) Business Days prior to the related Purchase Date.”248 In
other words, Elastic SPV must notify Republic Bank at the time of
origination if it will be purchasing the loans. While the actual purchase
does not happen for three days,249 Elastic SPV is already contractually
obligated for the purchase, and the purchase obligation is collateralized
with an account at the bank. This means that Republic Bank never has
to loan without knowing if Elastic SPV will buy the participation
interest. Moreover, if Elastic SPV has purchased an interest in an initial
advance to a borrower, it is deemed to have agreed to purchase an
interest in any Subsequent Advance.250 For a revolving line of credit,
this means that once one dollar is advanced, Elastic will buy all
subsequent advances. The original RISE participation agreement is
not publicly available, only its amendments, but presumably it has
similar terms.
4. The Funding Agreements. The final piece of Elevate’s rent-abank structure involves the source of the funding for the loans. While
the banks are the nominal lenders, the purchase of the participation
interests makes the SPVs the real funders of the loans. But where do
the SPVs get their money?
The SPVs are themselves nothing more than pass-through
conduits used for bankruptcy remoteness purposes. Their use ensures
that the investors in the SPV will not have to compete with Elevate’s
other creditors for rights in the participation interests in the event of
Elevate’s bankruptcy (hardly an impossibility in light of Think
Finance’s 2017 bankruptcy). The funding for the SPVs comes through
a credit agreement with none other than the same entity that funded
Think Finance—an investment firm called Victory Park Capital.251
Specifically, Elastic SPV and EF SPV each have a loan facility with
Victory Park Capital (multiple Victory Park Capital funds are lenders
to each SPV).252 Those loan facilities are guaranteed by Elevate Credit,

248. Id. § 2(b).
249. Part of the purchase price is paid on the purchase date (the principal balance times the
participation percentage), with the participation fee and purchase premium paid within ten
business days of the end of each calendar month. Id. In other words, the funding of the loan comes
from the Elastic SPV within three business days of the loan being made, while the payment to
Republic Bank for participating in the partnership is made on a monthly basis.
250. Id. § 2(a).
251. Elevate 2019 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 146.
252. Id.
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Inc. through a credit default protection agreement, such that any credit
losses on the loans fall on Elevate Credit, Inc., in exchange for a fee.253
In other words, the funding comes from Victory Park Capital, but
Victory Park Capital is taking on the credit risk of Elevate as a going
concern, not the Elastic loans themselves. The SPV is just functioning
to provide the investors with priority for the participation interest
collateral through entity structuring. The funding of the SPVs is
effectively a securitization of the participation interests in the subprime
consumer loans done through a set of privately placed notes.
E. Contractual Doublespeak
Looking at the entirety of Elevate’s relationships with Republic
Bank and FinWise Bank, it is impossible to conclude that the banks
play any meaningful role in the lending process. To be sure, they
nominally retain the entire loan, but the sale of the participation
interest shifts almost all of the credit risk to the Elevate SPVs. The
banks play no meaningful role in the design of the products, in their
marketing, in the underwriting of borrowers, or in the servicing of the
loans. Instead, the only purpose of the banks’ involvement with the
products appears to be facilitating evasion of state usury laws. This is
particularly clear with RISE, because Elevate offers the product
directly in states where it can do so without violating the state’s usury
laws. Elevate does not offer RISE directly in states with a usury cap,
but instead partners with a FinWise Bank in those states. There is no
obvious gain from adding FinWise Bank to the mix, much less only in
the states with usury caps. To the contrary, adding in the bank partner
only adds transaction costs and operational inefficiencies. The only
purpose for FinWise Bank’s involvement is to enable Elevate to claim
that RISE is not violating usury laws.
Elevate appears to be aware of the issue. In both the contracts and
its annual report, Elevate takes pains to insist that its bank partners
maintain control over the entire product, even though it provides the
marketing, the website, the technology platform, and the underwriting,
funding, and servicing of the loans.254 For example, Elevate states in its
annual report:

253. Id. at 135.
254. According to the Elastic Participation Agreement,
RB and ESPV each acknowledge and agree that it is the intention of the Parties that
RB is the sole lender with respect to the Accounts and the Receivables, and ESPV shall
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Under the terms of our agreement with Republic Bank, we provide
them with marketing services related to the Elastic program and
license them our technology platform and proprietary credit and
fraud scoring models to originate and service Elastic customers.
However, as the originator of the Elastic lines of credit, Republic
Bank reviews and approves all marketing materials and campaigns
and determines the underwriting strategies and score cutoffs used in
processing applications. In addition, Republic Bank defines all
program parameters and provides full compliance oversight over all
aspects of the program.255

This claim is hard to square with the automated nature of the
underwriting and the black box nature of the underwriting software.
Elevate brags,
Credit and fraud determinations are made in seconds and
approximately 94% of loan applications for all products are fully
automated with no manual review required, based on our proprietary
credit and fraud scoring models and affordability assessments. Once
approved, the customer is provided the loan amount and relevant
terms of credit being offered. Of the approximately 6% of loan
applications requiring manual review, in the US the majority require
further documentation, which can be provided via scanning, fax,
email or mail, others may have failed a fraud rule in the applicable
underwriting methodology, and are managed based on the rule failed,
and others are reviewed to address “know your customer” and/or
[Office of Foreign Asset Control] requirements.256

This means that for 94 percent of loans, the bank has no real
involvement in the underwriting decision. The underwriting criteria

not assert that it is the lender of the Accounts and the Receivables in connection with
any litigation, regulatory purpose or any other purpose.
Elevate Registration Statement, supra note 9, Exhibit 99.1, § 19(e). Additionally, in the Form 10K, the parties state,
We do not originate and do not ultimately control the pricing or functionality of Elastic
lines of credit originated by Republic Bank, Rise loans originated by FinWise Bank
(“FinWise”) and the Today Card originated by Capital Community Bank (“CCB”)
(collectively the “Bank-Originated Products” and the “Bank Partners” or the
“Banks.”)
Elevate 2019 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 43.
255. Elevate Credit, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 9 (Feb. 26, 2021) (Elastic); id. at 8
(RISE).
256. Elevate 2019 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 19. Additionally, the form states that “[a]s
a result of our proprietary technology and risk analytics, approximately 94% of loan applications
are automatically decisioned in seconds with no manual review required.” Id. at 8.
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are proposed by Elevate (subject to the bank’s approval), and the
actual underwriting is done automatically in almost all cases by the
software Elevate licensed to the bank. While that software should
reflect the agreed-upon criteria, it is contractually a black box to the
bank.257 As for the other 6 percent of cases, the underwriting is still
automated through the black box software, but with manual document
collection and data input. In other words, for all intents and purposes,
the underwriting is all done by Elevate, even if it is the bank that
presses the go button.
Likewise, the structuring of the transactions as sales of
participation interests seems designed to give Elevate a stronger basis
for claiming that the banks are in fact the lender—after all, the loans
remain on the banks’ books the entire time. Indeed, from a consumer’s
perspective, this arrangement is potentially deceptive. The consumer
might reasonably believe that the bank was the real party in interest on
the loans and therefore that the applicable usury law was the one
applicable to the bank, not the one applicable to Elevate entities.
There is no obvious reason why Elevate would choose to use a
participation purchase structure rather than an outright sale other than
to strengthen its claim to shelter in the banks’ regulatory status. A
purchase of a participation interest is inherently a riskier investment
than a purchase of a loan outright in part because the holder of the
participation interest lacks the ability to control the loan completely.
Elevate largely sidesteps these risks via contract, but that is the point—
the only reason to go to so much trouble creating an ersatz loan
purchase is because an actual loan purchase would reduce Elevate’s
claim that the bank is the actual lender. Whether Elevate’s state-ofthe-art rent-a-bank structure holds up remains to be seen; Elevate has
been sued by the District of Columbia for violating the District’s usury
laws.258
257. See Elevate Registration Statement, supra note 9, Exhibit 10.6, § 4 (“Licensee shall not
itself, or through any parent, subsidiary, Affiliate or any other third party: (a) modify, decode,
decompile, disassemble, reverse engineer or otherwise translate the Software, Documentation or
Tools, in whole or in part . . . .”); Elevate 2019 Annual Report, supra note 9, at 708 (“FB shall not
itself, or through any parent, subsidiary, Affiliate or any other third party: (a) modify, decode,
decompile, disassemble, reverse engineer or otherwise translate the Software, Documentation or
Tools, in whole or in part . . . .”).
258. Complaint for Violations of the Consumer Protection Procedures Act at 3–4, District of
Columbia v. Elevate Credit, Inc., 2020-CA-002697 (D.C. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2020). The District of
Columbia has also sued Opportunity Financial, another nonbank lender that partners with a bank
(again, FinWise Bank, one of Elevate’s partner banks) for violation of the District’s usury and
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There are two key takeaways here. First, this case study
underscores the sophisticated and deliberate design of rent-a-bank
structures that have been constructed to provide insulation from legal
challenges. And second, but for Elevate being a public reporting
company, the details of its rent-a-bank arrangements, and even their
very existence, would be unknown. The use of a sale of participation
interests, rather than a sale of the loans outright, makes Elevate’s
involvement in the loans all but invisible. This Article’s conclusion will
return to the significance of this point.
IV. THREE COMPETING DOCTRINAL APPROACHES
Rent-a-bank transactions are premised on the idea that the
nonbank can shelter in the bank’s exemption from state usury laws by
virtue of being the bank’s transferee by assignment or participation.
Whether the nonbank transferee of a loan from a bank can in fact step
into the shoes of the bank for usury law purposes is a sharply disputed
doctrinal question. It is a question that affects rent-a-bank transactions,
but potentially other transactions, particularly securitization, where
loans are sold by bank sponsors to nonbank SPVs, and sales of
defaulted debt from bank originators to nonbank debt buyers.
This Part reviews the three different doctrinal approaches courts
have taken to these transactions: (1) the valid-when-made rule, which
holds that if a loan was not usurious in the hands of its originator, it
cannot become usurious in the hands of a transferee; (2) the Madden
rule, which holds that a nonbank transferee may not shelter in the
bank’s exemption from state usury laws; and (3) the true lender
doctrine, which applies the usury law to the party deemed the real
lender in the circumstances of the transaction.
A. The “Valid-When-Made” Doctrine
The legal viability of rent-a-bank schemes is premised on a
doctrine called valid-when-made. This doctrine holds that if a loan was
not subject to a state usury law when it was made, it can never
subsequently become so upon transfer.259 Thus, if a loan is made by a
lending licensing laws. Complaint for Violations of the Consumer Protection Procedures Act at
2, District of Columbia v. Opportunity Fin., LLC, 2021-CA-001072 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Apr. 5, 2021).
259. See Kaur v. World Bus. Lenders, LLC, 440 F. Supp. 3d 111, 121 (D. Mass. 2020)
(describing the supposed doctrine as “if the interest rate in the original loan agreement was nonusurious, the loan cannot become usurious upon assignment—so, the assignee lawfully may
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bank that is exempt from state usury laws by virtue of the National
Bank Act of 1864 (“NBA”) or Federal Deposit Insurance Act
(“FDIA”), the loan will remain exempt from state usury laws in the
hands of a nonbank transferee that is not exempt from state usury laws.
Proponents of valid-when-made argue that it is a “well
established” common law doctrine and that it is a “cardinal rule” of
banking law and essential for the functioning of banking markets.260
Specifically, they argue that the doctrine is necessary to protect bank
liquidity261 and to vindicate banks’ powers to charge interest and to sell
loans.262 Without the doctrine, its proponents argue, there is
uncertainty about whether higher rate loans are sellable, which can
lead to inefficient pricing in secondary markets.263
Valid-when-made proponents further argue that the doctrine was
incorporated into section 85 of the NBA, the interest rate exportation
provision for national banks.264 The NBA incorporates the common
law as it existed in 1864,265 and valid-when-made is purported to have
charge interest at the original rate” (quoting Rent-Rite Superkegs W., Ltd. v. World Bus. Lenders,
LLC (In re Rent-Rite Superkegs W., Ltd.), 603 B.R. 41, 66 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019))).
260. Brief of the Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C., Fin. Servs. Roundtable, Consumer Bankers
Ass’n, and Loan Syndications and Trading Ass’n as Amici Curiae in Support of Rehearing and
Rehearing en Banc at 5–6, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d. Cir. 2015) (No.
14-02131-cv) (quoting Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 103, 109 (1833)); Brief of the Structured
Fin. Indus. Grp., Inc., and the Sec. Indus. and Fin. Mkts. Ass’n as Amici Curiae in Support of
Defendants-Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing en Banc at 8,
Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 86 F.3d 246 (2d. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-02131-cv); see also Petition
for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing en Banc by Defendant-Appellees at 13–14, Madden v.
Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-02131-cv) (arguing that the validwhen-made doctrine is a “cardinal principle” and “essential for [the bank’s] operations”).
261. See, e.g., Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise
Transferred, 85 Fed. Reg. 33,530, 33,532–33 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 &
160); Federal Interest Rate Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,146, 44,149, 44,151 (July 22, 2020) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 331).
262. Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Chase Card Funding LLC, Chase
Issuance Trust, and Wilmington Trust Company at 8–9, Petersen v. Chase Card Funding, LLC,
No. 19-cv-00741 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2019).
263. See, e.g., Marvin, supra note 57, at 1839–40.
264. National Bank Act § 16, 12 U.S.C. § 85.
265. See Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2286 (2016) (“[W]e presume that Congress
legislates against the backdrop of the common law . . . .”); Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 320
(2015) (instructing courts to follow “[t]he canon of construction that statutes should be
interpreted consistently with the common law . . . [to] interpret a statute that clearly covers a field
formerly governed by the common law”); Isbrandtsen Co., Inc. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783
(1952) (“[S]tatutes which invade the common law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring
the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the
contrary is evident.”).
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been part of the usury common law that was incorporated into the
statute.266 They further claim that it is incorporated into section 1831d
of the FDIA,267 enacted in 1980,268 which preempts state usury laws for
state-chartered banks, because FDIA section 1831d is patterned on
section 85 of the NBA and is read in pari materia with the NBA.269
Proponents also argue that the doctrine follows from the common law
of contracts because the assignee of a contract takes all the contractual
rights of an assignor. Accordingly, a nonbank transferee merely steps
into the shoes of a bank from which it acquires a loan and accedes to
all the bank’s rights and privileges, including exemption from state
usury laws.270
The Office of the Solicitor General and the OCC endorsed the
valid-when-made doctrine in a brief opposing granting a writ of
certiorari in Madden.271 The OCC and FDIC subsequently endorsed
the doctrine in another amicus brief.272 In 2020, the OCC and FDIC
codified the doctrine in a pair of nonuniform rulemakings.273
The OCC rule provides that “interest on a loan that is permissible
under [the National Bank Act] shall not be affected by the sale,
266. See Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred,
85 Fed. Reg. at 33,532; Letter from Structured Fin. Ass’n and Bank Pol’y Inst. on Proposed Rule
on Federal Interest Rate Authority, RIN 3064-AF21 (Feb. 4, 2020), https://bit.ly/393X1jy
[https://perma.cc/M877-8PJW]; see also Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104,
108 (1991) (noting a presumption that Congress legislates in light of the common law); SCA
Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 966 (2017)
(discussing the “presumption that Congress legislates against the background of general commonlaw principles”).
267. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 § 521, 12
U.S.C. § 1831d.
268. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-221, § 521, 94 Stat. 193 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
269. See Greenwood Tr. Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 827 (1st Cir. 1992); Amicus Brief
of the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. and Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency in Support of
Affirmance and Appellee at 5–6, Rent-Rite Superkegs W., Ltd. v. World Bus. Lenders, LLC (In
re Rent-Rite Superkegs W., Ltd.), 603 B.R. 41, 66 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2019) (No. 19-cv-01552)
[hereinafter FDIC/OCC Amicus Brief].
270. FDIC/OCC Amicus Brief, supra note 269, at 14–16.
271. The Solicitor General opposed a grant of certiorari on the grounds that the case was not
a good vehicle, but still argued that it was wrongly decided. Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 13, 17, Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden, 577 U.S. 1214 (2016) (No. 15-610) (jointly
filed by the Solicitor General and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency).
272. FDIC/OCC Amicus Brief, supra note 269, at 3.
273. Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 85
Fed. Reg. 33,530 (June 2, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 & 160); Federal Interest Rate
Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,146 (July 22, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 331).
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assignment, or other transfer of the loan.”274 In other words, for
national banks, the OCC rule provides that section 85 of the NBA
applies to a loan even if it has been transferred to a nonbank.
The FDIC rule, in contrast, purports to clarify the timing for
evaluating an interest rate for purposes of the FDIA by providing that
whether interest on a loan is permissible under the FDIA “is
determined as of the date the loan was made” and is not affected by
“the sale, assignment, or other transfer of the loan, in whole or in
part.”275 State attorneys general have challenged both the OCC and
FDIC rules.276
B. The Madden Rule
An alternative approach to the application of state usury laws to a
nonbank assignee of a bank emerged in the Second Circuit’s 2015
decision in Madden v. Midland Funding.277 Madden involved a putative
class action brought against a nonbank debt buyer, Midland Funding,
for violation of New York’s usury law.278 Midland had purchased the
defaulted credit card debt of named plaintiff Saliha Madden from FIA
Card Services, N.A., a national bank subsidiary of Bank of America,
N.A., itself another national bank.279 Madden was a New York
resident.280 The debt had an annual interest rate of 27 percent and
purported to be governed by Delaware law.281 Delaware allows credit
card debt to have whatever interest rate is agreed upon contractually,282
whereas New York has a 16 percent usury cap.283 After Midland
attempted to collect the debt of approximately five thousand dollars

274. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(e) (2020); see also 12 C.F.R. § 160.110(d) (2020) (providing identical
regulation for federal savings associations).
275. 12 C.F.R. § 331.4(e) (2020).
276. Complaint at 2, California ex rel. Becerra v. FDIC, No. 20-cv-5860 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20,
2020); Complaint at 2, California ex rel. Becerra v. Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, No.
20-cv-5200 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2020).
277. Madden v. Midland Funding, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015).
278. Id. at 247.
279. Id. at 247–48.
280. Id. at 247.
281. Id. at 248.
282. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 943 (West 2021).
283. The Second Circuit cites New York’s 25 percent annual rate for criminal usury. Madden,
786 F.3d at 248 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40 (Consol. 2021)). The civil usury rate applicable
to a bank in New York is 16 percent annually. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501(1) (McKinney
2021); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 14-a(1) (McKinney 2021).
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from Madden, she brought suit for violation of New York’s usury law
and the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.284
The district court held that the NBA would preempt any usury
claim against Midland, the nonbank debt buyer,285 but on appeal, the
Second Circuit reversed:286
[b]ecause neither defendant is a national bank nor a subsidiary or
agent of a national bank, or is otherwise acting on behalf of a national
bank, and because application of the state law on which Madden’s
claims rely would not significantly interfere with any national bank’s
ability to exercise its powers under the NBA . . . .287

For NBA preemption to apply to an entity other than a national
bank, the application of state law “must significantly interfere with a
national bank’s ability to exercise its power under the NBA.”288 This
“significantly interfere” standard comes from the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson,289
which the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 codified.290 The Second Circuit reasoned that while “it is
possible that usury laws might decrease the amount a national bank
could charge for its consumer debt in certain states,” such an effect
does not significantly interfere with national bank powers.291
C. “True Lender” Doctrine
1. True Lender as an Application of Usury’s Anti-Evasion
Doctrine. The valid-when-made rule and the Madden rule are both
bright-line rules. Whereas valid-when-made looks solely at the loan
originator, Madden looks instead to the identity of the party holding
the loan. Many courts, however, have eschewed such bright line rules
in favor of the true lender doctrine that determines the application of
usury law based on which party has the real economic interest in the
loan.
284. Madden, 786 F.3d at 248.
285. Id. at 247.
286. Id. at 255.
287. Id. at 247.
288. Id. at 250.
289. Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
290. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 12 U.S.C. §
25b(b)(1)(B).
291. Madden, 786 F.3d at 251.
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True lender doctrine has its roots in a long-standing anti-evasion
principle in usury law. Historically, courts have looked through a
transaction’s form to its substance to determine if the form is but a
mere contrivance to evade usury laws.292 As the Supreme Court noted
in 1835,
The ingenuity of lenders has devised many contrivances, by which,
under forms sanctioned by law, the statute may be evaded. . . . Yet it
is apparent, that if giving this form to the contract will afford a cover
which conceals it from judicial investigation, the statute would
become a dead letter. Courts, therefore, perceived the necessity of
disregarding the form, and examining into the real nature of the
transaction. If that be in fact a loan, no shift or device will protect it.293

As the Ruling Case Law treatise summarized:
The cupidity of lenders, and the willingness of borrowers to concede
whatever may be demanded or to promise whatever may be exacted
in order to obtain temporary relief from financial embarrassment, as
would naturally be expected, have resulted in a great variety of
devices to evade the usury laws; and to frustrate such evasions the
courts have been compelled to look beyond the form of a transaction
to its substance, and they have laid it down as an inflexible rule that
the mere form is immaterial, but that it is the substance which must
be considered.294

292. See, e.g., Whitworth v. Adams, 26 Va. (1 Rand.) 333, 337–38 (1827) (“[T]he only
question in all [usury] cases like the present is, what is the real substance of the transaction, not
what is the colour and form.” (quoting Lowe v. Waller, 2 Doug. 736, 740, 99 Eng. Rep. 470, 472
(K.B. 1781))); Scott v. Lloyd, 34 U.S. (1 Pet.) 418, 459 (1835) (“If the real contract was for a loan
of money, without any view to a purchase, it is plainly within the statute of usury . . . .”); Andrews
v. Pond, 38 U.S. (1 Pet.) 65, 76 (1839) (“[A]lthough the transaction . . . appears . . . free from the
taint of usury, yet if . . . any part of it[] was intended as a cover for usurious interest, [its] form . . .
will not protect [it] from the consequences of usurious agreements . . . .”); Wetmore v. Brien, 40
Tenn. (1 Head) 723, 727 (1859) (“[I]f the note were made . . . as an artifice to evade the usury laws
. . . the purchaser . . . will be held guilty of usury, if the discount shall have been greater than the
legal rate of interest.”); Mo., Kan. & Tex. Tr. Co. v. Krumseig, 172 U.S. 351, 356 (1899) (“[T]he
question always is whether it was or was not a subterfuge to evade the laws against usury.”);
Seeman v. Phila. Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403, 408 (1927) (“[T]he form of the transaction must
not ‘disguise its real character.’” (quoting Miller v. Tiffany, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 298, 310 (1864)));
Sachs v. Ginsberg, 87 F.2d 28, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (“It was the duty of the trial court to look
beyond the form . . . and, if found to be a loan and usurious, to bring it within the terms of the
statute, no matter how righteous the cloak of formality which was used to conceal its real
character.”).
293. Scott, 34 U.S. at 446–47.
294. 27 RULING CASE LAW 211 (William M. McKinney & Burdett A. Rich eds., 1920).
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Numerous state supreme courts have adopted similar statements,295 as
have federal courts of appeals when applying state law.296
This anti-evasion principle has been recently codified in one
state297 and has been reanimated in a string of modern cases dealing
295. See, e.g., Pope v. Marshall, 4 S.E. 116, 118 (Ga. 1887) (“[W]hether a given transaction is
a purchase of land or a loan of money . . . depends, not upon the form of the words used in
contracting, but upon the real intent and understanding of the parties.”); Crim v. Post, 23 S.E.
613, 616 (W. Va. 1895) (“The law evidently intends that the search for usury shall penetrate to
the substance.”); Barry v. Paranto, 106 N.W. 911, 912 (Minn. 1906) (“It is elementary that no
device or scheme intended for the purpose of evading the laws against usury will prevent the
courts from giving force to the statute and declaring contracts made in violation thereof null and
void.”); First Nat’l Bank of Ada v. Phares, 174 P. 519, 521 (Okla. 1918) (“In deciding whether any
given transaction is usurious or not, the courts will disregard the form which it may take, and look
only to the substance of the transaction in order to determine whether all the requisites of usury
are present.” (quoting 39 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 918 (William Mack ed.,
1912))); Bank of Lumpkin v. Farmers’ State Bank, 132 S.E. 221, 221 (Ga. 1926) (“The ingenuity
of man has not devised a contrivance by which usury can be legalized . . . . [T]he name by which
the transaction is denominated is altogether immaterial, if it appears that a loan of money was the
foundation and basis of the agreement which is under consideration.”); Fid. Sec. Corp. v.
Brugman, 1 P.2d 131, 136 (Or. 1931) (“The courts do not permit any shift or subterfuge to evade
the law against usury. The form into which parties place their transaction is unimportant.
Disguises are brushed aside and the law peers behind the innocent appearing cloaks in quest for
the truth.”); Beacham v. Carr, 166 So. 456, 459 (Fla. 1936) (“[C]ourts have been compelled to
look beyond the form of a transaction to its substance, and they have laid it down as an inflexible
rule that the mere form is immaterial, but that it is the substance which must be considered.”
(quoting 27 RULING CASE LAW, supra note 294)); Milana v. Credit Disc. Co., 163 P.2d 869, 871
(Cal. 1945) (“The courts have been alert to pierce the veil of any plan designed to evade the usury
law and in doing so to disregard the form and consider the substance.”); Austin v. Ala. Check
Cashers Ass’n, 936 So. 2d 1014, 1031–32 (Ala. 2005) (“[I]f . . . [the transaction] is in substance a
receiving or contracting for the receiving of usurious interest for a loan or forbearance of money
the parties are subject to the statutory consequences, no matter what device they may have
employed to conceal the true character of their dealings.” (quoting Hurt v. Crystal Ice & Cold
Storage Co., 286 S.W. 1055, 1057 (Ky. Ct. App. 1926))).
296. Anderson v. Hershey, 127 F.2d 884, 886 (6th Cir. 1942) (relying on the fact “[t]he courts
of Kentucky in usury cases look behind the form of the transaction to its substance”); Daniel v.
First Nat’l Bank of Birmingham, 227 F.2d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 1956) (“Usurious contracts are
condemned by public policy both state and national. . . . That public policy cannot be defeated by
the simple expedient of a written contract, but the real substance of the transaction must be
searched out.”).
297. The anti-evasion principle was codified in the 2004 Georgia Payday Lending Act, which
responded to rent-a-bank payday lending. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-17-1(c) (West 2020) (“[V]arious
payday lenders have . . . attempt[ed] to disguise these transactions or to cause these transactions
to appear to be ‘loans’ made by a national or state bank chartered in another state . . . even though
the majority of the revenues . . . are paid to the payday lender.”). The Georgia Payday Lending
Act included a provision that prohibited
[a]ny arrangement by which a de facto lender purports to act as the agent for an exempt
entity. A purported agent shall be considered a de facto lender if the entire
circumstances of the transaction show that the purported agent holds, acquires, or
maintains a predominant economic interest in the revenues generated by the loan.

LEVITIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

10/22/2021 10:01 AM

RENT-A-BANK

397

with rent-a-bank or rent-a-tribe situations under the name of true
lender doctrine. These cases attempt to determine which entity was the
true lender for the purposes of determining which usury laws apply.298
Thus, when determining whether New York law applied to a payday
lender in a rent-a-bank arrangement, the New York Supreme Court’s
Appellate Division noted that
we must look to the reality of the arrangement and not the written
characterization that the parties seek to give it, much like Frank Lloyd
Wright’s aphorism that “form follows function.” Thus, an
examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding this type
of business association must be used to determine who is the “true
lender,” with the key factor being “who had the predominant
economic interest” in the transactions.299

While “true lender” is often defined with reference to
predominant economic interest, it is ultimately a totality-of-thecircumstances inquiry about which party is serving as the lender. No
court has attempted to articulate an exclusive list of factors or their
weights, much less whether any factor is determinative.
Notably, only a few courts have outright rejected true lender
doctrine.300 Even some of the modern cases that are cited as supporting

Id. § 16-17-2(b)(4) (West 2020), upheld by BankWest, Inc. v. Baker, 411 F.3d 1289, 1293 (11th
Cir. 2005), vacated and appeal dismissed as moot, 446 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). The
Georgia Court of Appeals subsequently held that a payday lender could be liable for violating the
usury laws through a rent-a-bank transaction. Ga. Cash Am., Inc. v. Greene, 734 S.E.2d 67, 75
(Ga. Ct. App. 2012). Subsequently, numerous courts have adopted a similar position, whether in
the context of a complete preemption analysis for removal purposes or substantive preemption
in a merits ruling. See supra note 32 (listing cases). Some have claimed that the true lender
doctrine originates with the Georgia statute. See, e.g., John D. Skees, The Resurrection of Historic
Usury Principles for Consumption Loans in a Federal Banking System, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 1131,
1154 (2006); Hannon, supra note 57, at 1280. The existence of a pair of true lender cases from two
years prior to the statute, see infra note 298, plus Georgia’s well-developed jurisprudence on
disguised usury, see supra note 295, suggest that the statute was reflective of an established
doctrine, rather than the origin of the doctrine. Indeed, the Georgia court of appeals applied the
doctrine to a transaction that took place before the enactment of the statute, implying a common
law true lender doctrine that had merely been codified. See Ga. Cash Am., Inc., 734 S.E.2d at 75.
298. Goleta Nat’l Bank v. O’Donnell, 239 F. Supp. 2d 745, 748 n.2 (S.D. Ohio 2002); Goleta
Nat’l Bank v. Lingerfelt, 211 F. Supp. 2d 711, 714 n.4, 719 (E.D.N.C. 2002).
299. Spitzer v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 45 A.D.3d 1136, 1138 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007).
300. Beechum v. Navient Sols., Inc., No. 15-8239-JGB-KKx, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129782,
at *18 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2016); Sawyer v. Bill Me Later, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1367 (D. Utah
2014); Hudson v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. IP 01-1336-C H/S, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11226,
at *9 (S.D. Ind. May 30, 2002). Despite the deep historical roots of the true lender doctrine, the
OCC promulgated a true lender rule that abjured the doctrine. The OCC rule deemed a bank to
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the valid-when-made doctrine indicate that the analysis would be
different if a true lender allegation had been made.301 Indeed, a key
case often cited as support for valid-when-made actually engages in
something like a true lender analysis.302
2. True Lender Doctrine’s Application to Disaggregated Lending.
Yet it is also worth noting that no court has yet attempted to apply a
true lender analysis to a state-of-the-art rent-a-bank arrangement.
Applying true lender analysis to a structure such as Elevate’s requires
first disregarding the corporate separateness of the various affiliated
Elevate entities, as well as the unaffiliated SPV.
For the Elevate entities, collapsing corporate separateness is a
straightforward enough step, as they are all under common control.
The Elastic SPV or RISE SPV presents a slightly more complicated
situation, as the equity interest in the SPV is not held by an Elevateaffiliated entity. Yet it is hard to see the SPVs as anything other than
creatures controlled by Elevate: they were created for undertaking the
Elevate transactions, carry on no other business, have no employees of
their own, and transfer all of their economic risk to Elevate through
Elevate’s guaranties of the SPVs’ obligations.
Notably, Elevate is required to consolidate the SPVs for
accounting purposes.303 The accounting consolidation is based on an
economic reality test that looks to whether Elevate has control over
activities that both have a significant effect on the SPVs’ economic
performance and significant economic exposure for the SPVs.304
Retention of loan servicing gives Elevate the requisite control over the
SPV’s performance, and the guaranties mean that Elevate is obligated
to absorb the expected losses of the SPV. The accounting treatment is

be the lender for purposes of the interest rate exportation provision of the NBA if the bank were
merely “named as the lender in the loan agreement” or “funds the loan.” National Banks and
Federal Savings Associations as Lenders, 85 Fed. Reg. 68,742, 68,742 (Oct. 30, 2020). In other
words, the OCC rule hewed strictly to a form over substance approach that would preclude usury
(but not licensing) challenges to rent-a-bank arrangements. Congress, however, overturned the
OCC’s true lender rule under the Congressional Review Act procedure on a bipartisan vote. S.J.
Res. 15, Pub. L. No. 117-24, 135 Stat. 296 (2021). While congressional nullification of the OCC’s
rule is not the same as an outright endorsement of true lender doctrine, it strongly suggests that
Congress believes that it is best left to states to determine the application of usury laws.
301. See FDIC v. Lattimore Land Corp., 656 F.2d 139, 148 n.15 (5th Cir. 1981).
302. Krispin v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2000).
303. Elevate 2020 Annual Report, supra note 205, at 87.
304. See FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., FIN. ACCT. FOUND., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 167, at ii (2009).
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not a legal determination, but it is telling because it looks to the
economic reality of the transaction. Elevate’s accounting treatment
indicates that the use of the SPV is in part contrivance to create a legal
cutout to separate Elevate and its funder, Victory Park Capital, from
the transaction’s legal risks.
Even after the various Elevate entities and the SPVs are
consolidated for the purposes of true lender analysis, there are still the
issues that a bank is the lender of record for both Elastic and RISE and
that the loans remain on the bank’s balance sheets because it is only a
partial participation interest that is sold, not the loans themselves.
Again, the nature of the arrangement should make readily clear that it
is nothing more than a contrivance to evade usury laws—all of the
loans’ terms are proposed by Elevate; the banks otherwise do not make
similar loans (or even market the loans to their other customers); the
participation interest sales are nearly of 100 percent exposure; and the
banks have purchased every element of the lending process from
Elevate (marketing, underwriting, servicing, and almost all of the
funding). The fact that the bank retains nominal control of the
underwriting standards is beside the point if the bank does not engage
in this sort of collaboration on underwriting standards for its credit
products generally, excluding other rent-a-bank style transactions.
Thus, there should be little difficulty in concluding that Elevate is the
true lender for Elastic and RISE products, no matter the nominal
involvement of the banks as lenders of record.
While the application of true lender doctrine to Elevate’s products
is fairly straightforward, it is less so for marketplace lenders that truly
transfer the majority of the credit risk to unaffiliated capital market
investors. Elevate’s guaranties of the SPVs mean that the economic
exposure on the loans circled right back to Elevate through a chain of
contracts. How does true lender doctrine apply, however, when the
economic exposure on the loans is separated from the design and
production of the loans?
Consider Avant, a marketplace lender that makes loans at rates
under 36 percent APR.305 Avant makes the loans directly in states in
which the usury caps are not a binding constraint, but in a handful of
states where the usury cap is below 36 percent, Avant partners with

305. Personal Loans, AVANT, https://www.avant.com/personal-loans [https://perma.cc/
V8R9-DY4V] (“APRs ranging from 9.95%-35.99%.”).
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WebBank, a Utah-chartered industrial bank.306 One of those states is
Colorado, which has a 21 percent usury cap.307 Based on this, Colorado
sued Avant and another marketplace lender, Marlette, for violating its
usury statute.308
Colorado alleged that WebBank would serve as the initial funder
and lender of record on the loans.309 WebBank, however, would
allegedly sell without recourse the receivables on the loans—but not
the account relationship—within two business days to an Avantaffiliated entity.310 Avant allegedly handled all marketing, paid the
costs of underwriting, decided which loan applicants would receive
loans under the agreed-upon underwriting criteria, handled all
servicing and compliance, indemnified WebBank for all claims arising
from the partnership, and also paid all of WebBank’s legal fees
associated with the program.311 Moreover, if a consumer was declined
for a loan, only Avant allegedly had a right to solicit the consumer for
other products; WebBank had no right to contact the would-be
customers.312 Avant and WebBank allegedly shared in the profit on the
loans, but WebBank’s share was allegedly only around one percent of
the total profit.313
Thus far, the description of the Avant program does not differ
significantly from that of Elevate’s arrangements. The bank serves as a
front for a loan product designed, marketed, underwritten, and
serviced by the nonbank that is precluded by usury laws from directly
making the loans itself. Avant, however, adds in a twist in the way it
financed the loans. Avant retained some of the loans on its own balance
sheet314—a situation not much different from Elevate’s after its
guaranties of the SPVs’ obligations to Victory Park Capital are

306. Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 28, 57, Zavislan v. Avant of Colo. LLC, No. 2017-cv30377 (D. Colo. Nov. 30, 2018).
307. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-2-501 (West 2021).
308. Second Amended Complaint, Zavislan v. Avant of Colo. LLC, No. 2017-cv-30377 (D.
Colo. Nov. 30, 2018); Second Amended Complaint, Fulford v. Marlette Funding, LLC, No. 2017cv-30376, 2019 WL 4451038 (D. Colo. June 5, 2019).
309. Second Amended Complaint ¶ 30, Zavislan v. Avant of Colo. LLC, No. 2017-cv-30377
(D. Colo. Nov. 30, 2018).
310. Id. ¶¶ 31, 51.
311. Id. ¶¶ 37, 46, 52.
312. Id. ¶ 47.
313. Id. ¶ 55.
314. Id. ¶ 53.
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considered. Avant, however, also shifted some of the exposure on the
loans to third-party investors.315
Avant sold some of the receivables to institutional investors and
securitized others, with Avant continuing to act as servicer for the
securitization vehicles.316 Avant does not seem to guaranty the assetbacked securities issued against the receivables generated through its
program with WebBank.317 In other words, the economic exposure on
the securitized receivables has truly shifted to third-party investors.
So who is the true lender in the Avant situation?
•

Is it the third-party securitization investors or securitization
vehicles that hold the predominant economic interest in the
receivables? The investors have the economic exposure to the
loans, but they did not make the loans. Instead, they merely
bought the receivables in the secondary market.

•

Is it WebBank, which owns the loan accounts? WebBank has
almost no economic interest in the loans nor does it have much of
a role in the lending process, as it does not design, market,
underwrite, or service the loans.

•

Is it Avant, which designed, marketed, underwrote, and serviced
the loans? Avant does not hold an ongoing economic interest in
the securitized loans.

The point is that there is no single party that neatly fits the bill of being
the true lender because control is divided from economic exposure.
Avant has disaggregated the lending process more completely than
Elevate. While it is easy to predict how true lender analysis should
apply to Elevate, it is less clear with Avant. Although Colorado sued

315. Id.
316. Id. ¶¶ 53, 59, 60. The securitizations were both of the loans retained by Avant and loans
sold to third parties that Avant repurchased. Id. Curiously, Victory Park Capital has been
involved in at least some Avant securitizations. Victory Park Capital, KKR Lead $175MM
Securitization of Avant Consumer Loans, ABLADVISOR (Nov. 20, 2015, 7:45 AM),
https://bit.ly/3nlVwCJ [https://perma.cc/W94U-4HSZ].
317. Avant’s securitization deals are all Rule 144A unregistered transactions, so the deal
documents are not publicly available. Avant’s securitizations, however, appear to be without
recourse, but have credit enhancements including senior–subordinate tranching, excess spread,
overcollateralization, and pre-funded reserve accounts. See, e.g., Kroll Bond Rating Agency
Assigns Preliminary Ratings to Avant Loans Funding Trust 2016-A, BUS. WIRE (Feb. 08, 2016,
2:29 PM), https://bwnews.pr/35a2vbl [https://perma.cc/Z765-ABLH]. For explanation of these
different types of credit enhancements, see Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the
Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177, 1191 n.44, 1192 n.47 (2012).
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both Avant and the securitization vehicles that purchased the
receivables under a true lender theory, the issue was never resolved, as
the case settled.318 Uncertainty about the application of true lender
doctrine to this novel fact pattern likely contributed to Colorado’s
willingness to settle.
D. Taking Stock of the Doctrinal Landscape
To summarize, courts have taken a variety of approaches when
dealing with disaggregated lending situations. Under valid-whenmade, usury laws do not apply to nonbanks in rent-a-bank transactions.
In contrast, under the Madden rule, the nonbank would be subject to
state usury laws only if it purchased the loans outright. Under true
lender doctrine, the nonbank would be subject to state usury laws
irrespective of how the transaction was structured if it were deemed
the real party in interest. Yet it is unclear how true lender doctrine
would actually apply to more complex transactions that disaggregate
the various interests in the loan among numerous unaffiliated parties.
The doctrinal confusion about how to address rent-a-banks is a
symptom of a judicial system attempting to make sense of the mismatch
between the regulatory system and economic realities of disaggregated
lending. The upshot of this doctrinal confusion is that there is little
predictability or consistency about how courts will analyze any
particular disaggregated lending situation.
V. RECONCILING LEGAL DOCTRINE WITH DISAGGREGATED
LENDING
This Part turns to the normative question of how to reconcile the
law and the economic realities of disaggregated lending. It argues that
the best approach is to backstop an easily administrable presumption
similar to the Madden rule with an anti-evasion principle like the true
lender doctrine. In other words, the initial presumption should be that
only banks benefit from federal preemption of state usury laws. If the
bank, however, is alleged not to be the key party in the transactional
design and operation, then courts should inquire into the specific facts
and circumstances of the lending arrangement, and in particular, look
at which party originated the product arrangement. If the idea for the
318. Assurance of Discontinuation, Avant of Colo., LLC & Marlette Funding, LLC (Colo.
Adm’r of the Unif. Consumer Credit Code & Att’y Gen. of Colo. Aug. 7, 2020),
https://coag.gov/app/uploads/2020/08/Avant-Marlette-Colorado-Fully-Executed-AOD.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4CKU-ZYR2].
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loan product emerged from the nonbank, rather than the bank, that
fact should weigh heavily toward treating the nonbank as the lender.
This Part begins with a consideration of the policy defects of validwhen-made. It then turns to the benefits of the Madden rule, before
considering the need for the Madden rule to be buttressed by an antievasion doctrine and disclosures.
A. The Dangers Posed by Valid-When-Made
The valid-when-made position stands on three legs: its supposed
historicity, its supposed importance for bank safety and soundness, and
its supposed importance for ensuring the provision of credit to
marginal borrowers. This section addresses each in turn before turning
to the real effect of valid-when-made, namely the creation of a
regulatory vacuum.
1. The Spurious Pedigree of the Valid-When-Made Doctrine. A
key argument for the valid-when-made doctrine is its supposed
historicity. Proponents claim that it is a “well-established and widely
accepted” common law doctrine that is a “cardinal rule” of banking law
endorsed by multiple U.S. Supreme Court decisions.319 By virtue of
being part of the common law, the doctrine was supposedly
incorporated into section 85 of the NBA and thus again into section
1831d of the FDIA, because that provision is patterned on the NBA.
The doctrine’s deep historical roots have been claimed by the
Office of the Solicitor General,320 the OCC and FDIC,321 law firms

319. See, e.g., FDIC/OCC Amicus Brief, supra note 269, at 10. It is also worth noting that the
valid-when-made doctrine is federal common law. This would seem to create a problem for the
doctrine. The Supreme Court made clear in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
that federal courts cannot create federal common law governing state law claims when sitting in
diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 79. Usury claims are state law claims, so to the extent that there is
diversity jurisdiction, there is no basis for a federal common law rule. Jurisdiction might be federal
question jurisdiction based on section 85 of the National Bank Act of 1864, 12 U.S.C. § 85, and
section 1831d of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 12
U.S.C. § 1831d, but neither statute can support as broad of a doctrine as valid-when-made.
Instead, any federal common law under either statute would have to be confined to the scope of
the statute.
320. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
321. See FDIC/OCC Amicus Brief, supra note 269, at 10.
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representing major financial institutions,322 and trade associations.323
The doctrine’s historical basis has been endorsed sua sponte by a
federal bankruptcy court, as well as accepted by much of the scholarly
literature.324
The doctrine’s supposed historicity is actually an implicit policy
argument: this is how we’ve always done things, so don’t go fouling
them up with a change in doctrine. In other words, the supposed
historicity suggests to courts that they are not writing on a blank slate,
but are facing the overwhelming weight of precedent. Moreover, the
doctrine’s supposed historicity is fundamentally a claim to legitimacy
as the already existing state of the law. By claiming a historical pedigree
for the doctrine, its proponents implicitly reject the idea that the
problem of how to apply usury laws when high-cost loans are
transferred between banks and nonbanks is a new problem that
necessitates courts accounting for public policy considerations like
consumer protection.
The doctrine’s actual historicity, however, has never actually been
probed. As a companion doctrinal analysis to this Article shows, the
historicity of the valid-when-made doctrine is entirely spurious.325 The
doctrine is a modern invention. There is no mention of the doctrine in
any reported case or treatise prior to 2019, and no case can be found
that is consistent with the doctrine prior to 1979.326

322.

See, e.g., SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, OCC PROPOSES A RULE TO ESTABLISH WHEN
2 (2020) (“For centuries—predating the enactment
of the NBA in 1864—caselaw and market practice had established that an interest rate valid at
the origination of the loan remained valid even after the originator (whether or not a bank) sold
or assigned the loan to another party (whether or not a bank).”); DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL
LLP, FEDERAL BANKING REGULATORS CAN AND SHOULD RESOLVE MADDEN AND TRUE
LENDER DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2018), https://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/madden-truelender-federal-regulatory-fix-whitepaper_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ2F-A55J] (“A longsettled legal principle known as the ‘valid-when-made’ doctrine has served for almost two
centuries as the bedrock for bank lending.”).
323. See, e.g., Letter from Nathaniel L. Hoopes, Exec. Dir., Marketplace Lending Ass’n, to
the Off. of the Comptroller of Currency (2019), https://bit.ly/2Lfwfwu [https://perma.cc/P53BP3VZ]; Letter from Kristi Leo, President, Structured Fin. Ass’n & Naeha Prakash, Senior Vice
President, Bank Pol’y Inst. to Fed. Ins. Deposit Corp. (Feb. 4, 2020), https://bit.ly/2XmDbed
[https://perma.cc/Q4AF-FNRE] (noting “centuries-old fundamental market expectations”).
324. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
325. Adam J. Levitin, The Spurious Pedigree of the “Valid-When-Made” Doctrine, 71 DUKE
L.J. ONLINE (forthcoming 2022).
326. Id.
A BANK IS THE “TRUE LENDER” OF A LOAN
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2. Valid-When-Made Does Not Meaningfully Protect Bank
Liquidity. The second policy claim made for valid-when-made is that
it is important for bank safety-and-soundness because it protects
banks’ liquidity. In particular, proponents of the doctrine claim that the
doctrine is economically necessary because, without it, banks could not
sell loans in the secondary market.327 Without the doctrine, they claim,
banks could purportedly find themselves illiquid, and there would be
uncertainty over the validity of sale transactions that would result in
reduced sale prices for banks and confusion in secondary markets.328
Thus, Judge Posner, when confronted with the issue, noted that the
only effect of applying usury law to “assignees would be to make the
credit market operate less efficiently.”329
Yet it is hard to see how the doctrine is essential to the banking
system given that the system has operated successfully for centuries
without it. If the doctrine never existed until recently, it could hardly
be a precondition for bank credit markets to function. Moreover, validwhen-made only affects the ability of banks to transfer otherwise
usurious loans to nonbanks. Valid-when-made is not necessary for a
secondary market in nonusurious loans, and indeed, banks regularly
sell their nonusurious loans without incident even in jurisdictions that
have rejected valid-when-made.
As for higher cost loans, there is a circularity to the liquidity
argument. Without the doctrine, would banks be likely to make those
higher-cost loans in the first place? In most instances, and particularly
for very high-cost loans, the answer is no. The overwhelming majority
of bank loans charge rates beneath the usury cap of the borrower’s
home state. The rent-a-bank model indicates that banks only make
these high-cost loans because they are guaranteed a buyer; the banks
do not want to hold the risk on these loans and do not even market
them to their own customers.330
327. FDIC/OCC Amicus Brief, supra note 269, at 17 (stressing that any other position would
be “uneconomic” and “disastrous in terms of bank operations”); Rent-Rite SuperKegs W., Ltd.
v. World Bus. Lenders, LLC (In re Rent-Rite SuperKegs W., Ltd.), 603 B.R. 41, 66 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 2019) (“Any contrary legal standard would interfere with the proper functioning of state
banks . . . .”).
328. See, e.g., Marvin, supra note 57, at 1839–40 (arguing that “Madden will undermine
secondary credit markets and create widespread price confusion”).
329. Olvera v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C., 431 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 2005).
330. Elevate’s Elastic product is not mentioned anywhere on Republic Bank’s website.
FinWise Bank’s website does not advertise Elevate’s RISE product, but on its lending page says
“If you have received offers from our other Partners, please click the button below.” Lending,
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Indeed, the third policy argument for valid-when-made, discussed
further below, is that the doctrine helps expand provision of credit to
marginal borrowers. That could be true if and only if the doctrine
encourages banks to make loans that they would not otherwise make.
Therefore, without the doctrine, banks would rarely have to worry
about the liquidity of portfolios of otherwise usurious loans, as they
simply would not have such loans on their books.
A careful look at the modern banking system also shows that
valid-when-made would actually do little work to protect bank liquidity
in the current regulatory and market structure. First, since 1913, when
banks are pressed for liquidity (such as in a financial crisis), they turn
to the Federal Reserve’s discount window, where they are able to
obtain liquidity by borrowing against illiquid assets like loans, rather
than selling the loans into secondary markets.331 Borrowing from the
Federal Reserve’s discount window can be undertaken nearly
instantaneously.332 In contrast, selling a loan portfolio takes time to
negotiate, diligence, and document, and that is time that a bank does
not have when it is facing a liquidity crisis. Moreover, to the extent that
banks rely on loan sales to relieve liquidity problems (and rarely in
crisis situations), it is through sales of performing loan portfolios to
other banks, which are nearly all exempt from state usury laws. Only
defaulted receivables are likely to be sold to nonbanks (as in the
Madden case), but those defaulted receivables sell at such a heavy
discount—generally one to three cents on the dollar—that they do not
provide meaningful liquidity relief.
Second, the principal secondary market in loans is the market for
mortgages. State usury laws are specifically preempted for most

FINWISE BANK, https://www.finwisebank.com/lending [https://perma.cc/EQY4-TRW4]. The
webpage also says that “[o]ur Partners include American First Finance, Liberty Lending,
Lendingpoint, OppLoans, Mulligan Funding, Behalf and rise.” Id. Upon pressing on the link, it
takes the reader to another page with a very brief summary of each of the partner products and a
“Learn More” link that takes the consumer to the partner’s website. Strategic Partnerships,
FINWISE BANK, https://www.finwisebank.com/strategic-partnership-products [https://perma.cc/
4XNA-CXX2].
331. 12 U.S.C. § 347b(a).
332. See David Henry, U.S. Banks Borrow at Discount Window After Fed Offers Stigma
Relief, REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2020, 4:56 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthcoronavirus-fed-banks/u-s-banks-borrow-at-discount-window-after-fed-offers-stigma-reliefidUSKBN21D3JA [https://perma.cc/APW8-PH23].
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mortgages, regardless of the entity that holds them.333 In other words,
the largest bank asset class is already exempted from usury laws
without regard to institution type, so valid-when-made does not work
in this area.
Third, there are over five thousand FDIC-insured banks, virtually
all of which benefit from NBA or FDIA preemption.334 Banks can and
do sell loans to each other. Even without a valid-when-made doctrine,
there is a sizeable potential secondary market for non-mortgage loans
that is unaffected by state usury laws.
In short, the liquidity argument for valid-when-made does not
hold water in the contemporary market. The only liquidity it produces
is liquidity in high-cost, risky loans that banks would be unlikely to
make in the first place unless they believed that they had a guaranteed
buyer—which is precisely the case with rent-a-bank loans. This means
that the only policy argument with traction for valid-when-made is that
it is necessary to ensure provision of credit to riskier borrowers. But as
the following section addresses, this is a dubious policy goal and one
that really reflects a collateral attack on the wisdom of state usury laws,

333. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1735f-7, 1735f-7a. The broad express preemption for mortgages suggests
that Congress did not intend such broad preemption for other types of loans.
334. Statistics at a Glance, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Sept. 30, 2020),
https://www.fdic.gov/analysis/quarterly-banking-profile/statistics-at-a-glance/2020sep/industry.pdf
[https://perma.cc/65WH-9Z6L]. Every state except Iowa either: (1) allows all loans at any rate
agreed upon by contract, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1201(A) (LexisNexis 2021); (2) exempts all
banks from usury laws, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XV, § 1, or (3) has bank parity statutes that explicitly
or effectively allow the banks chartered by a state to charge the highest rate allowed to a bank
with a charter from another state or a federal charter, e.g., D.C. CODE § 26-1401.08 (2021); 205
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5(11) (2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 167F, § 2(31) (2021); MINN. STAT. § 48.61,
subdiv. 8 (2020); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 12-a (McKinney 2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-25.5(B)
(West 2020); see also Schroeder, supra note 75, at 203 (noting that all but two states had parity
laws in 2003, one of which has since adopted a parity law); NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note
75 (listing parity statutes). Only Iowa’s State Banks are incapable of purchasing all loans from all
other state-chartered banks, irrespective of the interest rate on the loan. Iowa has 249 statechartered banks, which collectively hold less than 0.5 percent of all assets in the U.S. banking
system. See Number of Banks, IOWA DIV. BANKING, https://bit.ly/3b4eiLY [https://perma.cc/
G6DQ-PWVP] (displaying a chart that records 249 state-chartered banks for the third quarter of
2020); Iowa State Chartered Banks: Net Loans and Leases, Total Deposits, and Total Assets, IOWA
DIV. BANKING, https://bit.ly/3kBiwxy [https://perma.cc/NG64-HZED] (displaying a chart that
records $91 billion of total assets held by Iowa state chartered banks at the end of the third quarter
of 2020); Total Assets, All Commercial Banks, FRED, https://bit.ly/2Pl0bK5 [https://
perma.cc/KKE7-4ZR4] (depicting total commercial banking assets of $20.22 trillion on
September 23, 2020 based on the data retrieved from the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System).
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a surprisingly popular body of laws that have been adopted by
referendum in a number of states.
3. Credit Provision to Less-Creditworthy Borrowers Does Not
Depend on Valid-When-Made. Valid-when-made proponents also
argue that the doctrine helps ensure the provision of credit to less
creditworthy borrowers. Whether credit provision to such marginal
borrowers is desirable is a hotly debated question beyond the scope of
this Article.335 But even if it were desirable, it is far from clear why
valid-when-made is necessary to achieve such an end. Nothing prevents
banks themselves from making loans to riskier borrowers and charging
appropriate risk premiums. Banks, after all, are generally not subject
to state usury laws.
Banks, however, have little interest in serving this population. The
risks, including reputational risk, offset the profits. Instead, it is
primarily nonbanks that focus on subprime consumer and small
business installment and non-card-based revolving lending. Without a
valid-when-made doctrine, loans made by these nonbanks, even if in
partnership with banks, are likely to be subject to state usury laws.
Therein is the real point: valid-when-made is merely a collateral attack
on state usury laws. If state usury laws are ill-advised as a policy matter,
they should be addressed directly, rather than through a roundabout
evasion combining rent-a-bank transactions and a concocted modern
doctrine.
4. Valid-When-Made Produces a Regulatory Vacuum. Validwhen-made is effectively a collateral attack on state usury laws in the
guise of a historical claim. Moreover, valid-when-made is actually an
affirmatively bad policy position because it produces a regulatory
vacuum. NBA and FDIA preemption are part of a bundle of regulatory
benefits and burdens specific to banks. Allowing federal preemption of
state usury laws for banks to be assigned to a nonbank would result in

335. See Atkinson, supra note 57, at 1147–53 (arguing that credit is of limited benefit to lowincome Americans); Modernizing Consumer Protection in the Financial Regulatory System:
Strengthening Credit Card Protections: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urb.
Affs., 111th Cong. 216 (2009) (statement of Adam J. Levitin, Professor, Georgetown University
Law Center) (stating that credit cards are more complicated than any other financial product with
complex price terms, hidden fees, and overleverage that has led to nearly one trillion dollars of
outstanding credit card debt).
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a regulatory vacuum in which the nonbank would be exempt from state
law, but also not subject to federal regulation.336
That is precisely the effect of valid-when-made. It enables
nonbanks to evade compliance with state usury laws as well as state
licensure and supervision requirements without substituting any, much
less an equivalent, federal regulatory regime. For this reason, validwhen-made should be rejected as a policy position. It is a poor way of
addressing concerns over the restrictiveness of some states’ usury laws
and undermines the state-based regulatory system that has proven
more resilient against regulatory capture than federal banking
regulators.337
B. Benefits of the Madden Rule
The doctrinal confusion about how to handle disaggregated
lending makes it difficult to predict ex ante how any particular lending
arrangement will hold up if challenged as violating state usury or
licensing laws. Uncertainty is undesirable in commercial markets
because it impedes efficient business planning. The fact-specific nature
of true lender doctrine only furthers uncertainty, but either the validwhen-made rule or the Madden rule can resolve uncertainty equally
well.
The Madden rule is a better approach than the valid-when-made
rule because it creates transactional certainty without producing
regulatory vacuums. The Madden rule respects the clear statutory
boundaries of federal banking law while effectuating state usury laws.
Banking law is predicated on there being a fundamental difference
between banks and nonbanks. This is why banking law restricts entry
into banking through the limited granting of charters, as opposed to
state law free chartering of corporations. It is also why banks are
subject to an extensive and detailed regime of regulation and why
banks have certain privileges that accompany that regulatory regime.
The Madden rule captures this regulatory distinction between
banks and nonbanks. It grants banks the full measure of their
regulatory privilege, including interest rate exportation, but confines
that privilege to the banks—the entities that are also subject to the

336. See Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation, supra note 55, at 188–89 (arguing that a regulatory
vacuum would exist if banking entities not subject to federal regulation also benefitted from
federal preemption).
337. Id. at 199–205 (noting that complete capture of all state attorneys general is much less
likely than capture of federal regulators).
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concomitant regulatory burden. In other words, the Madden rule takes
seriously the conceit that bank safety-and-soundness regulation is
actually an adequate substitute for usury laws. Limiting banks’
privileges to banks is the only way an entity-based regulatory system
can in fact function. If banks can freely transfer their regulatory
privileges to nonbanks, there would be no purpose to a banking
charter. Rent-a-bank arrangements threaten the very concept of banks
as special entities.
The Madden rule also preserves state usury laws. The unspoken
heart of the valid-when-made doctrine is a distaste for state usury laws.
Usury laws are popular regulations; a number of states have adopted
them in recent years by overwhelming margins in popular referenda.338
Perhaps because of their popularity, the financial services industry has
never attacked state usury laws head-on, but instead has always
chipped around the edges, carving out certain types of institutions and
loans. Yet behind this approach rests a belief that state usury laws are
outmoded restrictions on contracts that unnecessarily restrain the
financial services industry.339 Valid-when-made is not an attack on the
level of state usury caps, but on their very existence. Whatever one
thinks of the merits of state usury laws, they are still the laws on the
books and should be respected as such. If they are misguided, they

338. See e.g., Pat Ferrier, Colorado Election: Proposition 111, Capping Interest on Payday
Loans, Passes, COLORADOAN (Nov. 7, 2018, 3:18 PM), https://www.coloradoan.com/story/
news/politics/elections/2018/11/06/colorado-election-proposition-111-passes-limits-interestpayday-loans/1890551002 [https://perma.cc/KP4X-MAYB] (reporting that the passage of
Proposition 111 in Colorado will cap the annual interest rate on payday loans at 35 percent and
eliminates other finance charges and fees); Michael Calhoun & Charla Rios, Study Finds Strong
Continuing Support for South Dakota’s Capping Consumer Loan Rates at 36% Interest,
BROOKINGS (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/study-finds-strong-continuingsupport-for-south-dakotas-capping-consumer-loan-rates-at-36-interest [https://perma.cc/UV3JENLB] (reporting the passage of a ballot resolution limiting consumer loan interest rates to 35
percent); Megan Leonhardt, Nebraska Becomes the Latest State To Cap Payday Loan Interest
Rates, CNBC (Nov. 4, 2020, 12:44 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/04/nebraska-becomes-thelatest-state-to-cap-payday-loan-interest-rates.html [https://perma.cc/R4BW-46RR] (reporting
Nebraska voters’ overwhelming support of a ballot initiative that caps rates on payday loans at 36
percent); Ohio Lender Interest Rate Cap, Referendum 5 (2005), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_Payday_Lender_Interest_Rate_Cap,_Referendum_5_(2008)
[https://perma.cc/P8GT-9UC4] (showing the passage of the Ohio Payday Lender Interest Rate
Cap Referendum, which caps the maximum interest rate payday lenders can charge at 28 percent
and the maximum loan amount at five hundred dollars).
339. See, e.g., Marvin, supra note 57, at 1844 (arguing that Madden will lead to “weighty
consequences” by cutting down the nascent P2P lending market and raise borrowing costs for
consumers).
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should be repealed, rather than evaded through regulatory arbitrage.
The Madden rule avoids a collateral attack on state usury laws.
Finally, and this is no small matter, the Madden rule has the
benefit of easy administrability and certainty. It is simple to apply
because it merely asks whether the entity holding the receivable on
which interest is accrued (and not the account which is meaningless in
a usury context) is a bank or not. If an entity is a bank, the applicable
usury law is that of the bank’s home state per section 85 of the NBA
and section 1831d of the FDIA. If an entity is not a bank, then whatever
state’s usury law would normally apply to the contract (generally the
law of the borrower’s state) applies.
In contrast with the fact-specific inquiry required for true lender
doctrine, the Madden rule preserves state usury laws in a sensible and
administrable fashion because it tracks institutional boundaries by
looking at who actually owns the loan. No further inquiry about the
transaction’s details must be undertaken under the Madden rule, so it
creates more transactional certainty than true lender doctrine.
C. Disclosure Requirements to Prevent Evasion
While the Madden rule represents the best of the three doctrinal
approaches to the application of usury laws to nonbank assignees of
banks, it is incomplete. The Madden rule’s administrability benefit
renders it susceptible to evasion because it is an entity-based rule, and
entity boundaries can be blurred by contract.
For example, consider World Business Lenders’ loan purchase
arrangements, Avant’s purchases of receivables (but not the loan
accounts), and Elevate Credit’s participation purchase arrangements.
Under the Madden rule, World Business Lenders would be the lender
because it purchased the loans themselves from the bank partner.
Avant’s treatment would be unclear because of the bank’s retained
interest in the loan account, and Avant’s retained residual interest in
the securitized loans. While the account itself has minimal economic
value, at least two courts have held that in the context of credit card
securitization it is sufficient grounds for not following Madden.340 Thus,
Avant might not be treated as the lender under Madden. Likewise,
Elevate Credit would not be treated as the lender under Madden
because it had not purchased the loans from the bank partner, only a
340. Cohen v. Cap. One Funding, LLC, 489 F. Supp. 3d 33, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 2020); Petersen v.
Chase Card Funding, LLC, No. 19-cv-00741-LJV-JJM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172413, at *17–18
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2020).
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derivative interest in them. The Madden rule invites evasion both
through sales of receivables, not accounts, and through contracts such
as participation sales and credit derivatives.
Thus, the Madden rule needs to be buttressed by the anti-evasion
principle from historical usury doctrine. Courts have recognized that
“[t]he ingenuity of lenders has devised many contrivances by which,
under forms, sanctioned by law, the [usury] statute may be evaded.”341
Thus, the Supreme Court noted that “if giving [credence to the] form
to the contract will afford a cover which conceals it from judicial
investigation, the [usury] statute would become a dead letter. Courts,
therefore, perceived the necessity of disregarding the form, and
examining into the real nature of the transaction.”342 An anti-evasion
principle effectively incorporates true lender doctrine, as it looks to the
true economic nature of the relationship by determining which party
has the economic risk and control regarding the loans.
An anti-evasion principle alone, however, is not enough to be
effective. Instead, an anti-evasion principle needs to be coupled with a
disclosure requirement. Banks seeking to enforce debt contracts
should be required to disclose whether they transferred an economic
interest in the contract to a nonbank. Without such a disclosure
obligation, neither consumers nor regulators would be able to tell if the
bank in fact remained the true party in interest on a loan or if the bank
had merely rented out its charter to a nonbank.
The case of Elevate Credit, Inc., is again instructive in this regard.
The only reason Elevate’s participation purchases are available for
review is because Elevate is a public reporting company.343 Likewise,
the dealings of World Business Lenders and Avant are visible only as
the result of litigation. If Elevate were not a reporting company, its
involvement in the Elastic and RISE credit products would be invisible
to borrowers. As far as borrowers could tell, the lenders on their loans
would be Elevate’s bank partners. As a result, borrowers would not be
able to vindicate their rights under state usury laws by bringing a true
lender challenge to the relationship; they would have no idea that a
true lender challenge would even be a possibility. Banking regulators
would theoretically be able to learn of the participations, but it would

341. Scott v. Lloyd, 34 U.S. (1 Pet.) 418, 419 (1835).
342. Id.
343. The only reason the details of Think Finance’s earlier rent-a-bank and rent-a-tribe
dealings are known is because of litigation brought by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that
took five years to reach summary judgment. See supra Part III.
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take quite a bit of sleuthing to piece together the relationship of the
various Elevate entities with one of its bank partners, not least because
the contracts are all with different Elevate entities whose names do not
always indicate affiliation. The same is true for Avant’s purchase of
receivables.
To address the possibility of evasion through derivative contracts,
including participations, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(“CFPB”) should require disclosure of the transfer of a material
economic interest in all consumer loans. The CFPB has the power to
prohibit deceptive and abusive acts and practices.344 Failure to inform
a consumer of the transfer of an economic interest in a loan is
potentially deceptive because it omits a material fact regarding the
consumer’s legal rights. Likewise, it is potentially “abusive” because it
“takes unreasonable advantage of . . . a lack of understanding on the
part of the consumer of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the
product or service,” namely the consumer’s lack of understanding that
the loan is usurious under the applicable law.345 If a bank has disclosed
that it parted with an economic interest in a loan, then in an action to
enforce the loan, the consumer debtor should be able to seek discovery
regarding the terms of such transfer to potentially raise a usury
defense.
D. Bringing True Lender Doctrine Up to Date
Yet even with adequate disclosure, the anti-evasion principle
might not be sufficient to address modern rent-a-bank arrangements
for two reasons: disaggregation, and clever legal counsel that masks
substance with process.
1. Disaggregation as Evasion. First, disaggregated lending can
make it difficult to identify a single party that is the true lender.
Although there are multiple parties that might contend for that role,

344. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531, 5536. Such a requirement should also exist for business loans, but the
ability to enact a parallel requirement for business loans, including small business loans, is more
complicated, because federal banking regulators lack a general power to prohibit unfair and
deceptive acts and practices. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FIL-44-2014, INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE
REGARDING UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE CREDIT PRACTICES (Aug. 22, 2014), https://www.fdic.gov/
news/financial-institution-letters/2014/fil14044.html [https://perma.cc/8XTF-7YCG] (noting that
the Dodd-Frank Act resulted in the repeal of federal banking regulators’ authority to issue unfair
and deceptive practices regulations).
345. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d)(2)(A).
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the traditional framing of true lender doctrine conceives there as being
a single true lender. In particular, applications of the doctrine often
look to see which party holds the predominant economic interest, a
formulation that may be too rigid to deal with disaggregated lending
arrangements.
Consider, for example, the difficulty in applying “true lender”
doctrine to Avant, the nonbank marketplace lender that securitized
without recourse the loan receivables generated through a rent-a-bank
operation.346 Clearly the bank that formally makes the loans is not the
true lender in Avant’s transactions. But is the true lender Avant or the
securitization vehicle (or the securitization investors)?
The securitization vehicle (and indirectly the securitization
investors) holds the predominant economic interest in the loans, but it
does not exercise control over the lending. In that circumstance, does
it make sense to tag it as the true lender?
In contrast, Avant exercises control over the lending process and
holds the predominant economic interest in the loans until they are
securitized in a transaction it sponsors, but does not hold a direct
economic interest thereafter, although it retains the residual interest in
the securitization. Once Avant no longer holds the predominant
economic interest, it is unlikely to be tagged as the true lender.
In short, neither entity neatly fits the traditional bill of true lender:
the economic interest is with the securitization vehicle, but the nerve
center for the whole operation is with Avant, which has a substantial
economic interest in the transaction, just not in the performance of the
loans themselves after securitization.
In terms of effectuating the usury laws, it probably does not matter
which party is ultimately deemed the true lender, so long as one is
tagged with the liability. If the securitization vehicle or investors are
liable, funding will dry up, which will have a similar effect to holding
the nonbank liable as the true lender.
The danger, however, is that a court is unwilling to deem any party
individually the true lender because neither conforms precisely to the
older iterations of the doctrine. If the plaintiff sues Avant, Avant will
point to the securitization vehicle as the true lender, and vice versa,
with the possible result that neither is deemed the true lender. In other
words, there is a loan, but somehow no lender!

346.

See supra Part IV.C.2.
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True lender doctrine should move past older articulations of the
doctrine that were limited by the nature of the transactions before the
courts and look to the party that is the lynchpin and nerve center of the
lending transaction, namely the nonbank mastermind of the deal—
here, Avant.
2. Process as Evasion. True lender doctrine also faces a second
difficulty, however: transactions planned with evasion of true lender
doctrine in mind. This is exactly what good legal counsel will advise in
light of the current state of the law. For example, it is easy to muddy
the waters by taking steps that make it look as if the bank exercises
more control over the lending than it really does. This can be
accomplished by having the bank undertake processes with
predetermined conclusions where the predetermination cannot be
readily proven. Thus, a bank might have a committee meet to evaluate
the nonbank’s proposed underwriting standards for the loans.
Everyone involved understands that the committee will approve the
underwriting standards without any material changes, but unless
someone blunders by putting this in writing, it is difficult for a court to
second guess. With good legal advice in transaction planning, the
theater of process becomes part of evasion.
In the absence of conflicts of interest, courts are generally
reluctant to second guess substantive decisions so long as there is
adequate process—this is the essence of corporate law’s famed
business judgment rule. Yet when process itself becomes part of the
evasion, courts must push further. The convening of a committee
meeting should not alone suffice. Instead, courts should demand
evidence about the nature of the committee’s inquiries and
deliberations and how the process compares to the process used for
loan products where a nonbank partner is not involved or that have
lower interest rates.
Put another way, when process becomes a tool of evasion, stricter
scrutiny is necessary. That scrutiny should look at the bank’s
motivations for the transaction: Is the bank able to articulate a credible
reason for why it is engaged in the transaction in partnership with the
nonbank? If the product idea emerged from the bank, and the bank
sought out a nonbank partner with operational capabilities it lacked,
then the bank’s engagement in the product should be taken seriously
in the true lender evaluation. But if the nonbank approached the bank
with the product idea, and the product is not one that the bank would
offer on its own, then the court should be skeptical of the substance of
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the bank’s involvement and the nonbank should be presumptively
treated as the true lender. The Madden rule creates such a presumption
when the nonbank is the actual assignee of the loan, but the Madden
presumption should be broadened to situations in which the idea for
the loan product emerged from the nonbank rather than the bank.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown how over the last few decades the market
structure of consumer lending has frequently shifted. Traditionally,
one financial institution would design, market, underwrite, service, and
hold the risk on a loan. Today, lending is frequently institutionally
disaggregated with those components divided among multiple
institutions, including both banks and nonbanks.
The shift from unified to disaggregated lending has resulted in a
mismatch with financial regulatory regimes that are keyed to
institutional type, treat banks differently from nonbanks, and assume
that there is only a single institution involved in making a loan. This
mismatch has created fertile ground for regulatory arbitrage that is the
hallmark of shadow banking—the provision of banking-type services
by nonbanks without bank regulation.347 While shadow banking is
mainly seen as a systemic risk concern, its regulatory arbitrage also
threatens to undermine a long-standing set of state-law consumer
protections.
Because banks are generally exempt from state usury laws,
nonbanks have taken to partnering with banks in rent-a-bank
arrangements that involve the banks making loans on spec for
nonbanks to purchase. The nonbanks then claim to shelter in the
banks’ exemption from state usury laws.
Courts have taken inconsistent approaches when considering such
arrangements. This Article argues that consumer protections are best
served by limiting the privileges of banks to the ambit of bank
regulation, and not allowing them to be rented out by nonbanks that
seek to operate in a regulatory vacuum. In particular, this Article
argues that courts should adopt the Second Circuit’s entity-based
Madden rule when evaluating the application of usury laws to
nonbanks, but should couple it with usury law’s long-standing anti347. Normally the regulatory arbitrage of shadow banking has been to offer bank-type
services without bank-type regulation. Here the arbitrage has been to offer bank-type lending
services by nonbanks without compliance with the regulatory regime that applies to nonbanks
themselves.
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evasion principle that is capable of catching state-of-the-art derivativebased rent-a-bank transactions.
For such an approach to succeed, however, it must be coupled with
disclosure requirements that mandate that lenders disclose the transfer
of any economic interest in a loan they seek to enforce. The
combination of the Madden rule and an anti-evasion principle
buttressed by disclosure would ensure that the usury laws are enforced
predictably and consistently, thereby preventing nonbanks from
usurping the privileges of banking charters without also complying with
the concomitant regulatory obligations.

